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SERVICE OF JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

By

BEVERLY MAY CARL *

Through application of our longarm statutes, it is often
possible for an American court to take jurisdiction over a defendant domiciled abroad, if he has done business, entered a contract, or committed a tort here, and if the due process requirements of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,' as well as its
offspring,2 have been satisfied. However, even where a jurisdictional basis acceptable to both the U.S. court and the foreign
nation concerned exists, legal difficulties can arise concerning the
method used to notify the defendant of the pending trial.
For instance, suppose one wishes to bring suit in Colorado
against an American defendant domiciled in Mexico. Assume
further that the defendant entered contracts and engaged in business in Colorado to the extent that both Mexican and U.S. laws
would concede that a sufficient jurisdictional basis exists for the
court in Colorado to hear the case. How does one legally serve
(i.e., give notice to) the defendant in Mexico?
Latin American legal systems traditionally require that legal
documents be served by a government official or through some
other official channel. Under a civil law system, the power of the
sovereign is deemed to be exercised even at this early stage of
litigation. Hence private parties, without the intervention of the
state, are unable to perform such acts. Within the Latin Ameri* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. Ms. Carl, who is Chairman of
the Committee on Private International Law of the American Bar Association, served as
a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Specialized Conference on Private International
Law of the Organization of American States, where the Letters Rogatory Convention was
drafted.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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can nations, the normal mode of serving documents in other nations has been through diplomatic channels.'
In contrast, U.S. laws usually do not require intervention by
the state (or court) to perform such acts. Often parties or their
lawyers can serve the documents. As a result American law tends
to be liberal in recognizing a broad variety of means of making
service abroad, such as by mail, by personal delivery by anyone
over 18 years of age who is not a party to the acton, and by a
qualified attorney.' However, such acts, when carried out inside
the territory of a civil law country, without the intervention of its
government, may be viewed by it as an illegal infringement upon
its sovereignty. Thus, a Colorado lawyer using one of the methods
set forth in our Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to serve a defendant in Mexico may be performing an act on Mexican territory
which the Mexican authorities would consider illegal.
But assume the opposite situation, where a Venezuelan lawyer needs to serve a defendant domiciled in Texas. His courts will
recognize the service as legally effective only if made through the
appropriate official of the foreign government. Thus, the very
liberality of our laws in permitting more informal means of service has, in the past, resulted in a lack of understanding by our
governmental institutions of foreign courts' need for service
through official channels. For many years, the U.S. Department
of State refused to forward foreign requests for service, received
through diplomatic channels, to the appropriate parties or their
representatives. Although this situation has now been remedied,"
foreigners wishing to serve persons within the United States may
still be confused, as the result of our complex federal-state system, about the identity of the proper local authority to perform
the actions sought. Moreover, the local American officials seldom
perform these activities and frequently do not understand the
formal needs of the foreign court.
A major step toward solution of these problems was taken by
the ratification of the Hague Convention on Service Abroad'
' M. OWEN, STUDY ON INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURAL LAW, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.
K/XXI.1, CIDIP/5 (1974) 41.
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), (i).
28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1970).
Done, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163; reprinted
in FED. R. Civ. P. 4, Notes [hereinafter HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION].
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(hereinafter referred to as the Hague Service Convention). This
Convention, which has now been adopted by nineteen countries,7
requires that each nation establish a "Central Authority" to
whom requests from foreign nations for service may be sent. In
the United States, the federal Department of Justice has been
designated as the Central Authority. Hence an attorney from
Denmark who wishes to serve an individual domiciled in Denver
does not have to ascertain whether the documents should be sent
to some state court, to a particular federal district court, or to a
certain officer thereof. Rather, the foreign attorney may simply
forward the documents, together with the appropriate forms, to
the U.S. Department of Justice, which in turn transmits them to
the appropriate local official and eventually returns the executed
documents to Denmark. Conversely, a U.S. lawyer wishing to
serve a person in Denmark may simply forward the requisite documents to the Central Authority designated by the Danish Government.' Alternative modes of service are still valid under the
Hague Service Convention, if the state of destination does not
object.'
I. THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE APPROACH
In January 1975 the Organization of American States
(O.A.S.) convoked the Specialized Conference on Private International Law for the purpose of negotiating treaties in the area
of transnational judicial assistance and conflicts of laws. Twenty
nations of the Western Hemisphere participated in that Conference. One of the products of the Conference was the InterAmerican Convention on Letters Rogatory (the Letters Rogatory
Convention or Convention), 0 designed to establish an orderly
method of serving judicial and extrajudicial documents in the
Western Hemisphere nations. The Convention is open to adherence, not only by the participating states, but also by other
nations, including those which are not members of the O.A.S.
Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland,
France, Israel, Luxembourg, Malawi, Norway, Japan, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, and United States. TREATIES IN FORCE, Jan. 1, 1974, at 347; interview with
Robert Dalton, Legal Adviser's Office, U.S. Dept. of State, Aug. 18, 1975.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 Notes, for a list of the Central Authorities for each nation.
HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION art. 10.
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. A/21 (SEPF) [hereinafter LETTERs ROGATORY CONVENTION].
The Convention is printed as an appendix to this paper.
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The U.S. delegation to the O.A.S. Conference would have
preferred that the Latin American states simply ratify the Hague
Service Convention. To the Americans it seemed desirable to
have the Latin American nations added to that widely spread
group of countries which have already ratified this multilateral
convention. Moreover, this convention has proved itself workable
in practice. Nevertheless, it became crucial to take into account
the fact that most of the Latin American nations probably did not
intend to ratify the Hague Convention, for diverse reasons. Brazil
and Argentina are the only Latin American countries which are
members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
and they did not participate in the drafting of this convention.
The official languages of the Hague Convention are French and
English. Spanish and Portuguese, spoken by most people in Latin
America, are not even mentioned.
In addition, Latin American nations have long held the view
that there exists a system of Inter-American regional international law, distinct from the so-called universal or generalized
international law. In keeping with that philosophy, many of these
countries wanted to form a separate Inter-American convention
on this subject. Similarly, a number of the Latin American delegates at the negotiating Conference felt that the Hague Service
Convention was unduly complex for the nations of this hemisphere. Since there did not appear to be any significant reason
why the United States could not be a member of both the Hague
Service Convention and an Inter-American convention on the
same topic, the U.S. delegation did not object to this approach.
II.

SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION

The Convention, because it was the first to be negotiated at
the Conference, is cast in terms of letters rogatory and may be
applied both to serving documents and to taking evidence
abroad. The U.S. delegation wished to defer the subject of evidence to a subsequent convention because it was felt that obtaining evidence involved complex issues" which should be handled
" As the Americans saw it, some of the special problems involved in an evidence
convention included: The right of a witness to invoke privileges under U.S. law and under
foreign law; the right of commissioners and/or consuls to obtain evidence; and the right
to insist that a foreign judge permit the use of cross-examination.
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in a separate convention. However, many Latin American delegates feared there might not be time to do a separate evidence
convention. Thinking in terms of their own concepts of civil law,
they saw no reason why the two subjects could not be included
in the Letters Rogatory Convention. As a compromise, it was
agreed that both subjects could be included in the Letters Rogatory Convention, with a right to make a reservation against the
Convention covering evidence. Article 2(b) authorizes such a reservation." Subsequently, the Conference did produce a separate
convention on taking evidence abroad."t If the United States ratifies the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, it
should unquestionably make an article 2(b) reservation. Thus, for
the purposes of this discussion, this Convention should be viewed
as encompassing service only. Its scope will then parallel that of
the Hague Service Convention.
III.

COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC SECTIONS

Article 1. This provision states that the Convention shall
apply to "letters rogatory" in English and to both "exhortos" and
"cartas rogatorias" in Spanish. The two Spanish terms were included because in some Spanish-speaking nations, the label
"exhortos" is used for "letters rogatory," while in others the
phrase employed is "cartas rogatorias." No such problem existed
for the French or Portuguese language.
Articles 2 and 3. These articles limit the scope of the Convention to formal procedural acts only, such as the service of a
summons or other judicial documents. Under article 3, acts of a
compulsory nature are specifically excluded. Hence, attachments, garnishments, and restraining orders would not fall within
the purview of the Convention. It was deemed advisable to defer
dealing with these kinds of judicial action, which raise more complex questions, for a later convention. Article 2(b) permits application of this Convention to obtaining evidence from abroad unless a reservation is made.
Article 4. The state of destination will be required to execute a letter rogatory from a member nation if it has been transmitted through one of the channels stipulated in this article: To
2
'

MAT.

See text of Convention, appendix.
The Inter-American Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad (1975), 14
328 (1976).

INT'L LEGAL
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wit, diplomatic or consular agents, judicial channels, the Central
Authority of the state of origin, or the Central Authority of the
state of destination. Unlike the Hague Service Convention, the
Letters Rogatory Convention does not expressly mandate that
each member designate a Central Authority." Nevertheless, the
establishment of a Central Authority might be considered compulsory by implication since paragraph 2 of this article requires
each member to advise the General Secretariat of the O.A.S. of
the identity of its Central Authority.
Under the Hague Service Convention, the Central Authority
comes into play only for the state of destination. The InterAmerican Convention would make the Central Authority in the
state of origin another proper channel for transmission of letters
rogatory.
Articles 5, 6, and 7. Member states are obligated under
article 5 to execute letters rogatory sent through the designated
channels from other member nations, if the proper formalities
have been observed. The first formality mentioned is "legalization," which refers to a series of official authentications required
for legal documents in international transactions."' Member
states are not required to execute the letters rogatory unless they
have been legalized. However, when they are transmitted through
consular or diplomatic channels or through the Central Authority, no legalization is necessary. " Similarly, legalization is not
required for letters rogatory issued by courts in "border areas" of
the contracting states. 7
In addition, the state of destination is obligated to execute a
letter rogatory only if the letter rogatory and its appended documentation have been translated into the language of the state of
destination." It was agreed during the negotiations on this Convention to waive the requirement of an "official" translation,
since some nations, such as the United States, do not have "official" translators.
HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION art. 2.

See Amram, Toward Easier Legalization of Foreign Public Documents, 60 A.B.A.J.
310 (1974); The Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalizationfor Foreign
Public Documents, 9 INT'L LAW. 755 (1975).
" LETTERS ROGATORY CONVENTION art.

" Id. art. 7.
I1 art. 5(b).
Id.

6.
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Article 8. This provision deals with the documentation that
must accompany the letter rogatory if the state of destination is
to be required to execute it. The provisions of this article were
included in order to help satisfy procedural due process requirements.
Article 9. This provision is designed to separate the issue of
notice or service from that of jurisdiction. Such division is the
usual practice under civil law. In contrast, Anglo-American law
frequently tends to intertwine these two issues, as, for example,
where personal service on a defendant is considered sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon a court. As a result of the intermingling
of these two ideas, one U.S. judge, early in this century, refused
to execute a Mexican letter rogatory because, he pointed out,
under Mexican law the Mexican court could exercise jurisdiction
merely on the ground that Mexico was the place of the contract. "
The U.S. judge was concerned that a court in the United States
might subsequently be expected to recognize and enforce a judgment resulting from the Mexican proceeding. Because he feared
that issuing the letter rogatory would be tantamount to conferring
jurisdiction on the Mexican court, he refused to grant the Mexican request.20
This situation has now been remedied, for federal courts at
least, by a statute" authorizing such courts to honor a request
from a foreign tribunal to aid in serving a judicial document and
stipulating that such help does not require recognition or enforcement in the United States of any judgment resulting therefrom.
Article 9 of this Convention reaches the same result as the
American statute by stating that the execution of a letter rogatory
does not imply ultimate recognition of the jurisdiction of the state
of origin. Accordingly, there is no obligation, either as a matter
of law or of comity, for the state of destination to enforce any
judgment resulting from the foreign proceedings.
Article 10. This article states that the procedural laws and
standards of the state of destination govern the execution of the
letters rogatory. Although the Convention does not clearly indi"1 In re Letters Rogatory out of First Civil Court of City of Mexico, 261 F. 652
(S.D.N.Y. 1919).
- Id. at 653.
28 U.S.C. § 1696 (1970).
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cate, in the case of a federal system, when the word "state" refers
to a nation-state and when it refers to a constituent state thereof,
it appears that the language of article 10 is sufficiently broad to
encompass both, depending upon which court system is handling
a given case.2"
Article 11. The state of destination is given jurisdiction to
determine any issue arising out of the execution of the letters
rogatory. Again, the word "state" should be interpreted as described in the discussion of article 10.
If the court of destination concludes that it does not have
jurisdiction to execute the letter rogatory, it shall ex officio forward the documents and a summary of the procedural history
("antecedents") to the appropriate court or authority within the
state of destination. This rule prevents the documents from being
returned to the state of origin merely because they were initially
directed to the improper authority within the state of destination.
Article 13. Consular or diplomatic agents are also authorized under this provision to execute letters rogatory, if such action
is not contrary to the laws of the state of destination.
Article 14. This article is basically directed towards nations
which are involved in economic integration schemes, such as the
Latin American Free Trade Association or the Andean Common
Market. Such countries are permitted to conclude more liberal
arrangements among themselves concerning letters rogatory and
such liberalized arrangements do not have to be extended to other
member states of this Convention.
Article 15. This article authorizes member states to continue or to enter agreements with more liberal provisions on letters rogatory. It also authorizes the continuance of practices between states concerning letters rogatory which may be more liberal than those prescribed by the Convention. Hence service by
mail or by a private person would still be legal, if the state of
destination does not object.
-1 This article also permits the use of special procedures when so requested by the
state of origin, provided the use thereof is not contrary to the laws of the state of destination. This provision is not likely to be of much significance in the case of the service of
documents. It could be useful in the taking of evidence, such as cross-examination, from
abroad, but, as already indicated, it is recommended that the subject of evidence be
handled in another convention.
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Article 16. This article allows a member state to declare
that the Convention shall also apply in criminal, labor,
arbitration, and contentious-administrative cases, as well as
other matters.
Article 17. This provision states that the state of destination may refuse to execute a letter rogatory which is manifestly
contrary to its public policy ("ordre publique"). This public policy exception, usually undefined, is one that appears in many
international conventions. Because of the vagueness of its terms,
scholars have long objected to it as simply offering an escape
hatch to undermine a treaty obligation. The Hague Service Convention in article 13 did narrow the area within which- a state
could refuse to comply with a request for service to situations
where compliance would infringe upon the destination state's
"sovereignty or security." Unfortunately, since it did not prove
possible to insert this more restrictive language in the InterAmerican Convention, one can only hope that member states will
narrowly construe this public policy exception.
Articles 18 through 20, 22, and 23. These are standard provisions for O.A.S. conventions which relate to signing, ratification, accession, entry into force, denunciation, and deposit.
Article 21. This article allows member states, which have
two or more territorial units in which different systems of law
apply, to declare that the Convention applies to some, but not to
others, of its territorial units. This is a standard provision currently being inserted in all the Hague Conference private international law conventions at the request of Canada. Such clause will
allow Canada to accede to these conventions, but to exclude, for
example, Quebec from coverage if that province so desires.
IV.
A.

POSSIBLE PROBLEMS

Administrative Machinery

The basic administrative structure needed to implement an
international convention on service has already been established
in the United States under the Hague Service Convention, and
it appears that this structure could be extended to accommodate
the Letters Rogatory Convention without too much difficulty.
There is, however, one potential difference in the operation of
these two conventions. Under the Hague Service Convention, our
Central Authority, the U.S. Department of Justice, is used only
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when the United States is the state of destination. When the
documents originate within the United States, they are sent directly to the Central Authority of the foreign nation of destination. Under article 4 of the Inter-American Convention, it appears
that the U.S. Department of Justice might also be designated as
the Central Authority for documents originating in the United
States. This would mean a lawyer in Chicago could send his
request for service on a Mexican resident to the U.S. Department
of Justice and let that Department forward the documents to the
appropriate Mexican authorities. Would this be imposing an unreasonable burden on the U.S. Department of Justice? Since the
Justice Department's main task would be simply to forward the
document to the proper Mexican body, such as Mexico's Central
Authority, it is suggested that the answer is "no."
B.

Definition of Term "Letters Rogatory"

Under applicable U.S. regulations," a "letter rogatory" is a
"formal request from a court" of one country to "a foreign court
to perform some judicial act," such as to serve a summons or take
evidence. Under the mechanisms established by this Convention,
the request might come not only from a court, but also from
diplomatic or consular agents or from a Central Authority. Likewise, under article 13, a letter rogatory, under certain conditions,
may be directed to and executed by diplomatic or consular
agents. Fortunately, this definition can be easily revised through
action by the executive branch to reflect these alternative routes.
The regulations further state: "In United States usage, letters rogatory have been commonly utilized only for the purpose
of taking evidence." 24 This statement will need revision to encompass service of documents."'
22 C.F.R. § 92.54 (1975).

"' Id.
-'The consequences of a failure to amend the definition become apparent when it is
noted that at least one court has narrowly construed the term to deny the execution of a
letter rogatory for the purpose of service:
Letters rogatory have been . . .long familiar to our courts, and . . . exclusively limited by understanding and in practice to proceedings in the nature
of commissions to take depositions of witnesses . . ..
Inre Letters Rogatory Out of First Civil Court of City of Mexico, 261 F. 652, 653 (S.D.N.Y.
1919).
However, as discussed at text accompanying note 20 supra, the basis of that court's
objection went to the fear that execution of the letters rogatory would confer jurisdiction
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Language Requirements

Unlike the Hague Service Convention, the Letters Rogatory
Convention does not contain an appendix of stipulated forms
which must be used; to wit, the "Request," "Certificate," and
"Summary."" Moreover, the Inter-American Convention requires that the letters rogatory and the appended documentation
7
be translated into the language of the state of destination ,
whereas the Hague Service Convention requires only that the
blanks in the stipulated forms be completed in English, French,
or the language of the destination state."z
However, the Hague Service Convention was intended as a
world-wide mechanism to which nations with a variety of different languages might adhere. Hence, it was mandatory to include
some provisions restricting the number of languages and the
quantity of translations the member state might demand. In contrast, the nations within the Inter-American system all use one
of the major western tongues (English, Spanish, French, or Portuguese) as their official languages. Thus, the need to translate the
"appended documentation" should not constitute an insurmountable burden.
D.

Excessive Formalities

Several commentators have objected that the Convention
requires unnecessary fomalities. For example, under articles 5
and 8, the complaint, as well as any supporting exhibits, must be
on the Mexican court. This danger has been expressly eliminated by article 9 of the
Convention.
Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1696 (1970) specifically authorizes the use of letters rogatory
for the purpose of service. It is true that this section describes a "letter rogatory" as coming
from a "tribunal." However, that section also permits such service on behalf of foreign
proceedings "upon application of any interested person." This language would seem sufficiently broad to include requests originating with diplomatic or consular agents or the
Central Authority. Surely, if our law is liberal enough to allow private individuals to
request such judicial assistance, no violence would be done to the statute by granting the
same capacity to these official bodies.
For samples of these forms, see FED. R. Civ. P., 4, Notes.
2 LETTERs ROGATORY COVENTION art. 5.
2a HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION art. 7. The Hague Convention also contains requirements as to the language which must be used for the forms themselves. Id. art. 6. As to
language requirements in service cases, see, e.g., Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33
Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973); Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101
Cal. Rptr. 796 (1972).
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translated and attached. Americans tend to think that a short
summary of the complaint should suffice when the foreign official
is merely being asked to serve a document. However, Latin American attorneys negotiating the Convention, who tend to be more
attached to formalities than U.S. attorneys are, considered such
complete documentation in their own language an absolute essential.
Another objection is to article 5's requirement of legalization
in most cases. This series of chain authentications strikes Americans as a long, complicated, and superfluous process. It would
seem preferable to treat the signature of a public official as authentic, unless some reason arises to question its authenticity.
This is the modern approach taken in many nations, especially
in Europe. Recently, the American Bar Association recommended that the United States adhere to the Hague Convention
Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization of Foreign Public
Documents.".
Nevertheless, in Latin America the passion for formalities in
regard to legalizations still prevails. Delegates from the Latin
American nations did concede to the views of the United States
in the case of legalizations for letters rogatory from courts in
border regions,"' and for letters rogatory transmitted through diplomatic or consular channels or through the Central Authority. :"
They also agreed in article 5(b) that the translators did not have
to be "official" translators. Having made those concessions, they
were unwilling to permit further inroads on their ideas of requisite
formalities.
It has been suggested that, because of the excessive formalities required, the United States should refuse to ratify this Convention. This position, however, fails to take into account that
Latin American officials and courts presently require translated
documents and legalizations. Moreover, under the present chaotic system, a U.S. attorney or judge cannot be certain to whom
such materials should be sent. Finally, even after the proper papers are placed in the hands of the appropriate foreign authority,
Done. Oct. 5, 1961, 527 U.N.T.S. 189.

2-1
31

LETTERS ROGATORY CONVENTION

:1 Id. art. 6.

art. 7.
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there is no international legal requirement that he execute the
request.
E.

Default Judgments

The Hague Service Convention contains special provisions
concerning default judgments, which can help satisfy American
due process requirements. 2 No such provisions are contained in
the Letters Rogatory Convention. However, since article 9 of the
Convention relieves courts from the necessity of recognizing the
jurisdiction of the state orginating the letter rogatory, U.S. courts
would not be obligated to enforce any objectionable judgment
which might result therefrom.
In any event, no U.S. court has the power to prevent the
court of another nation from handling a case in a situation where
our due process requirements may be considered lacking. The
capacity of U.S. judicial bodies to object effectively to such proceedings comes into play only when they are subsequently asked
to recognize and enforce a judgment from a foreign nation. Since
the "full faith and credit" clause 3 of the United States Constitution does not apply to foreign-nation judgments, 4 a U.S. court
can and should refuse to enforce a judgment from another country
where basic due process requirements have not been satisfied.1 5
The Letters Rogatory Convention would not change this result.
Thus, the absence of special provisions on default judgments in
this Convention does not appear to offer any threat of infringement on our constitutional protections.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Ratification of this Convention by the United States should
be subject to the following understandings.
HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION

arts. 14, 15.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
' Most American courts, it should be noted, will enforce a judgment from a foreign
nation, if the other country had adjudicatory jurisdiction in the international sense, and
if fair procedures were utilized. Ginsburg, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil
Judgments: A Summar, View of the Situation in the United States, 4 INT'L LAW. 720
(1970); Von Mehren and Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and
a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601 (1968). See also, Uniform Foreign Money,Judgments Recognition Act, 13 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 271, enacted in Alaska, California,
Illinois. Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Oklahoma.
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Limitation of Scope to Service of Process

For reasons already discussed, '" the United States should
make a reservation under article 2(b) that the Convention shall
not apply to taking evidence or obtaining information in other
nations.
B.

Restriction of Coverage to Civil Matters and Arbitration

As permitted under article 15 of the Convention, our accession should include a declaration that the Convention shall apply
to arbitration cases, but not to criminal, labor, or administrative
cases. Application to arbitration cases would be consistent with
the liberal attitude our law has shown toward recognition of foreign arbitration awards and with our ratification of the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.37 It might be noted that Mexico has also
recently ratified that Convention, and that the O.A.S. Conference produced an Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration. 3 Because of the unique nature of our
criminal and labor law systems, it is suggested that those cases
should not be included within the purview of the Convention.
Obviously, the term "contentious -administrative" is one
which gives lawyers difficulties. Consultations with administrative law experts have convinced this writer that the Convention
should not encompass such cases where the United States is concerned. First, it is not clear at what stage of an administrative
proceeding the Convention would come into play. For example,
would it apply to ex parte proceedings? Next, it is possible that
some foreign governments might undertake certain types of administrative investigations to which we would deem it inadvisable to render any governmental assistance. Finally, it is claimed
that U.S. administrative agencies usually have available to them
other means of notifying persons over whom they wish to exercise
jurisdiction, such as attachment of their assets in the United
States.
"' See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
Done, June 10, 1958, entered into force Dec. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No.
6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; reprinted in 9 U.S.C.A. § 201, Notes.
'
14 INT'l. LEGAL MAT. 336 (1976).
3'
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C.

Application to the Entire United States

There appears to be no valid reason for the United States to
invoke the authority contained in article 21, excluding certain
states or territories from coverage of the Convention. Rather, it
should be effective throughout the fifty states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone. This can be accomplished under the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution 3 and the doctrine enunciated in Missouri v. Holland.4"
D. Revision of the Code of Federal Regulations
Applicable federal regulations4' will need to be revised to
make it clear that the term "letters rogatory" includes the service
of documents and that such documents may originate, not only
with a foreign or international tribunal, but also with diplomatic
or consular agents, or the "Central Authority" of any nation.
Likewise, this provision should indicate that under certain conditions letters rogatory may be directed to and executed by diplomatic or consular agents.
CONCLUSION

The 19th Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association
in October 1975 passed a resolution recommending that its member associations and individual members urge their governments
to ratify this Convention. 2 Likewise, there are indications that
the Mexican Government is favorably inclined toward ratification.
The picture within the United States is less clear. The two
American Bar Association committees studying the Convention
are split. The Private International Law Committee voted overwhelmingly in favor of ratification, but several members of the
Committee on Transnational Judicial Assistance have expressed
strong objections. As of the time of writing this article, the U.S.
art. VI.
" 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In upholding a treaty which had been entered into for the
protection of migratory birds and a subsequently passed domestic statute to the same
effect, the Court noted that the treaty power may override the control which a state might
normally exercise over its inhabitants and become binding on the states. Id. at 434.
22 C.F.R. § 92.54 (1975).
£ Resolution No. 2.
"' U.S. CONST.
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Department of Justice has indicated it will recommend against
adoption of the Convention. Whether this position is unalterable
is not known.
The objections focus on several points: (1) The Latin American nations should adopt the Hague Service Convention, because
it is a better convention; (2) the English used in the Letters
Rogatory Convention is not the most felicitous; (3) the Convention does not absolutely mandate the establishment of a Central
Authority; (4) it requires too many formalities; and (5) it does not
contain the default provisions of the Hague Service Convention.
For reasons already given, these arguments seem accurate,
but irrelevant. The Hague Service Convention may be a better
convention, but it is unlikely that Latin American nations will
adopt it. The English translation of the Letters Rogatory Convention may be less than superb, but it is probably functional. U.S.
common law judges have long shown themselves capable of reasonable interpretations of less-than-artful phrases in contracts
and statutes, where the drafters' native language was English.
Surely they will not abandon this same common sense when faced
with a document that was negotiated in four languages, each
version of which had to be "equally authentic."
Naturally, the designation of a Central Authority is vital to
the proper operation of the Convention. As previously mentioned,"' one can argue such designation should be considered
compulsory by implication under article 4, paragraph 2. But legal
obligations aside, it is in the self interest of the member nations
to do so. Imagine the difficulties a Columbian judge must have
trying to figure out where to send papers which concern a defendant residing in Odessa, Texas. Columbia needs the United
States to designate one Central Authority even more than we
need Columbia to do so.
In regard to criticism of the many formalities required under
the Letters Rogatory Convention, the Convention does nothing to
make matters worse; and it offers at least some improvement by
eliminating the requirement for legalizations in certain cases and
for "official" translations. Finally, although it might have been
better to include the default provisions of the Hague Service Con" See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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vention, it was not possible to convince the Latin Americans of
their importance. Because article 9 at least maintains the existing
amount of protection, the lack of default provisions should not be
a bar to ratification.
The Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory is far
from perfect. Nevertheless, it appears that we can live with it and
that it is better than the status quo. Currently, there is no orderly
way to serve documents in Latin America. This Convention will,
at least, require the member nations to execute our requests for
service and will advise our lawyers what they must provide in the
way of documents, translations, and legalizations to ensure execution. The Convention is a sufficient improvement over the present situation to warrant ratification by the United States.
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APPENDIX

INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON
LETTERS ROGATORY
OAS Official Documents OEA/Ser. A/21 (SEPF);
Treaty No. 43 (1975)
The Governments of the Member States of the Organization of American
States, desirous of concluding a convention on letters rogatory, have agreed as
follows:

I.

USE OF TERMS

Article I
For the purposes of this Convention the terms "exhortos" and "cartas rogatorias" are synonymous in the Spanish text. The terms "letters rogatory", "commissions rogatoires", and "cartas rogatorias" used in the English, French and
Portuguese texts, respectively, cover both "exhortos" and "cartas rogatorias".
II. SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
Article 2
This Convention shall apply to letters rogatory, issued in conjunction with
proceedings in civil and commercial matters held before the appropriate authority of one of the States Parties to this Convention, that have as their purpose:
a. The performance of procedural acts of a merely formal nature,
such as service of process, summonses or subpoenas abroad;
b. The taking of evidence and the obtaining of information abroad,
unless a reservation is made in this respect.
Article 3
This Convention shall not apply to letters rogatory relating to procedural
acts other than those specified in the preceding article; and in particular it shall
not apply to acts involving measures of compulsion.

III.

TRANSMISSION OF LETTERS ROGATORY

Article 4
Letters rogatory may be transmitted to the authority to which they are
addressed by the interested parties, through judicial channels, diplomatic or
consular agents, or the Central Authority of the State of origin or of the State
of destination, as the case may be.
Each State Party shall inform the General Secretariat of the Organization
of American States of the Central Authority competent to receive and distribute
letters rogatory.
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR EXECUTION
Article 5
Letters rogatory shall be executed in the States Parties provided they meet
the following requirements:
a. The letter rogatory is legalized, except as provided for in Articles
6 and 7 of this Convention. The letter rogatory shall be presumed
to be duly legalized in the State of origin when legalized by the
competent consular or diplomatic agent;
b. The letter rogatory and the appended documentation are duly
translated into the official language of the State of destination.
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Article 6
Whenever letters rogatory are transmitted through consular or diplomatic
channels or through the Central Authority, legalization shall not be required.
Article 7
Courts in border areas of the States Parties may directly execute the letters
rogatory contemplated in this Convention and such letters shall not require
legalization.
Article 8
Letters rogatory shall be accompanied by the following documents to be
delivered to the person on whom process, summons or subpoena is being served:
a. An authenticated copy of the complaint with its supporting documents, and of other exhibits or rulings that serve as the basis for
the measure requested;
b. Written information identifying the authority issuing the letter,
indicating the time-limits allowed the person affected to act upon
the request, and warning of the consequences of failure to do so;
c. Where appropriate, information on the existence and address of
the court-appointed defense counsel or of competent legal-aid societies in the State of origin.
Article 9
Execution of letters rogatory shall not imply ultimate recognition of the
jurisdiction of the authority issuing the letter rogatory or a commitment to
recognize the validity of the judgment it may render or to execute it.
V.

EXECUTION

Article 10
Letters rogatory shall be executed in accordance with the laws and procedural rules of the State of destination.
At the request of the authority issuing the letter rogatory, the authority of
the State of destination may execute the letter through a special procedure, or
accept the observance of additional formalities in performing the act requested,
provided this procedure or the observance of those formalities is not contrary to
the law of the State of destination.
Article 11
The authority of the State of destination shall have jurisdiction to
determine any issue arising as a result of the execution of the measure requested
in the letter rogatory.
Should such authority find that it lacks jurisdiction to execute the letter
rogatory, it shall ex officio forward the documents and antecedents of the case
to the authority of the State which has jurisdiction.
Article 12
The costs and other expenses involved in the processing and execution of
letters rogatory shall be borne by the interested parties.
The State of destination may, in its discretion, execute a letter rogatory
that does not indicate the person to be held responsible for costs and other
expenses when incurred. The identity of the person empowered to represent the
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applicant for legal purposes may be indicated in the letter rogatory or in the
documents relating to its execution.
The effects of a declaration in forma pauperis shall be regulated by the law
of the State of destination.
Article 13
Consular or diplomatic agents of the States Parties to this Convention may
perform the acts referred to in Article 2 in the State in which they are accredited,
provided the performance of such acts is not contrary to the laws of that State.
In so doing, they shall not perform any acts involving measures of compulsion.
VI. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 14
States Parties belonging to economic integration systems may agree directly between themselves upon special methods and procedures more expeditious than those provided for in this Convention. These agreements may be
extended to include other States in the manner in which the parties may agree.
Article 15
This Convention shall not limit any provisions regarding letters rogatory in
bilateral or multilateral agreements that may have been signed or may be signed
in the future by the States Parties or preclude the continuation of more favorable practices in this regard that may be followed by these States.
Article 16
The States Parties to this Convention may declare that its provisions cover
the execution of letters rogatory in criminal, labor, and "contentiousadministrative" cases, as well as in arbitrations and other matters within the
jurisdiction of special courts. Such declarations shall be transmitted to the
General Secretariat of the Organization of American States.
Article 17
The State of destination may refuse to execute a letter rogatory that is
manifestly contrary to its public policy ("ordre public").
Article 18
The States Parties shall inform the General Secretariat of the Organization
of American States of the requirements stipulated in their laws for the legalization and the translation of letters rogatory.
VII.

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 19
This Convention shall be open for signature by the Member States of the
Organization of American States.
Article 20
This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification
shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American
States.
Article 21
This Convention shall remain open for accession by any other State. The
instrument of accession shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the
Organization of American States.

1976

SERVICE OF JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS

Article 22
This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the
date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification.
For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of
the second instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on
the thirtieth day after desposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or
accession.
Article 23
If a State Party has two or more territorial units in which different systems
of law apply in relation to the matters dealt with in this Convention, it may, at
the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that this Convention
shall extend to all its territorial units or only to one or more of them.
Such declaration may be modified by subsequent declarations, which shall
expressly indicate the territorial unit or units to which the Convention applies.
Such subsequent declarations shall be transmitted to the General Secretariat
of the Organization of American States, and shall become effective thirty days
after the date of their receipt.
Article 24
This Convention shall remain in force indefinitely, but any of the States
Parties may denounce it. The instrument of denunciation shall be deposited
with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. After one
year from the date of deposit of the instrument of denunciation, the Convention
shall no longer be in effect for the denouncing State, but shall remain in effect
for the other States Parties.
Article 25
The original instrument of this Convention, the English, French, Portuguese and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with
the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. The Secretariat
shall notify the Member States of the Organization of American States and the
States that have acceded to the Convention of the signatures, deposits of instruments of ratification, accession, and denunciation as well as of reservations, if
any. It shall also transmit the information mentioned in the second paragraph
of Article 4 and in Article 18, and the declarations referred to in Articles 16 and
23 of this Convention.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly
authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention.
DONE AT PANAMA CITY, Republic of Panama, this thirtieth day of
January one thousand nine hundred and seventy-five.

THE POWER OF THE

PAY-TV:

FCC

TO REGULATE CABLE

JURISDICTIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS
By MARK D. HOFFER*

I.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was created by the Communications Act of 1934,' a broadly based statute
superseding earlier, largely ineffective attempts to regulate
radio.' Under the terms of the Act, the FCC has the power to
regulate "broadcast services," 3 which in the 1930's principally
included radio. Broadcast television, when it arose in the 1940's,
was an obvious object of the Commission's power.' More recently,
* Law Clerk to the Hon. Harrison L. Winter, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit; B.A., Queens College of the City University of New York, 1973; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1976.
47 U.S.C. § 151-609 (1970).
The Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed by the Radio Act of 1927, ch.
169, § 39, 44 Stat. 1174), vested authority over broadcast frequencies in the hands of the
Secretary of Commerce. However, this authority was substantially weakened by subsequent judicial decisions. In Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923),
appeal dismissed per stipulation, 266 U.S. 636 (1924), the court held that the Secretary
lacked discretion to refuse to renew a broadcast license on the grounds of interference. In
United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Il. 1926), a district court held
that licencees were not bound by nonstatutory regulations and could operate on any
frequency despite the Secretary's order to the contrary. Following those decisions, the
Secretary abandoned all attempts to regulate, and the airspace became jammed with selfstyled radio operators who cared little about interference or national security needs. Justice Frankfurter summarized the chaotic situation when he remarked: "With everybody
on the air, nobody could be heard." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 212 (1943). Congress thereafter decided upon a permanent regulatory agency with the
power to set conditions precedent for broadcasting, and to license only those operators who
met the requirements and could be accomodated within reasonable limits of interference.
The first was the Federal Radio Commission, created by the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169,
44 Stat. 1162 (repealed by the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat.
1102). It was succeeded 7 years later by the present Federal Communications Commission. On the early history of broadcast regulation, see National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, supra at 210-13; W. EMERY, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT: RESPONSIBILuTIES AND REGULATIONS 10-25 (1961).
See subchapter IIlof the Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-31 (1970).
' Broadcasting is defined by the statute as: "the dissemination of radio communications intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay
stations." 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1970). By way of clarification, "radio communications" are
further defined as:
the transmission by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of
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the Commission has sought to exercise power over other new
forms of communication as they have become available.
The first of these was community antenna television, often
known as cable TV (CATV). Starting in the early 1950's, CATV
provided, for a fee, better reception of radio and television in
areas where the broadcast signal was weak.' The FCC began regulating cable TV in 1965,6 largely for fear that its amplification of
distant signals would undercut local broadcasters.7 In United
all kinds, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services
• . .incidental to such transmission.
Id. § 153(b). Television is clearly broadcasting because it relies on radio waves, specifically
the VHF portion of the electromagnetic wave spectrum-54-88 MHz and 174-220
MHz-which was allocated to broadcast television in 1951. Sixth Report and Order, 41
F.C.C. 148 (1951).
See S. REP. No. 923, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1959). Cable TV captures weak
broadcast signals through a master antenna, amplifies them, and distributes them to
individual homes over a network of coaxial wire. The technology of cable TV is more fully
defined in ON THE CABLE/THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE 11-23 (Sloan Comm'n 1971)
[hereinafter cited as SLOAN REPORT].
I Direct regulation of cable TV began with the First Report and Order on Microwave
Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, modified, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 F.C.C.2d 524
(1965), aff'd sub nom. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968),
approved, United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 659 n.17 (1972). A form
of indirect regulation had begun two years earlier, with the FCC controlling cable TV
through microwave carriers which served it. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32
F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd sub noma. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d
359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963) (denying the use of a microwave carrier
to a cable TV system which allegedly threatened local broadcasters). The nature and use
of microwave carriers is explained in note 7 infra.
I As an amplifying and distributing device, cable TV proved a boon to local broadcasters. It provided a means whereby their audiences could be extended and maximized
beyond the range of the local broadcaster's transmitter. See, e.g., VHF Booster and Community Antenna Legislation: Hearingsbefore the Senate Comm. on Interstateand Foreign
Commerce, Pts. I & II, 86 Cong., 1st Sess., at 503 (1959) (statement of Harold Fellows,
Pres., National Ass'n of Broadcasters) [hereinafter cited as 1959 CATV Hearings]. This
satisfaction, however, was to be short lived. Cable TV gradually expanded its function as
a "master antenna" for local stations to include importing more distant TV signals for
the added enjoyment of its subscribers. This was done through the use of microwave
relays, high frequency transmission facilities used to relay messages from point to point
via common carrier. Local broadcasters began to complain that CATV with unchecked
powers of importation would hamper their financial stability (by fractionalizing audiences
and revenues, and by program duplication). See, e.g., 1959 CATV Hearings, at 380-86
(statement of Frank Reardon, KGEZ-TV, Kalispell, Mont.), 501-18 (statement of Harold
Fellows, Pres., National Ass'n of Broadcasters); Regulationof CA TV: Hearings before the
Communications and Power Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H.R. 7715, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. at 317-53 (1965) (statement of Vincent T.
Wasilewski, Pres., National Ass'n of Broadcasters), 355-78 (statement of Lester W. Lindow, Executive Director, Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as 1965
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States v. Southwestern Cable Co.' and again in United States v.
Midwest Video Corp.,' the Supreme Court sustained the FCC's
exercise of jurisdiction over cable TV.
The next development in the 1950's was broadcast pay television, also known as subscription television."0 Subscription TV
used conventional broadcast signals to provide a wider range of
programs than network television." The FCC began regulating
CA TV HearingsI, Regulation of CA TV: Hearings before the Communications and Power
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce on H.R. 12914, H.R.
13286, and H.R. 14201, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 352-73 (1966) (statement of Vincent T.
Wasilewski, Pres., National Ass'n of Broadcasters), 373-425 (statement of Lester W. Lindow, Executive Director, Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.); Regulation of CATV:
Hearings before the Communications and Power Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 10268, H.R. 10510, H. Con. Res. 87, and H.
Con. Res. 2a5, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 287-313 (1969) (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
General Counsel, National Ass'n of Broadcasters) [hereinafter cited as 1969 CATV
Hearings]; First Report and Order on Microwave Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 688-91,
modified, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 1 F.C.C.2d 524 (1965), aff'd sub nom. Black
Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968), approved, United States v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 659 n.17; CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 41314 (1959).
- 392 U.S. 157 (1968), revg Southwestern Cable Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 118
(9th Cir. 1967).
, 406 U.S. 649 (1972), rev'g Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th
Cir. 1971).
10In 1955, two pay-TV proponents, Zenith Radio Corp. and Teco, Inc., convinced the
FCC to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 Fed. Reg. 988 (1955), inviting comments as to whether authorization of subscription television (STV) would be in the public
interest. Because of Congressional pressure, the first STV station was not authorized until
1961. Hartford Phonevision Co., 30 F.C.C. 301 (1961), aff'd sub nom. Connecticut Comm.
Against Pay TV v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 816 (1962). A
complete review of interim developments is provided in National Ass'n of Theatre Owners
v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 195-97 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
1 Contract rights to first run movies, athletic events, and cultural presentations are
purchased by the entrepreneur. These are broadcast on a conventional TV channel, using
conventional TV equipment, with the exception that the aural and visual signals are
purposely distorted. In order to rectify the image and receive these programs (which are
not available on network TV), subscribers lease special decoding devices at established
rates. See R. BLOCK, OVER THE AIR PAY-TV: FOR WHOM WILL IT PAY? 6-8 (1974); R. ADLER
& S. BAER, THE ELECTRONIC Box OFFICE: HUMANMES AND ARTS ON THE CABLE 42 (1974).
Following FCC authorization of STV in 1961, supra note 10, three systems became operational in Hartford, Toronto, and Los Angeles/San Francisco. All three failed due to lack
of viewer support. See Blank, The Quest for Quantity and Diversity in Television
Programming,56 AM. ECON. REV. 448, 451-54 (1966). General interest in STV has declined,
although additional authorizations have been sought and granted. Blonder-Tongue Broadcasting Corp., 25 P. & F. RADIO REG. 2d 104 (1972); B & F Broadcasting, Inc., 28 P. & F.
RADIO REG. 2d 414 (1973). See also Paul Kagan Pay-TV Newsletter, June 11, 1974 at 2
(describing plans for financing new STV systems).
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subscription TV in 1968, under pressure this time from theater
owners who feared loss of their audiences."2 This jurisdiction was
upheld in National Association of Theatre Owners v. FCC.'3
The most recent development is cablecast pay television, or
cable pay-TV. Introduced in 1972,'1 cable pay-TV provides the
same service as subscription TV-programs for a fee-but uses
cable rather than broadcast transmission.' The FCC had anticipated cable pay-TV by 1970, and has imposed regulation since
that time." Cable pay-TV is of special concern to the national
broadcast networks. Unlike cable television proper, it does far
more than merely amplify weak signals. Unlike subscription TV,
it does not rely on conventional broadcast TV equipment, and is
therefore not affected by the limited capacity of the air to carry
broadcasts without minimal interference. 7
2 Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968), aff'd sub nom. National Ass'n
of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
Literature on the regulation of subscription television includes: Brown, The Subscription
Television Controversy:A Continuing Symptom of Federal Communications Commission
Ills, 24 FED. COMM. B.J. 259 (1971); Comment, Subscription Television, the FCC, and the
Courts, 15 ST. Louis L.J. 283 (1970).
,3 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
' Cable pay-TV was first introduced at the 1972 National Cable Television Association Convention. Broadcasting, May 22, 1972, at 21-22. The first systems went into commercial operation in early 1973. Paul Kagan Pay-TV Newsletter, Feb. 8, 1973, at 1.
"s An agreement is reached between the pay-TV entrepreneur and a cable television
operator for the use of vacant channels on the latter's system. In exchange for a stated
percentage of future gross revenue, the entrepreneur is granted the right to transmit
material which he has personally selected, purchased, and edited. Subscribers to the cable
pay-TV are drawn from the pool of individuals already connected to the "parent" cable
television system. They pay fees on a per-program or per-channel basis and are also leased
special decoding devices to receive the transmission clearly. The technology of cable payTV is set out in detail in R. ADLER & S. BAER, supra note 11, at 30-46; Pay Cable: An
Industry Overview 2-10 (National Cable Television Ass'n 1974). A sample channel lease
agreement can be found in A.B.A./A.L.I., LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION AND OPERATION OF PAY TELEVISION SYSTEMS AND LEASED CABLE TELEVISION CHANNELS 369 (1974).
Cable pay-TV has grown into an industry which encompasses 43 cable television
systems, 60,000 households, and 11 states. NCTA, Subscription Cablecasting Fact Sheet
(Apr. 1974) at 1 [hereinafter cited as Fact Sheet].
11Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825 (1970). The literature on regulation of cable pay-TV includes Pearson, Cable: The Thread by Which Television Competition Hangs, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 800, 818-22 (1974); Comment, Regulation of Pay-Cable
and Closed Circuit Movies: No Room in the Wasteland, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 600 (1973).
11Television has been relegated to the VHF portion of the electromagnetic spectrum,
supra note 4, which allows for 12 clear channels, given a stipulated bandwidth of 6 MHz
each. No one locality has all 12 channels in use because of interference problems. New
York City and Los Angeles are the national leaders, each having 6 television channels by
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The greater flexibility of cable pay-TV (it can deliver almost
any program the public will pay to see and hear) virtually assures
its power to compete effectively with other forms of communication for audiences and profits. The networks have argued that
cable pay-TV will eventually divert not only their viewers and
advertising dollars, but their programming as well. They have
argued cable pay-TV will be able in the end to "siphon off" (i.e.,
bid away) the most popular shows currently shown on network
television. 8 The FCC responded to these complaints by promulgating a set of regulations-known as "anti-siphoning"
rules- restricting the program content of cable pay-TV. 9
This article argues first that under the Communications Act
of 1934 the FCC lacks power over cable pay-TV, and second that,
were such a power granted by Congress, the application of the
"anti-siphoning" rules to cable pay-TV violates the first amendment.
FCC allocation. 47 C.F.R. § 73.606 (1975). The FCC has attempted to alleviate the overcrowding of VHF by opening up the more numerous UHF frequencies for television use.
However, because of technical drawbacks, financial woes, and administrative bungling,
UHF television is still more myth than reality. See Webbink, The Impact of UHFPromotion: The All-Channel Television Receiver Law, 34 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 535 (1969).
1"Broadcasters estimate that cable pay-TV could, if left unchecked, derive sufficient
bargaining power to force exclusive rights to new motion pictures, merely by attracting 2
percent of the current TV households in the United States. N.A.B. Fact Sheet: Economic
Effects of Siphoning 6 (1974). But see R. NoLL, M. PECK, & J. McGowAN, ECONOMIC
ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 297 (1973). More detailed analysis on the ability of
cable pay-TV to outbid network TV is found in First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 910, reconsiderationdenied, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797 (1975).
Similar rhetoric was used by the television networks to oppose broadcast pay-TV when it
first emerged. See Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 500 (1968).
" The rules were adopted in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825
(1970), and codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1975). They were patterned after similar rules
which had been previously adopted for subscription television. Fourth Report and Order,
15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968), as codified in 47 C.F.R. § 73.643 (1975).
The FCC has recently reviewed the anti-siphoning rules for both broadcast and cable
pay-TV and found them basically satisfactory, subject to some changes in detail. See First
Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797 (1975) (rules on movies, sports, and series amended; jurisdiction
reaffirmed); Second Report and Order, 40 Fed. Reg. 52731 (1975) (series rule deleted). The
thrust of this article is limited, as the text indicates, to anti-siphoning rules as they relate
to cable pay-TV.
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The Text of the Act

In support of its rules governing cable pay-TV, the FCC has
claimed a general power over all broadcast and wire communications under the 1934 Act. The Supreme Court, in dictum, has
acquiesced in this view. But analysis of the Act itself reveals no
such power.
The provision on which the FCC relies for its assertion of
broad power is section 2(a) of the Act:
(a) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate
and foreign communication by wire or radio and all interstate and
foreign transmission of energy by radio, which originates and/or is
received within the United States, and to all persons engaged within
the United States in such communication or such transmission of
energy by radio, and to the licensing and regulating of all radio
stations as hereinafter provided; but it shall not apply to persons
engaged in wire or radio communication or transmission in the
Canal Zone, or to wire or radio communication or transmission
wholly within the Canal Zone."

But the words: "The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio," do not
constitute a grant of power. Congress could easily have written:
"The power of the Commission shall extend . .," but it did not.
Section 2(a) does not establish the extent of the FCC's power, but
describes an area within which that power shall operate; it does
nothing more than allude to other provisions in the Act, which are
themselves grants of power. 2'
If we read section 2(a) as a grant of power in itself, that power
must apply to all persons "engaged in such communication" as
well as to all communication. And if that power is held by the
FCC independently of other provisions of the Act, it is hard to see
where its boundaries are. Would it extend to the homes or families of the affected "persons"? The more difficult the answer to
0 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970).

" See First Report and Order on Microwave Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 753 (Loevinger, Comm'r, dissenting), modified, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 F.C.C.2d 524
(1965), aff'd sub nom. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968),
approved, United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 659 n.17 (1972).
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such questions, the more likely that section 2(a) describes persons
subject to specific powers granted elsewhere in the Act.
Other provisions of the 1934 Act, taken individually and together, confirm that section 2(a) is not a grant of full power to
the FCC. Section 4 contains an enumeration of the general powers
of the Commission; 22 subchapter II grants to the Commission specific powers over common carriers;23 subchapter III contains an
entire section enumerating the Commission's specific powers over
radio communications. 24 If section 2(a) were a grant of power over
all wire and broadcast communications, these enumerations of
specific (and more limited) powers would be surplusage. The purpose of section 2(a), placed near the beginning of the Act and
couched in general terms, is to establish a framework for the Act
and to ground it squarely within the power of Congress to regulate
commerce.25 To see in such broad language a specific grant of
power would be akin to deriving a "general welfare" power from
the preamble of the Constitution.
If section 2(a) is not a grant of power, the Commission's
claim of jurisdiction over cable pay-TV must rest on some other
provision of the Act, and no other provision supports such a
claim. The powers granted to the Commission are distributed
over two subchapters, one relating to "common carriers" and the
other to "broadcast communications." Cable pay-TV falls into
neither category.2 1 The specific powers in section 303 of the Act,
47 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).

23 Id. §§ 201-23.

Id. §§ 301-30.
Indeed, the Act states that
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission
jurisdiction with respect to . . . intrastate communication service by wire or
radio ....
Id. § 152(b). See also S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934) (stating that the
purpose of the section was, among others, to delineate federal and state jurisdiction over
communications).
" Broadcasting is defined in note 4 supra. Cable pay-TV is clearly not broadcasting
because it does not rely on transmission via radio waves. See note 15 supra.
Common carriers are defined as:
any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission
of energy . . . but a person engaged in broadcasting shall not, insofar as such
person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.
47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970). This section sheds little light on the nature of common carriers
and recourse must be had to additional FCC materials. These indicate that an archetypal
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governing broadcast communications, 7 while they might fairly be
construed to extend beyond the narrowest definition of "broadcast" communications to embrace various auxiliary services, do
not reach so far as to cover a mode of communication entirely
different in nature from broadcast television.
In Southwestern Cable," the Supreme Court rejected this
line of argument.
We cannot construe the Act so restrictively. Nothing in the
language of [section 2(a)], in the surrounding language, or in the
Act's history or purposes limits the Commission's authority to those
activities and forms of communication that are specifically described by the Act's other provisions.2

The Court relied for its position almost entirely on a few brief
excerpts, taken largely out of context, from the legislative history
of the 1934 Act. One particular excerpt was invoked by the Court
to establish that the Commission was vested with "broad authority" over communications.0 However, that two-word quotation is
from the President's message to Congress in support of the bill."
Presidents do not always get what they ask for, and their pronouncements are not the will of Congress. Further, the sentence
in which the words "broad authority" occurs is the following: "In
the field of communications, however, there is no single government agency charged with broad authority. 3 2 It is hard to infer
a grant of power by Congress from this sentence. Finally, Roosewlt's message specifically proposed that the new Commission be
vested only with such powers as were already distributed among
existing agencies.3 3 The history of the Act in fact cuts rather
strongly against the position taken by the Court.
common carrier must possess four characteristics: (1) Interstate operations; (2) the offering of a "communications service"; (3) to the public; (4) "for hire." FCC, Memorandum
on Jurisdiction, reprinted in 1965 CATV Hearings,supra note 7, at 104, 15. Cable payTV is not a "communications service"-a mere vehicle over which messages selected by
the consumer may be carried (such as telephone or telegraph service). Cable pay-TV
messages (i.e., actual cable pay-TV programming), though responsive to consumer tastes,
are under the control of the entrepreneur.
-747 U.S.C. § 303 (1970).
" United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), rev'g Southwestern
Cable Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1967).
"Id.
at 172.
0 H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), cited id. at 168.
' The text of the address appeared originally in 78 Cong. Rec. 3181 (1934).
32 Id.

11 The address continued by stating:
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The committee reports from both Houses indicate that section 2 of the Act is designed to settle the respective spheres of
power between the Federal Government and the states, not to
make a specific grant of power to the FCC; 4 and indicate that the
Act as a whole grants no new powers to the Federal Government,
but only consolidates existing jurisdiction within a single new
agency." In any event, the Court's endorsement in Southwestern
Cable of a broad FCC power over wire communications was entirely by way of dictum, as the majority opinion was quick to
point out:
There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of the Commission's authority to regulate CATV.... We express no views as
to the Commission's authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any
other circumstances or for any other purposes."

The holding itself in Southwestern Cable-thata specific exercise
of power over CATV by the FCC was legitimate 37-was based
entirely on a theory of "ancillary jurisdiction. ' 3 In a sole
I recommend that the Congress create a new agency to be known as the
"Federal Communications Commission," such agency to be vested with the
authority now lying in the Federal Radio Commission and with such authority over communications as now lies with the Interstate Commerce Commission-...
It is my thought that a new commission such as I suggest might well be
organized this year by transferring the present authority for the control of
communications of the Radio Commission and the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
Id. These remarks have always been construed as advocating an FCC geared solely to the
concerns of its predecessor agencies. See, e.g., Hearings before the Senate Comm. on
Interstate Commerce on S. 2910, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. at 48 (1934) (testimony of Henry A.
Bellows, National Ass'n of Broadcasters), 106 (testimony of David Sarnoff, R.C.A.);
Hearings before the House Comm. on Interstate Commerce on H.R. 8301, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. at 105 (1934) (testimony of Henry A. Bellows, National Ass'n of Broadcasters).
'4 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
" See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934); S. REI.
No. 781, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 10312-13 (1934) (statement of Rep. S. Rayburn,
Chmn., House Comm. on Interstate Commerce).

" 392 U.S. at 178.
31 In response to the fears of broadcasters over signal importation by cable television
(see note 7 supra), the FCC imposed rules which prohibited CATV from importing any
distant signal into the nation's top 100 markets, absent a showing of public interest. 47
C.F.R. § 7 4 .1107(a) (1972). The rules have since been modified by the Cable Television
Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, reconsiderationdenied, 36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972). See
47 C.F.R. §§ 76.61, 76.63 (1975).
11 392 U.S. at 178. Ancillary jurisdiction is discussed at text accompanying notes 44-

50 infra.
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concurrence, Mr. Justice White disagreed with the reading of
section 2(a) offered by the majority, and took a position close to
the one advanced in this article:
Section 2(a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 152(a), says
that "[tihe provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate
and foreign communication by wire or radio .... ." I am inclined
to believe that this section means that the Commission must generally base jurisdiction on other provisions of the Act."

In United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,'0 decided three
years after Southwestern Cable, the Court again recognized a
broad grant of power in section 2(a) of the Act, but erroneously
characterized the dictum of Southwestern Cable as a holding:
We also held that § 2(a) is itself a grant of regulatory power and not
merely a prescription of the forms of communication to which the
Act's other provisions . . . apply."

Once again, however, the Court relied on the theory of "ancillary
jurisdiction" to decide the case.4"
After Midwest Video, the state of the case law on FCC jurisdiction is far from clear. Only four Justices, including Mr. Justice
White, joined in the plurality opinion in Midwest; Mr. Chief
Justice Burger concurred in the result, but questioned the broad
jurisdiction granted to the FCC;4 3 and four Justices dissented.
Thus, despite the assertions found in these cases, it cannot be
said that the Supreme Court has squarely held section 2(a) of the
Act to be a grant of power broad enough to include jurisdiction
over cable pay-TV. Indeed, if the power of the FCC were as great
as is suggested in dictum, the theory of "ancillary jurisdiction,"
on which the Court actually relied in Southwestern Cable and
Midwest Video, would be unnecessary.
1,392 U.S. at 181.
10 406

U.S. 649 (1972), rev 'g Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th

Cir. 1971).

Id. at 660.
, Id. at 662-63.
"

, Chief Justice Burger remarked:
Candor requires acknowledgement, for me at least, that the Commission's
position strains the outer limits of even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions of the Commission and the courts.
Id. at 676.
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B.

Ancillary Jurisdiction

Under the doctrine of "ancillary jurisdiction," the FCC may
regulate any form of communication which is "reasonably related" to broadcasting, since power over "broadcast communications" is specifically granted in section 303 of the Act." The Commission has justified its proposed regulation of cable pay-TV by
alleging a threat of "siphoning" and attendant injury to regular
broadcast television.4" Although the Supreme Court has twice
upheld FCC regulation of cable television proper (CATV) under
the doctrine of "ancillarity," 46 it has yet to speak on the matter
of cable pay-TV.
"Ancillarity" is a compelling argument in favor of the Commission's power over CATV; were it rejected, the FCC's statutory
jurisdiction over "broadcast" communication might be largely
frustrated. But the argument has little force with respect to cable
pay-TV. The jurisdiction over CATV upheld in Southwestern
Cable and Midwest Video was over a medium which is strictly
auxiliary to broadcast television." As used in CATV, the cable is
in essence a long antenna provided to viewers who otherwise receive a weak signal from the broadcast networks." Since the distribution of broadcast signals is clearly the subject of FCC control, the Court's decisions are eminently reasonable.49 But in
47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970).
See First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 44-45, reconsiderationdenied, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797 (1975).
' See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
1 The explicit concern of Southwestern Cable is described in note 37 supra. Midwest
Video dealt with proposed rules that would require cable television systems to cablecast
programs of local interest. See Second Report and Order on Microwave Served CATV, 2
F.C.C.2d 725, stay denied, 3 F.C.C.2d 816 (1966), reconsiderationdenied, 6 F.C.C.2d 309
(1967), aff'd sub nor. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968), codified
as 47 C.F.R. § 76.201 (1973). The rules have since been rescinded. Report and Order, 49
F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974).
' See note 5 supra.
" Put another way, by carrying TV signals along the cable, CATV indirectly gains
through the exploitation of a resource that is subject to FCC control. As a trade-off, the
courts have expressly imposed a degree of federal regulation:
CATV systems receive the signals of television broadcast stations, amplify
them, transmit them by microwave or cable, and ultimately distribute them.
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161 (1968).
The use of broadcast signals has enabled CATV to finance the construction
of high capacity cable facilities.
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 656 (1972).
"
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cable pay-TV the cable is used as a self-contained form of communication; it is a channel for selling entertainment entirely separate from broadcast television. 0 An entrepreneur could set up a
cable and sell anything from recorded French lessons to reruns of
children's shows without encroaching in the slightest on the air
waves. This activity would be no more "auxiliary" to broadcast
television than that of a mail-order book company. It is true that
cable pay-TV can compete with broadcast television for audiences and ideas. But so can the stage, live sporting events, or even
phonograph records. The point is too broad to serve as an argument for FCC jurisdiction."
C.

Plenary Rulemaking Powers

A third theory of jurisdiction over cable pay-TV advanced by
the FCC rests on the broad rulemaking powers granted in the
Communications Act. The most sweeping of these, section 4(i), 2
confers on the Commission power to make rules "necessary" to
the exercise of its power over communications. 3 The Commission
Those who exploit the existing broadcast signals for private commercial
surface transmission by CATV-to which they make no contribution-are
not exactly strangers to the stream of broadcasting. The essence of the matter is that when they interrupt the signal and put it to their own use for
profit, they take on burdens, one of which is regulation by the Commission.
Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis supplied).
" See note 15 supra.
The FCC has, in any event, a general duty to promote competition within the
broadcast industry, and not to engage in economic protectionism. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304, 307(b), 307(d), 309(h), 312 (1970); United States
v. Radio Corp. of America, Inc., 358 U.S. 346, 351 (1958); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 340 U.S.
470, 474-75 (1940); Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 362 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d
230, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 414 (1952); Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180
F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Hyde, The Role of Competition& Monopoly in the Communications Industry, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 899, 900 (1968); Johnson & Hoak, Media
Concentration:Some Observations on the United States' Experience, 56 IA. L. REV. 267,
290-91 (1970). Cf. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 97 F.2d 641, 643 (1938).
52 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1970).
Specifically, the section states that:
The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be
necessary in the execution of its functions.
Id. A similar provision is:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to
time, as public convenience, interest or necessity requires, shall . . . (r)
[miake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and con-
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claims the power under these provisions over almost any person
or organization identified as a threat to a statutory policy, 4 and
justifies applying anti-siphoning rules to cable pay-TV by asserting a policy which favors maintenance of flourishing and diverse
broadcast television. 5
Except in its attempt to rely on more specific support in the
rulemaking provisions of the Act itself, this argument is virtually
the same as the one advanced for "ancillary jurisdiction," and
fails in the same manner when applied to cable pay-TV. The
rulemaking powers granted to the Commission are couched in
narrow terms and are in support of other powers;5" they cannot
in themselves be read as a source of sweeping control over all
57
communications.
ditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this chapter ....
Id. § 303(r).
The expression of this theory itself can be seen in the regulation of cable television
proper. See, e.g., Second Report and Order on Microwave Served CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725,
727-29, 734, 794-97, stay denied, 3 F.C.C.2d 816 (1966), reconsiderationdenied, 6 F.C.C.2d
309 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968).
But see CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 429 (1959).
The attitude that this theory of jurisdiction extends to any and all persons or organizations is evident in Second Report and Order, supra at 730.
The FCC has a major responsibility under subchapter III of the Act. It is "the
obligation to provide a widely dispersed radio and television service" with a "fair, efficient, and equitable distribution" of service among "the several states and communities."
S. REP. No. 923, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1959); 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1970). Because of
the threat of siphoning, cable pay-TV is seen as undermining the continued vitality of
broadcast TV service, hence the Commission's overall responsibility under subchapter III
of the Act. See First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 44-45, reconsideration denied,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797 (1975) (stressing the "continuing
economic vitality of free television," enhancing "the integrity of broadcast signals" and
the obligation to "make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States,
a rapid, efficient, nationwide wire and radio communications service" (citations omitted)).
' Both rulemaking clauses use such phraseology as "not inconsistent with this chapter"; "not inconsistent with law"; "as may be necessary in execution of the Commission's
functions"; and "as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter." Such
language, especially the last two excerpts, mark the rulemaking grants as mere technical
tools to enforce jurisdiction vested elsewhere in the statute. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 303(r)
(1970).
11The sweep of the rulemaking clauses, if construed to be jurisdictional grants, is
virtually boundless:
The principal argument urged in support of the Commission's jurisdiction
[over such cable television companies] is that it is desirable for the FCC to
have such jurisdiction in order to attain the general objectives of the Communications Act. However, if this reasoning is sound, then the jurisdiction

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

III. CABLE PAY-TV AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
It is settled law that the protections of freedom of speech and
of the press in the first amendment" extend to radio and television. 9 Anti-siphoning regulations are clearly abridgements of the
broadcasters' power to speak unrestrainedly. 0 But because of the
special nature of the broadcast medium, the Supreme Court has
also countenanced certain constraints on the form and content of
broadcast communications as necessary incidents of FCC regulation. The interest of the public in efficient and varied use of the
air waves has been held to justify some limitation on the networks' power to broadcast whatever they want. In this area the
Court has engaged in a classical balancing, "a candid and informed weighing of competing interests."'"
of the Commission is literally unlimited. There is scarcely any aspect of
organized social living that is not in some way related to the complex ramifications of the communications system . . . .Such a vague and broad reasoning simply will not sustain jurisdiction as to activities not plainly within
more specific statutory language.
1965 CA TV Hearings,supra note 7, at 36 (statement of L. Loevinger, FCC Commissioner).
',The first amendment to the Constitution reads in appropriate part that "Congress
shall make no law ..
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.
...
U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
1' Section 326 of the Communications Act specifically enjoins the FCC from engaging
in censorship. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970). Appellate courts have also repeatedly stressed that
the guarantees of the first amendment are as applicable to radio and television as they
are to any other mode of expression. See, e.g., Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of
Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("the First Amendment draws
no distinction between the various methods of communicating ideas."); Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir. 1969), aff'd, 403 U.S. 29 (1971) ("no rational
distinction can be made between radio and television on the one hand and the press on
the other in affording the constitutional protection contemplated by the First Amendment."); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (first amendment
rights apply to any "significant medium for the communication of ideas."); United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) ("We have no doubt that moving
pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed
by the First Amendment."). However, the reach of those guarantees may well differ
between the various media. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
388 (1969); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290, 307 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
See 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1975).
, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
rehearing denied, 342 U.S. 842 (1951), rehearingdenied, 355 U.S. 936 (1958). The nature
of the balancing test is defined, and a list of significant opinions included in T. EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 48-58 (1967). In the telecommunications field, the balancing test is exemplified by three recent decisions. In Red Lion
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Under the established law of the first amendment, both
within and without the area of communications, the FCC's antisiphoning rules cannot be applied to cable pay-TV. The interests
entering into the "balance" are entirely different from those relating to broadcast or cablecast network television, and the established first amendment "balancing" yields a different result.
A.

Preservationof a Scarce Resource

The most important element entering into the balance in the
case of conventional broadcast is "spectrum scarcity."6 2 If the
"ether" or channel airspace used by radio and television is indeed
a precious and limited natural resource," the allocation of this
scarce resource to broadcasters can plausibly be accompanied by
such regulation as the public interest demands.6" In such situations, the regulation of speech may be necessary to preserve the
possibility of any speech at all. If four tried to speak at once in a
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Court upheld the Commission's fairness
doctrine rules against a first amendment challenge. While conceding that the broadcast
licensee has the private right to speak as he chooses under the constitutional mandate (id.
at 389-90), the majority nonetheless concluded that the public's right to hear a full panoply of political commentary was stronger. "It is the right of the viewers and the listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Id. at 390.
In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973), the Court rejected the contention that public groups are guaranteed some form of
access to radio and television. A test of balancing was invoked (id. at 102), but the
majority concluded that the first amendment prevailed over the need for such a guarantee.
Id. at 120-21.
Finally, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Court upheld
the right of a broadcasting company to telecast a rape victim's name, obtained from
records open to public inspection. The Court concluded that "political institutions must
weigh the interests in privacy with the interests of the public to know and of the press to
publish" (id. at 496), and that the material in contention "contains none of the indicia of
those limited categories of expression . . . of such slight social value . . . that any benefit

to be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
Id. at 495.
See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943):
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio is inherently not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other
modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it
cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be denied.
Id. at 226.
" See note 17 supra.
" See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 638 (1965); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 663 (1970); National Broadcasting Co. v.

United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470, 474 (1940).
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town square which could only hold three, no one could be heard
at all unless the town moved in to prevent a brawl. An extension
of this principle is the Commission's "Fairness" doctrine, the
requirement that interested parties be invited to answer the networks' contentions on certain matters, 5 which the Supreme Court
upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC"6 against a first
amendment challenge. The Court squarely placed the public's
access to a full range of views above the broadcaster's unfettered
right to speak. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."6 7
The "scarce resource" analysis does not support the application of anti-siphoning rules to cable pay-TV. The cable does not
use broadcast frequencies. Where cable pay-TV is concerned,
there is no scarcity of the power to communicate. 9 The public can
receive over the cable as many programs as it will pay to see and
hear. In this respect, cable pay-TV is no different from the daily
press. There is potentially a town square for each speaker.70
I The fairness doctrine consists of two distinct obligations: (1) The duty to broadcast
all sides of significant public issues; and (2) the duty of broadcasters to provide a right of
reply when individuals or groups have been attacked over their facilities. The first obligation is codified in 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970). The latter is contained in 47 C.F.R. § 73.123
(1975).
" 395 U.S. 367 (1969), rev'g Radio & Television News Directors Ass'n v. United
States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968).
11Id. at 390. The court expressly relied upon notions of "spectrum scarcity" in reaching its conclusion. Id.
" Cable television does not use broadcast signals except to the extent that its primary
purpose is the amplification and distribution of weak signals already in the air. See note
5 supra.
" Cable pay-TV, in contrast to its parent cable system, has no contact with broadcast
frequencies whatever. The corpus of its transmissions consists of material selected, purchased, and edited by the individual entrepreneur. See note 15 supra. Further, cable payTV does not become engaged in a "scarcity" question by virtue of its occupying a channel
on a cable television system. Cable television systems in the current state of the art may
carry up to 40 channels. See SLoA REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. Indeed, FCC regulations
require all CATV systems within the top 100 TV markets to carry a minimum of 20. 47
C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(1) (1975). In contrast to the crowded radio spectrum, there is ample
room for many voices catering to many tastes.
1*The Justice Department, for example, has argued this position before the FCC
repeatedly, stating that cable pay-TV entrepreneurs are "businessmen engaged in a business, cablecasting, into which any number of others may enter." Comments of the Justice
Dep't, F.C.C. Docket 19954, Nov. 1, 1972, at 10. Proponents of cable pay-TV (arguing for
less restrictive, or no regulation) have likewise rebutted the notion of "spectrum scarcity."
See, e.g., Comments of Optical Systems Corp., F.C.C. Docket 19554, Sep. 20, 1974, at 43
[hereinafter cited as Optical Comments]. See also First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d
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B.

Other Interests To Be Weighed
The arguments which balance other interests against the
freedom of speech of the broadcasters fundamentally resemble
the "scarce resource" analysis in that they rely on the special
nature of the broadcast medium. Again, the difference between
cable pay-TV and broadcast communication blunts the force of
these arguments as applied to the former.
1. Public Domain or Ownership
Courts have upheld FCC regulations limiting the freedom of
broadcasters on the ground that the channel airspace is "owned"
by the public." Broadcasters are treated as trustees of the property.72 Analogies are commonly drawn from constitutional decisions in which the inherent "public character" of property is held
to survive its private use.7"
The "public domain" theory is inapplicable to cable pay-TV.
Cables used in transmitting entertainment for a fee have no inherent "public" character. There is no reason they cannot be
owned and operated by those who build them. To be sure, the
cable owners and builders must generally obtain some form of
public authorization to use streets, ducts, and rights of way routing the cables." This is at best an argument for allowing states
and localities, not the FCC, to impose limitations on cable pay1, 74 n.6, reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797
(1975) (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning application of scarcity rationale to cable pay-TV).
1' See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 205-07 (1963); In re Business
Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242, 254-55 (1970) (Johnson, Comm'r,
dissenting), rev'd, Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); EMERSON, supra note 64, at 660-61; Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth Centur%
Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57 U. VA. L. REv. 574, 591
(1971); Robinson, The F.C.C. and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of
Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 151 (1967); Note, Regulation of
Program Content by the F.C.C., 77 HARV. L. REv. 701, 713 (1964).

See, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1971); Food Emp.
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946). But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
1' See, e.g., Section 362, Charter of the City of New York (Rev. 1972), which empowers
the Board of Estimate to grant franchises for the use of city streets, pipes, and conduits
"for the transmission of electricity . . .heat or power." Id.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

TV."h And the argument sweeps too broadly: It would justify government control over all forms of communication that use such
public places as streets, sidewalks, and parks.78 The courts have
never gone so far."
2. Rights/Privileges Doctrine
Closely related to the notion of "public ownership" is the
theory that "those who obtain a license are granted a privilege
. . . therefore . . . a licensee, exercising such a privilege, must
abide by Commission imposed rules."7 In sum, a distinction is
drawn between a naturally vested right, and a privilege benevolently granted by government. The triennial licensing of radio
and television79 is held to fall in the latter category, and the generosity of the state is held to be a fair exchange for a heavier degree
of regulation. 0
Commentators have rejected the idea of a rights/privileges
dichotomy as "little more than a legalism."'" Furthermore, the
11States and localities are currently precluded from regulation of cable pay-TV. See
Interpretive Ruling, 31 F.C.C.2d 747 (1971); Cable Television Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d 143, 193, reconsiderationdenied, 36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972). This ruling has evoked
much dissatisfaction from the states and localities, probably because they view cable payTV as a source of much needed revenue (through the imposition of franchise fees). See,
e.g., Broadcasting, May 20, 1974, at 57-58; July 1, 1974, at 39.
7' Radio & Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1019 (7th
Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969);
Robinson, supra note 71, at 152-53.
" See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (all cases recognizing the public's constitutional right to use
streets and parks in the exercise of first amendment freedoms).
n Radio & Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1019 (7th
Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See
also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969); Television Corp. of
Michigan v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
", The FCC is statutorily empowered to grant and renew all broadcast licenses. 47
U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d) (1970). Renewals are currently on a three year basis. 47 C.F.R. §
73.630(a) (1975).
" Put quite simply, the rationale is that since no one has a right to a broadcast
frequency (the frequency spectrum constituting scarce, publicly held property), the state
could scrutinize the circumstances under which a privilege to broadcast was granted, even
to the extent of compromising constitutional rights.
11 Note, supra note 71, at 713. For a full discussion of how the doctrine arose, and its
current status, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
ConstitutionalLaw, 81 H~Av. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
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Supreme Court has proven unreceptive to the notion that government may extract the surrender of constitutional liberties in return for some form of subsidy. 2 Objections directed at the doctrine's application to cable pay-TV are even clearer. The whole
underpinning of "privilege" rests upon our earlier assumption
that broadcast frequencies are few and far between, 3 making
their allocation a very real privilege for the aspiring broadcaster.
Since the latter reasoning does not apply to cable pay-TV,84 the
rights/privileges doctrine falls with it.
3. Unique Impact
Courts have also upheld FCC regulation of broadcasters on
the ground that radio and television have a unique impact on the
listening and viewing public. This impact, said to be much
greater than that associated with other media (such as newspapers or periodicals), justifies a greater degree of control.
The major decision utilizing this approach is Banzhaf v.
5 where the court included
FCC,"
advertising within the scope of
the fairness doctrine86 In dismissing a first amendment challenge
to this inclusion, Chief Judge Bazelon discussed the impact of
various media and distinguished radio and television:
Unlike broadcasting, the written press includes a rich variety of
outlets for expression and persuasion, including journals, pamphlets, leaflets and circular letters, which are available to those
without technical skills or deep pockets. Moreover, the broadcasting
medium may be different in kind from publishing in a way which
has particular relevance to the case at hand. Written messages are
not communicated unless they are read, and reading requires an
affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in contrast, are "in the air."
See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874); Barron v. Burnside.
121 U.S. 186, 200 (1887); Milwaukee Social Democratic Club Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255
U.S. 407, 437 (1921)(Holmes, J., dissenting); Terral v. Burke Construction Co.. 257 U.S.
529, 532 (1922); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 515 (1926); Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. California R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926); United States v.
Chicago, St. Paul & Minneapolis Ry., 282 U.S. 311, 328-29 (1931); Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965).
See note 17 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
'
405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute v. FCC,
396 U.S. 842 (1969).
" The fairness doctrine is described briefly in note 65 supra. Banzhaf itself concerned
the right of reply by public interest groups to cigarette advertisements (replies that would
stress the health hazards posed by smoking).
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In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes a citizen who
does not know some part of a leading cigarette jingle by heart. Similarly, an ordinarily habitual television watcher can avoid these commercials only by frequently leaving the room, changing the channel,
or doing some other affirmative act. It is difficult to calculate the
subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may be
heard even if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought
greater than the impact of the written word. 7

Banzhaf has not given rise to many subsequent decisions
resting on the concept of impact."' Thus there is doubt about the
continued viability of impact as a first amendment counterbalance. However, assuming arguendo that the concept is still valid,
it is plainly inapplicable to cable pay-TV. The nature of the
special impact of radio and TV, as developed by Chief Judge
Bazelon, consists of three elements: (1) The greater impact of any
one channel because of the overall paucity of airspace; 9 (2) the
, 405 F.2d at 1100-01.
There are but two subsequent decisions which appear to rely on the concept of
impact. In Robinson v. American Broadcasting Companies, 441 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1971),
the court refused to enjoin broadcast announcements which stressed the harmful effects
of cigarette smoking. In concluding that such an injunction would clearly violate the first
amendment (id. at 1399), the court took notice of the differing nature of radio and television, and traced that distinction to the idea of impact. Id. at 1398-99. In Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub noma. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), the court upheld the constitutionality of an outright ban of cigarette advertisements on radio and TV. The court also
relied upon impact in squaring its ruling with the first amendment. Id. at 585-86. Apart

from Robinson and Capital, the concept of impact has only appeared in the opinions of
Judge Bazelon, and only as dicta. See, e.g., Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC,

473 F.2d 16, 79 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1972);
Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring); National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1176 n.65 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting from the order vacating the previous order granting rehearing en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Accuracy in the Media, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1105 (1976); Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC,
515 F.2d 397, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Statement of Bazelon, C.J., in favor of granting
rehearing en banc).
There is also some doubt as to whether Banzhaf is traceable to previous first amendment law. There is some validity in tracing the concept of impact to the dissenting opinion
of Justice Jackson in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 308 (1951). However, the doctrine
(if it indeed may be labeled as such) is more likely a product of scholarly speculation,
transmuted by Banzhaf into the force of law. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 71, at 15455 (cited in Banzhaf); Note, supra note 71, at 713; Note, Memorandum on First Amendment Issues Involved in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, News Directors'Association
v. United States, and Banzhaf v. FCC, 43 CONN. B.J. 517, 524 (1970).
11"Unlike broadcasting, the written press includes a rich variety of outlets for expres-

sion ....

" 405 F.2d at 1100 (emphasis supplied).
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fact that television and radio are thrust upon the consumer, and
can be avoided only by affirmative action;9 and (3) the assumption that television and radio have greater psychological effect
upon the public because of their numerical pervasiveness." Cable
pay-TV is not plagued by spectrum scarcity, and is but one voice
out of many available to CATV subscribers." It is not thrust upon
the consumer; indeed, obtaining any cable TV service requires
the affirmative act. 3 Finally, the differing technology of cable
pay-TV constrains its growth, and renders it far less pervasive
than radio or television."
"

"Written messages are not communicated ualess they are read, and reading re-

quires an affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in contrast, are 'in the air.' " Id. (emphasis
supplied).
" "It is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda
.
... Id. (emphasis supplied). This allusion to the numerical pervasiveness of radio and
television is further clarified in Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16,
79 n.65 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1972) (stressing
the fact that the average American household watches television an average of 6 hours
per day). See also Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 586 n.13
(D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405
U.S. 1000 (1972).
" See note 69 supra.
"' Cable pay-TV is available either on a per-program or per-channel fee basis. Those
systems operating on a per-program basis require the subscriber to purchase tickets or
other devices to activate the decoding units on their TV receivers and receive a particular
program. See, e.g., the systems described in ADLER & BAER, supra note 11, at 34. Those
systems operating on a per-channel basis require at minimum that the viewer connect his
television to a cable TV network, and lease a decoding device from the entrepreneur on a
monthly basis. All programs transmitted over that cable pay-TV channel will be received
as a matter of course. The majority of cable pay-TV systems are now operating on this
basis. See Fact Sheet, supra note 15, at 2.
" Normal broadcast television service is currently received by some 66,200,000
homes. Broadcasting: Yearbook 12 (1974). This number has risen steadily over the last
decade. Id. at 68. The average American family watches television an average of 6 hr. 52
min. per day, or 44 hr. 7 min. per week. Id. at 69.
Present penetration and future expansion of cable pay-TV is much more limited, tied
as it is to the growth of cable television proper (since CATV serves as the carrier for cable
pay-TV). At present, cable pay-TV services roughly 60,000 homes, or 1 percent of all
homes served by CATV (estimated at 7 million, Broadcasting: Cable Sourcebook 5 (1974)
The total number of homes served by cable television in turn amounts to only 9 percent
of the families served by broadcast television generally. Estimates of the future expansion
of cable pay-TV are generally couched in pessimistic terms. See, e.g., Nou., PECK &
McGOWAN, supra note 18, at 142, 149 (suggests that cable pay-TV will eventually penetrate only 4 percent of the homes served by CATV). But see Stanford Research Institute
Press Release, Apr. 11, 1974, at 1 (commenting on a recently concluded study which
indicates that cable pay-TV will achieve a 30 percent penetration rate by 1985, with 25
million subscribers and revenues of over $4 billion per annum).
On the issue of average family exposure, the National Association of Broadcasters

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

4.

VOL. 53

Commercial Structure of Broadcast Television

The profits of the broadcast industry are obtained almost
entirely from advertising."5 Since there are few broadcast channels," advertisers who want to reach the broadest public tend to
avoid subsidizing shows which are "high brow" or controversial. 7
The need to offset the influence of a small number of large advertisers is a strong argument for allowing some control by the FCC
over network programming. 8 But once again, the argument fails
when applied to cable pay-TV. Cable pay-TV is apt to be more
ecumenical in its programming than broadcast network television. A given program need only find a small segment of the
public willing to pay for it to justify its transmission.9
indicates that cable pay-TV will be used with more discretion than broadcast television.
See National Ass'n of Broadcasters, Fact Sheet: Economic Aspects of Siphoning (1974)
at 2-3 (suggesting that the weekly median would be one 2-hour movie per family, amounting to a yearly exposure of some 100+ hours of viewing).
" Total television revenues (less commissions) for fiscal 1972 amounted to
$3,179,400,000 (an increase of 15.6 percent from the previous year). FCC, Television Financial Data, 39 FCC ANN. REP. 223 (1973). Gross advertising revenues for television
amounted to $3,675,000,000 in fiscal 1972 (also amounting to an increase of 15.6 percent
from the previous year). Id.
, See note 17 supra.
The major networks, relying on advertising revenues, are thus pressured into broadcasting only those programs which satisfy the sponsor's interests. See, e.g., FCC, OFFICE
OF NETWORK STUDY, TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, 2d Interim Report
(1965):
It is an economic fact of life that under our present system of television
broadcasting the ultimate diversity of programs . . . whatever may be the
intent and efforts of licensees, cannot be substantially greater than the sum
of the diversity of commercial interests and advertising objectives among the
sponsors for whom it is "good business" to provide economic support for
television.
Id. at 26. As an example of the control wielded by sponsors, consider the fact that over 55
percent of all television series are cancelled each year, many of which have garnered
popular praise and viewing audiences exceeding 20 million homes. See Optical Comments,
supra note 70, at 14.
The delicate symbiosis between broadcasters and advertisers is set out in detail in
Note, Diversity in Television Program Content: A Proposal for Sustaining Programming,
7 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROS. 319, 322-23 (1971).
" See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied
sub nom. Tobacco Institute v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); Note, supra note 70, at 714. Cf.
Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy, and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON. 15, 3132 (1967).
"1 In other words, because it relies solely upon subscriber fees for income (rather than
advertising, which is expressly forbidden) cable pay-TV will schedule programming based
upon popular demand rather than external forces. The purchasing power of the individual
consumer, when added to that of his fellows, can ensure a program fare closer to individual
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CONCLUSION

This article has argued that the anti-siphoning rules, as applied to cable pay-TV, violate both the commands of the Communications Act of 1934, and the first amendment. The legal analysis suggests that the courts should nullify these rules on appellate
review.""'
It should be noted, however, that the analysis contained
herein proceeds on classical tenets of statutory construction and
first amendment theory. A number of public policy issues, decidedly non-traditional in character, have yet to be resolved.
These issues are important, because they may ultimately support the article's thesis or provide renewed impetus for antisiphoning controls. For example, will a viable cable pay-TV, unfettered by such controls, provide the solution to a growing network monopolization over programming?"" Will it stimulate the
growth of cable television proper in urban areas?"0 2 Conversely,
tastes and needs. See, e.g., Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods,
7 J.L. & EcoN. 71, 75 (1964).
'* The Justice Department has recently initiated a challenge to the anti-siphoning
rules in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1976, § 2, at 58, col. 6.
'"I By 1973, the degree of this monopolization had increased to the point where 84
percent of all prime time television was selected and prepared by the major television
networks. Long, Antitrust and the Television Networks: Restructuring Via Cable TV, 6
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 99, 102 (1973). This has evoked fears of mass "thought control"
by a small group of network executives. See, e.g., Johnson, Freedom to Create: The
Implications of Antitrust Policy for Television Programming Content, 8 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 11, 18 (1970). Advocates of cable pay-TV suggest that a fully developed medium, as
an alternative program source, will liberate the American viewer from his role as "a virtual
prisoner . . . of three giant organizations .
Optical Comments, supra note 70, at
12.
102 The outstanding potential of CATV takes three primary forms: as a source of
greater program diversity; as a future vehicle for two-way "broadband" communications;
and as a technological solution to the shortcomings of traditional VHF/UHF broadcasting.
These benefits have been noted by Congress, commissions, commentators, and the courts.
See, e.g., 1969 CA TV Hearings, supra note 7, at 67 (testimony of Irving Kahn, Teleprompter Corp.), 135 (testimony of Harold Wigren, Joint Council on Educational Telecommunications), and 210 (testimony of Harold Barnett, consultant, National Cable Television
Ass'n); FINAL REPORT: PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY (1968) at ch.
7, 36-39; CABLE: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, CABINET COMM. ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 916 (Office of Telecommunications Policy 1974); SLOAN REPORT, supra note 5, at chs. 6, 8,
9, and 11; Southwestern Cable Co. v. United States, 392 U.S. 157, 164 (1968); United
States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 651 (1972).
As to the relationship between these benefits, the cities, and cable pay-TV, the
following reasoning is advanced; Cable operations within major cities pose special finan-
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will a strictly regulated cable pay-TV ensure that low income
groups receive the same leisure-time options as wealthier
Americans?"'" Will it prevent inflationary and self-destructive
price wars between the media over program material?' 4 At this
time, the answers supplied are neither consistent or conclusive.
At best, they suggest the need for continued scholarly analysis,
and for continued concern by the FCC, the courts, and the
American public.
cial problems. For example, the National Association of Broadcasters has suggested that
the cost of wiring in urban households to CATV amounts to over $300 per home and over
$600 per apartment. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, Fact Sheet on Economic Aspects of
Siphoning 4 (1974). The Justice Department has voiced fears that a restricted cable payTV capacity (i.e., by virtue of anti-siphoning rules) would inhibit already cautious CATV
operators from entering urban areas, where cable has yet to take hold. Optical Comments,
supra note 70, at 19-21. Cable pay-TV could, it is claimed, provide CATV proper with
enough additional revenues to maintain inner-city operations on a continued basis. First
Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 15, reconsiderationdenied, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797 (1975).
1 Opponents of cable pay-TV suggest that without the check imposed by the antisiphoning rules, 20 percent of the consumer units at the bottom of the income ladder would
be deprived of over 80 programs per year. These programs would be withdrawn from free
television and sold to cable pay-TV producers (because of the latter's alleged financial
power). They would cost the average viewer $134 per year, and would be unobtainable by
lower-income Americans (whose total annual recreation budget amounts to $84 and is
subject to other demands quite apart from television). National Ass'n of Broadcasters,
Fact Sheet on the Potential Impact of Pay Television upon Low Income Consumers (1974).
"I The price war has perhaps already begun. See, e.g., Paul Kagan Pay TV Newsletter Commentary, July 30, 1974. The author recounts the record-breaking deal between
NBC Television and Paramount Pictures for the exclusive rights to The Godfather. The
price tag amounted to over $10 million, a far cry from the older average of $750-800
thousand per film, and even from recent "blockbusters" such as The Poseidon Adventure,
which cost ABC Television an estimated $3.3 million. See also First Report & Order, 52
F.C.C.2d 1, 17, reconsiderationdenied, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 797
(1975).

NOTE
WRONGFUL BIRTH IN THE ABORTION

CONTEXT-

CRITIQUE OF EXISTING CASE LAW AND

PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION

With increased recognition of the need for and desirability of
family planning, couples are attempting to limit the size of their
own families not only through preventing conception by sterilization and use of birth control pills, but also by terminating pregnancy through abortion. As birth control devices were becoming
more popular there developed a new area of the law, referred to
as wrongful birth actions, in which parents sued third persons in
contract or negligence for unwanted births. Typically these actions have been against birth control manufacturers' and druggists2 for producing or dispensing ineffective birth control pills, or
against doctors for performing unsuccessful sterilizations.3
Recently, with the increased public approval of abortion, the
phenomenon of wrongful birth suits is appearing in that context
as well. The purpose of this article is to examine the development
of the wrongful birth concept in the abortion area. It should be
stressed that the subject of this note, wrongful birth actions, is
not the same as so-called wrongful life actions. Wrongful life actions differ from those for wrongful birth in that the former are
brought by individuals for the wrong of their very own existence.
They present unique legal and philosophical problems which are
not found in wrongful birth actions, problems which will not be
discussed in this note.4
'

Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Custodio v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Shaheen v. Knight. 11 Pa. D. &
C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957). Among the more recent sterilization cases are Herrera v. Roessing.
533 P.2d 60 (Colo. App. 1975); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974):
Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Betancourt v. Gaylor. 136
N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973).
See note 56 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the problem of assess2
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In the abortion context, wrongful birth actions have arisen
where the doctor has failed to diagnose pregnancy in time for the
woman to seek an abortion.' They have also arisen where the
doctor has failed to diagnose rubella in the mother during pregnancy or has failed to inform her of the high risk that rubella may
cause the child to be deformed. Unaware of the attendant risks,
the mother did not terminate the pregnancy, and the baby was
born with a defect.'
This article will concentrate on these types of factual settings. The abortion type of wrongful birth actions will be analyzed against the background of other wrongful birth actions in
the past few years. As will be seen, there has been little consistency in this area. Therefore, a suggested approach which would
lead to more continuity in future decisions will be presented.
I.

THE ILLUSORY TURNING POINT

Until 1971 plaintiffs had little success in wrongful birth actions. Courts were unwilling to grant recovery and dismissed such
actions on the grounds that public policy prohibited recovery for
the "blessing" of a child. The courts made a basic assumption
that every child is such a joy to his or her parents that any recovery for the birth of that unexpected child is precluded.7
In 1971 in Troppi v. Scarf,' the Michigan Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff may recover the expenses of rearing an unplanned child. The defendant in Troppi was a druggist who had
negligently dispensed tranquilizers instead of birth control pills
to the plaintiff. The court rejected the blessing doctrine., It held
that damages for wrongful birth are not so speculative as to preing damages in wrongful life actions see Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life",
I ISRAEL L. REv. 513 (1966).
-1Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975).
' Two cases which set forth this argument, and which have been frequently cited
therefor, are Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934) and Shaheen
v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957).
11 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
Id.at 253, 187 N.W.2d at 517. The court also noted that, where the state so strongly
advocated family planning as to include payments for contraceptives in its welfare program, it could not be said that public policy disfavored contraception. Id.
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clude recovery, setting forth the benefit doctrine. This doctrine
recognizes that a child brings certain benefits which should be
subtracted from any detriment to determine the plaintiff's damages."'
Because this was the first instance in which a court had
rejected the theories which had prevented recovery, Troppi was
heralded by many as the turning point in the area of wrongful
birth cases." The case certainly seemed to indicate a complete
reversal in the trend. The court made special note of the fact that
contraception is within the constitutionally protected "zone of
privacy" described in Griswold v. Connecticut,'2 and that the
state cannot infringe on a right within that zone. "Since the State
may not infringe upon this right," the court reasoned, "it may not
constitutionally denigrate the right by completely denying protection provided as a matter of course to like rights."' 3
Troppi seemed to indicate that courts, in deciding wrongful
birth cases, were at last recognizing that family planning deserved encouragement and protection. Since the Troppi decision,
The so-called 'benefit rule' is pertinent. The Restatement declares:
'Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or
to his property and in so doing has conferred upon the plaintiff a special
benefit to the interest which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred
is considered in mitigation of damages, where this is equitable.'
Id. at 254, 187 N.W.2d at 517-18, quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 920 at 616 (1966).
" For a discussion of Troppi, its history, and its predicted impact on future wrongful
birth cases see Thayer, Liability to a Family for Negligence Resulting in the Conception
and Birth of a Child, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 181 (1972); Note, Busting, the Blessing Balloon:
Liability for the Birth of an Unplanned Child, 39 ALB. L. REV. 221 (1975): Note.
Misfeasance in the Pharmacy: A Bundle of "Fun, Joy and Affection?", 8 CAL. W.L. REV.
341 (1972); Note, Birth of Healthy But Unplanned Child Due to Pharmacist's Negligence
Held a Compensable Injury, 3 SET. HALL L. REV. 492 (1972); Note, Recovery of Child
Support for "Wrongful Birth", 47 TUL. L. REV. 225 (1972), Note. Negligently Filled Prescription for Birth Control Pill Results in Recovery for Birth of Normal Child. 40
U.M.K.C.L. REV. 264 (1971-72); Comment, A Married Couple Can Recover Damages for
the Birth of a Healthy Child Which Resulted From a Pharmacist'sNegligent Filling of
the Couple's Prescription for Oral Contraceptives, 38 BROOK. L. RExv. 531 (1971); Comment, Parents Allowed Recovery of Expenses in Having and Rearing an Unwanted Child
Where PharmacistNegligently Dispensed Birth Control Pills, 3 CUMBER. SAM. L. REv. 220
(1972); Comment, Cause of Action for Birth of Unwanted Child Due to Negligent Dispensing of Oral Contraceptives, 76 DICK. L. REV. 402 (1972); Comment, Damage Suits Against
Pharmacistsand Physicians Based on Negligence in Birth Control Treatments. 13 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 666 (1972).
12 31 Mich. App. at 253, 187 N.W.2d at 517, citing Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 I.S.
479. 485 (1965).
" 31 Mich. App. at 253-54, 187 N.W.2d at 517 (footnote omitted).
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abortion has also gained more general acceptance as a legitimate
family planning method. Roe v. Wade 4 clearly established the
constitutional right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy,,5 and
thereby discredited the argument that public policy does not support abortions.
Not only has the public policy argument been stripped of its
validity, but also the damages issue has been resolved in a logical
manner; Troppi met the problem by applying the benefits rule
and weighing the injury against the benefits conferred on the
parents by the child. " Thus, when one looks at Troppi and Roe
one can see that the two hurdles which had prevented recovery
in earlier wrongful birth actions have been met. After those decisions, one would logically have expected an extension of wrongful
birth recoveries to abortion cases. However, subsequent cases
have cast some doubt on that expectation.
II. PosT-Troppi DEVELOPMENTS
In cases decided after Troppi which involved sterilization,
plaintiffs generally have not fared well. In Terrell v. Garcia7 the
defendant physician unsuccessfully performed a tubal ligation to
sterilize the mother. Thereafter she gave birth to a normal
healthy child and sued for the cost of rearing and educating the
child. In denying recovery the court impliedly rejected Troppi,
holding that public policy precluded recovery because the expense of a child is offset by the joy and companionship a child
brings.
Coleman v. Garrison5 was based on a factual situation similar to that in Terrell. Once again the court held for the defendant,
14410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe struck down the Texas abortion statute, which excepted
from criminality only those abortions performed to save the life of the mother, holding
such statutes to be violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court established that, during the first trimester of pregnancy, the abortion decision
should be left to the medical judgment of the woman's attending physician; in the second
trimester, the State may regulate the abortion procedure to promote its interest in the
mother's health; and, in the third trimester, the State may regulate and even proscribe
abortion except where necessary for the preservation of the mother's health. Id. at 16465.
Id. at 153.
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). See note 10 supra and
accompanying text.
" 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
" 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974).
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and stated that there can be no cause of action for wrongful birth
because to hold otherwise would be to rule as a matter of law that
under certain circumstances a child is not worth the trouble and
expense necessary to bring him into the world. The court also
relied on the notion that damages would be too speculative."9
One sterilization case where the plaintiffs prevailed is
Betancourt v. Gaylor.2 0 The New Jersey Superior Court held that
any loss or damage proximately resulting from a negligent sterilization operation, including the costs, emotional distress, and inconvenience of rearing the child, may be recovered. The opinion
stated, "mere uncertainty as to the amount of damage should not
preclude the right of recovery."'" "In light of the law's recent
recognition of a woman's right to control her bodily functions,"
the court reasoned, "the trier of the facts should be permitted to
evaluate whatever damages plaintiffs are entitled to."2
Since 1971 there have been four major wrongful birth cases
based on a third person's negligence after conception. In Ziemba
v. Sternberg"'the New York Supreme Court held that an action
does lie against a doctor for his negligence in failing to diagnose
a woman's pregnancy soon enough for her to terminate it. Rieck
v. Medical Protective Co., 4 a Wisconsin case based on facts similar to those in Ziemba, held that to allow recovery would violate
public policy and encourage fraudulent claims. The cause of action was recognized in Jacobs v. Theimer2 and Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hospital" wherein parents sued their physicians for
failing to diagnose that the wife had contracted rubella while
pregnant. Although the two courts recognized a tort, both limited
' The court did go so far as to develop a new type of action called "wrongful pregnancy," in which damages would be limited to those incident to the unplanned pregnancy.
Id. at 761. However, it found nothing to indicate the operation was performed negligently.
and denied any recovery. It does not seem that any subsequent cases have adopted this
idea of an action limited to the expenses and damages attendant to an unexpected pregnancy.
136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975).
"Id. at 73, 344 A.2d at 340.
22 Id. at 72, 344 A.2d at 339, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1967).
1 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
-"64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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damages to compensation for the burden related to the child's
defects.
Given the expectations raised by the decisions in Troppi and
Roe, why are the courts not permitting a plaintiff to receive the
cost of rearing the child if the burden of proving the doctor's
negligence in failing to diagnose the pregnancy or failing to diagnose rubella during the pregnancy has been met? To answer this
question, the four cases described above will be analyzed closely
to develop an understanding of the reasoning courts have heretofore followed. Some other meritorious approaches that have been
propounded in dissenting as well as majority opinions will also be
examined to formulate a model approach which could lead to
more stability in this area of the law.
HI.

THE ABORTION CASES ANALYZED
Co. 7

Rieck v. Medical Protective

A.

In Rieck the plaintiff mother sued her doctor for failing to
diagnose her pregnancy in time for her to seek an abortion. The
court held that to allow recovery would contravene public policy,2" would award damages out of proportion to the defendant's
culpability, and would encourage fraudulent claims. 9 The court
noted that the parents did not attempt to place the baby for
adoption to mitigate damages, and that no evidence had been
presented that the child would be unwelcome.
Rieck represents a return to the blessing doctrine, emphasizing the intangible benefits the plaintiffs would receive from their
unplanned child. :"'
It is such retention of benefits-the parents keeping their child, and
seeking to transfer only the financial costs of its upbringing to the
doctor-that is a relevant factor in evaluating the public policy
considerations involved."
64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
'2 Id. at 518, 219 N.W.2d at 245. In support of its public policy argument the court
cited Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) and Shaheen v. Knight, II
Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957).
64 Wis. 2d 514, 519, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1974).
Every child's smile, every bond of love and affection, every reason for
parental pride in a child's achievements. every contribution by the child to
the welfare and well-being of the family and parents, is to remain with the
mother and father.
Id. at 518, 219 N.W.2d at 244.
Id. at 519. 219 N.W.2d at 245.
I:
2
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The case reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court when the defendant appealed an overruling of its demurrer. Although at this
point no factual resolution had been made, the court decided, as
a matter of law, that every child brings happiness to his or her
parents. Thus a physician cannot be held liable for the costs of
raising such child, even though his negligence was the direct and
proximate cause of the child's birth. On what basis can such an
assumption be made? First, one must question the notion that
every parent receives joy and happiness from his or her offspring.
The number of child abuse cases in this country is an indicator
that such an "axiom" may be an overstatement. Secondly, even
where a parent does reap certain joys from the child, it is not
necessarily true that those delights totally offset the burden, both
emotional and economic, of the unplanned addition to the family.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not mention the possibility of
allowing the case to go to trial so that benefits and damages could
be weighed in the particular family setting. Instead the court
pointed out that the parents could have placed the child for adoption and avoided any injury.32 The problem with this argument
is that the decision to bear a child and the decision to give up
one's own baby after it is born involve different emotional and
philosophical problems. The decision to keep the child may be an
indication of the satisfaction the parents are receiving, and
thereby lessen the total damages figure, but it does not vitiate the
action.
The second concern of the court in Rieck was that the
amount of damages sought would be totally out of proportion to
the culpability of the defendant doctor.33 One need only consider
the types of recovery granted in personal injury cases to see the
emptiness of this argument. Plaintiffs in a wrongful birth action
seek damages for a period of 18 to 21 years, the time during which
the child would be a minor. In a personal injury case damages are
frequently sought for injuries that will last the rest of a plaintiffs
.-

Id.

To permit the parents to keep their child and shift the entire cost of
its upbringing to a physician who failed to determine or inform them of the
fact of pregnancy would be to create a new category of surrogate parent.
Id. at 518, 219 N.W.2d at 244. "[Tlhe allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable
a burden upon physicians, under the facts and circumstances here alleged." Id. at 51819, 219 N.W.2d at 245.
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life. If a 20-year-old loses a limb due to a defendant's negligence
his recovery may include pain and suffering and lost wages for a
period of over 50 years. This would be no more out of proportion
to culpability than in the Rieck situation.
Perhaps one reason behind the court's determination that
any damages would be out of proportion to the physician's degree
of fault is the fact that the court did not offset any of the economic injuries by the benefits. Had this been done, the court
could have said the physician must bear all of the "hard money
damages" while the parents enjoyed all of the intangible benefits.,4
The third point set forth in Rieck is that, if the plaintiffs were
granted recovery, the door would be opened to fraudulent claims.
This fear was based on the importance in such an action of
subjective testimony as to the parents' intent not to have any
more children and as to their decision that, had they known of
the pregnancy, they would have taken steps to terminate it."
Undoubtedly there are persons who will attempt to receive a
windfall by asserting a fraudulent claim. However, should this be
a basis for denying relief to the deserving plaintiff? This fear of
facilitating fraudulent actions has arisen in other areas of the law,
particularly regarding the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In that area one court has held that administrative difficulties cannot justify denial of relief for serious invasion
of mental tranquility. 3 Battalla v. State37 emphasized that
"[a]lthough fraud, extra litigation and a measure of speculation
are, of course, possibilities, it is no reason for a court to eschew a
measure of its jurisdiction."" Whether or not a particular claim
is valid is a matter to be assessed by the court and jury in each
case. Here, as in the area of emotional distress, much evidence
must be directed toward the plaintiff's state of mind. However,
in both instances objective evidence can be used to prove the
subjective elements. The plaintiff's actions, doctors' testimony,
and the testimony of others who associate with the plaintiff often
3'Id. at 518, 219 N.W.2d at 244-45.
Id. at 519, 219 N.W.2d at 245.
31 State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952).
37 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
31Id. at 240-41, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37, 176 N.E.2d at 731.
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reveal the necessary information about the plaintiff's state of
mind. The court should not refuse to perform its function or to
allow the jury to perform its duties merely because the task may
be difficult. If recovery could be denied whenever fear of
fraudulent complaints existed, plaintiffs' claims in many areas of
the law would be refused without being heard by a jury."
B.

4"
Ziemba v. Sternberg

Ziemba also presented the issue of whether a woman could
recover where the defendant doctor negligently failed to diagnose
her pregnancy in time for her to obtain a safe abortion. The
plaintiffs, husband and wife, sought not only damages incident
to the pregnancy but also the cost of raising the child. Although
the court did not deal with the issue of determining damages, it
held that plaintiffs did have a cause of action and cited Roe v.
Wade 4' in recognition of the courts' changing attitudes toward
abortion. 2
Ziemba offers a more constructive approach than does Rieck.
While the latter ignored the implications of Roe v. Wade,43
Ziemba recognized "that the United States Supreme Court has
articulated the constitutional right of a woman to seek such a
If the right to recover for injury resulting from the wrongful conduct
could be defeated whenever such dangers exist, many of the grievances the
law deals with would be eliminated. That some claims may be spurious
should not compel those who administer justice to shut their eyes to serious
wrongs and let them go without being brought to account. It is the function
of courts and juries to determine whether claims are valid or false.
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961).
"145 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974). For a discussion of Ziemba within
the New York legal setting see Note, Busting the Blessing Balloon: Liability for the Birth
of an Unplanned Child, 39 ALB. L. REV. 221, 229 (1975).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
45 App. Div. 2d at 232-33, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 268-69. The court distinguished Stewart
v. Long Island College Hospital, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d
695, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640, 283 N.E.2d 616 (1972), a previous wrongful birth case in which
recovery was denied where defendant hospital refused to perform an abortion and plaintiff
mother bore a deformed child. Here, the court noted, a different legal environment existed; abortions at the time of Stewart were illegal, whereas not only were they now legal.
but a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy
had been recognized by the Court in Roe. 45 App. Div. 2d at 232-33, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 26869.
1:1410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe was decided on January 22, 1973, 5 months before Mrs.
Rieck was informed erroneously by the defendant that she was not pregnant. Rieck v.
Medical Protective Co.. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
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medical procedure [as abortion] in the first trimester of pregnancy."" The entire Ziemba opinion is one addressed to the public policy arguments against allowing such a silit. It is an attempt
to view the action in its current milieu. 5
The Ziemba case reached the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court on defendant's appeal of a lower court ruling
denying his motion to dismiss. Thus, the opinion was directed to
the sufficiency of the complaint, and not to the damages issue.
The court held only that damages sustained by the plaintiffs may
flow from the physician's malpractice, and that the plaintiffs
should be compensated. No suggestion was given concerning
what damages might be considered proper. Thus, Ziemba has
resolved only half of the problems raised by a wrongful birth
abortion action, and provides no guidance as to the damages
issue.
4
C. Jacobs v. Theimer 6
In February 1975 the Texas Supreme Court decided Jacobs,
a suit by a husband and wife against their physician for failing
to diagnose that the wife had contracted rubella while pregnant
and to advise them of the risks that the child might be deformed.
They sought medical expenses for treatment and care of their
child, who was born with defective major organs, and alleged
that, had they been informed, the pregnancy would have been
terminated. At the time of the wife's pregnancy, abortions other
than for the safety of the mother were still illegal in Texas. 7
Nevertheless, the court held that, at the time the action arose,
the question of whether to terminate the pregnancy was one for
the parents to resolve. 41 The court saw no problem with finding
" 45 App. Div. 2d at 232-33, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 269, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
See note 42 supra.
519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
17 The plaintiff contracted rubella in July 1968 and the child was born
in March 1969.
Id. at 847.
" The trial court and the civil court of appeals granted summary judgment for the
defendant on the ground that such an abortion as plaintiffs contended they would have
sought was prohibited under the state's penal code. The Texas Supreme Court pointed
out that the doctor would have suffered no criminal liability unless he actually advised
the plaintiffs to terminate the pregnancy, and unless they did so upon such advice. Here
plaintiffs did not complain that the doctor failed to tell Mrs. Jacobs to obtain an abortion
but rather
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that the doctor was under a duty to disclose the diagnosis of
rubella and the risks attendant to continuing the pregnancy, and
thus held that if a jury were to find he failed to meet that duty,
plaintiffs would be entitled to the damages proximately caused
by that failure.
The damages issue here differed from that of Rieck because
the parents sought only those expenses necessary to treat the
child's deformity and the damages for their own emotional suffering. This distinction played a crucial role in the court's decision.
In Gleitman v. Cosgrove,2 the court had denied recovery of childrearing expenses on similar facts. The court in Jacobsagreed with
the Gleitman holding, but distinguished it on the damages issue,
stating that the public policy obstacles where an award would be
based on "speculation as to the quality of life and as to the pluses
and minuses of parental mind and emotion" do not exist where
only the costs related to the physical defects of the child are
sought.' However, what the court did in effect was to allow plaintiffs the value of the difference between a healthy child and a
deformed child. The doctor was not responsible for the child's
deformity; he could have done nothing to make that child
healthy. The defendant's assumed negligence precluded the
choice between seeking an abortion and risking the birth of a
deformed child. Admittedly, the parents here were not seeking
expenses for raising and educating their child, but the court made
clear that, if they had, their claim would not have been sustained.
D.

Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital"

The Wisconsin Supreme Court in September 1975 held that
a doctor who fails to diagnose rubella in a pregnant woman and
to advise her of the possible effects of the disease on the fetus is
liable for injuries sustained because of any deformity. The court
required the parents to show that they would have sought an
abortion for the wife had they been informed of her illness and
its effects.
only that the defendant should have given them information as to Mrs.
Jacobs' condition and then, with the information she had a right to expect
from her doctor, the decision would have been made by the plaintiffs themselves to terminate the pregnancy.
Id. at 848.
49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975).
69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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As in Jacobs,5" the facts of Dumer occurred prior to the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. 3 Nevertheless, the court opined that the choice of whether or not to
submit to an abortion is for the parents to make. Dumer limited
damages to those expenses reasonably suffered by reason of the
child's deformities. In this regard the court expressly distinguished Rieck, noting that in the latter case the parents sought
the expenses of raising a normal, healthy child. 4
IV.

OTHER VIEWPOINTS

Justice Weintraub's dissent in Gleitman v. Cosgrove55 offers
a constructive approach to wrongful birth actions where defendant's negligence was the cause of a mother's not obtaining an
abortion. There both the parents and the child were suing. Weintraub agreed with the majority that the child's action must fail
because the court was asked to recognize a right not to be born."
However, he emphasized that the parents do have a maintainable
action. His opinion noted that ordinarily a parent's claim is derivative of the child's claim, and if in the instant case the parents'
claim were viewed as derivative, it would not be allowable because the defendants did not injure the child. 7 The dissent
stated, however, that the mother was personally injured by the
denial of her right to choose whether or not to bear the child, and
:' Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
' Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d at 770 n.6, 233 N.W. 2d at 377 n.6 (1975).
The child was born November 19, 1972, 2 months before the Supreme Court decided Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" Id. at 769, 233 N.W.2d at 376, citing Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d
514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
" 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
"' [Tihe choice is between a worldly existence and none at all. Implicit,
beyond this claim against a physician for faulty advice, is the proposition
that a pregnant woman who, duly informed, does not seek an abortion, and
all who urge her to see the pregnancy through, are guilty of wrongful injury
to the fetus, and indeed that every day in which the infant is sustained after
birth is a day of wrong. To recognize a right not to be born is to enter an
area in which no one could find his way.
Id. at 63, 227 A.2d at 711.
57 [Ilt seems to me that the parent's claim
for the infant's cure and care
must ultimately presuppose it would have been to the child's own interest
not to have been born. The claim for cure and care is the child's, whether it
is asserted on the child's behalf against a wrongdoer or against the mother
or father or anyone else who in law must furnish it . . ..
Id. at 64, 227 A.2d at 711.
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that the father was also injured, because he was so directly involved in the mother's decision. Weintraub believed that the trier
of fact should be allowed to measure the cost of losing that right.
His opinion suggested trying to balance in some way the injury
caused by having a deformed child with the pluses in the parent/child relationship and stressed that "[tihe pain of the parents must be measured against the joy they find in him [the
childl as he is."" While Weintraub recognized the difficulty in
placing a price on the loss of the choice whether or not to risk
bearing a deformed child, he believed the law should compensate
in some way.
There is much merit to this approach, which can be applied
in the Ziemba/Rieck type of factual situation as well, because the
key is that the parent was injured through loss of the right to
choose whether or not to enter into a parent/child relationship.
The result does not have to turn on whether or not the child was
healthy.
Although Terrell v. Garcia9 is a sterilization case, the dissenting opinion by Justice Cadena offers some arguments useful
in formulating an approach to the abortion cases. While rejecting
the social policy arguments of the majority, the dissent pointed
out that Griswold and Roe have established the right of persons
to prevent conception and terminate an existing pregnancy.
It is, therefore, impermissible to say that social policy requires that
a husband and wife be denied the right to limit the number of
children which they will bring into the world, or that a person shall
be allowed, by his negligent conduct, to frustrate the realization of
the married couple's aim to limit the size of their family."

The dissent criticized the majority' for arguing that damages
would be too difficult to prove. Analogies were drawn to actions
by parents for loss of companionship and comfort upon the
wrongful death of their children," as well as to alienation of affection suits for loss of consortium. 2 If courts can place a price tag
Id. at 65, 227 A.2d at 712.
496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
Id.at 128.
Id.at 129, citing Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1971); Lockhart
v. Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113
N.W.2d 355 (1962); PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 121 at 930 (3d. ed. 1964).
1
496 S.W.2d at 129, citing Smith v. Smith. 225 S.W.2d 1001, 1006 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950).
'
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on these losses, certainly they can do so in wrongful birth cases
as well. As Justice Cadena emphasized, the fact that damages are
difficult to ascertain is no reason for a court to refuse to even try
to compensate the plaintiff.
The third point raised by Justice Cadena is that those factors
which may mitigate damages do not defeat the action. He rejected the blessing doctrine, finding no basis for the assumption
that the plaintiffs experience any joy and satisfaction from raising an unwanted child. 3 In his opinion, the birth of that child
may be a catastrophe for the entire family.
The doctor whose negligence brings about such an undesired birth
should not be allowed to say, "I did you a favor," secure in the
knowledge that the courts will give to this claim the effect of an
irrebuttable presumption."

In Jackson v. Anderson,15 a sterilization wrongful birth case
in which the action was upheld, the defendant contended that the
normal birth of a healthy child precludes recovery on public policy grounds. There the plaintiff had been sterilized upon a doctor's advice because of difficulty with previous deliveries. The
court stated that it is well established that prior to normal delivery of the child an action would lie. Thus defendant's contention
would result in an anomalous situation, wherein the same plaintiff would be able to recover if the final hearing occurred before
delivery. "IT]he fallacy in appellee's argument is clear: he suggests as vitiating liability a fact which mitigates damages."6 In
assessing damages the court pointed out that the child is to be
looked upon as unplanned rather than as unwanted. Although at
first glance this may seem a matter of semantics, the statement
emphasizes that the damages the plaintiffs are entitled to are the
expenses of raising this child that they did not plan, offset by the
benefits that the child brings them. The court seems to be underlining the fact that the plaintiffs are not trying to argue that the
Perhaps these parents, in deciding that they did not want to pay the
price for the enjoyment and pleasures which "normal" parents would derive
from the birth of an unwanted child, were not acting as "normal" persons.
But it is hornbook law that a tort feasor must take his victim as he finds him
and has no right to insist on a "normal" victim.
Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 131.
230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
/d.
IN
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child is unloved, but that nevertheless they suffered injury by the
unexpected addition to the family.
V. A VIABLE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
Various approaches to these actions have been examined to
find some guidance in formulating a framework of analysis which
will recognize the direction in which courts are going and overcome the weak points of past decisions. The two key issues are
public policy and damages. Although they are interrelated, the
simplest way to clarify the problems is to treat each separately,
resolving one at a time.
A.

Public Policy

With respect to the public policy arguments, the courts must
view these cases in the current social setting. When the blessing
doctrine was first propounded in 1934,7 family planning was
practically unheard of. Contraceptives were not yet accepted, and
abortions were performed in secret by disreputable doctors or
quacks in unsanitary surroundings. The average family was larger
than today's family." The woman's role was to bear and raise
children. Today, in contrast, there is a major concern with the
population explosion, and parents are realizing what an economic
and emotional burden a large family can be. Many couples plan
how many children they will have and how far apart in age they
will be. Abortions, although still controversial, are no longer
shrouded in secrecy, and are performed by respected members of
the medical profession on women of all ages and life styles. The
public recognizes that for some people a child is not a blessing.
Not only has the social setting changed radically since 1934,
but the legal setting has also. Roe v. Wade made clear that abortions in the first trimester are legal, and recognized that a woman
has a constitutional right to choose whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy during that period. 9 In a number of states it has
been held that if Medicaid programs reimburse for life-saving
abortions, they must also bear the cost of any nontherapeutic
67 Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620
(1934), is the case in which
the blessing doctrine gained its popularity.
" In 1910 the average family size was 5 children per married woman; in 1940 that
average was 3.2 children and between 1957 and 1959 the average was only 2.8 children. L.
DUBLIN, FACTBOOK ON MAN 22 (2d ed. 1965).
" 410 U.S. 113. 153 (1973).
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abortions performed on women eligible for Medicaid. 7 These developments indicate that today public policy favors nontherapeutic abortions.
The other portion of the public policy argument is that by
allowing the action, a court would, in effect, be deciding that no
life is better than life. 7 This may be very true in a wrongful life
action where the damage to plaintiff is his very existence.7 2 However, this is not the case in wrongful birth actions. In the latter
situation, the parent is not bringing a derivative action for the
child but rather is suing in his or her own right. There is no issue
of whether or not a person would have been better off had he
never been born. The allegation is that due to the doctor's negligence the plaintiff was unable to make an informed choice
whether or not to take on the parent/child relationship. It is the
mother's right to decide if she wants the child to be born. If
someone deprives her of that right she has been wronged. The
father has also been wronged due to the important part he plays
in that decision. If a doctor breaches his duty of reasonable care,
and as a result of such breach the mother is unable to make an
informed choice to continue or terminate her pregnancy, she
should be compensated for the damages proximately caused by
such negligence. Public policy and Roe v. Wade mandate that
every protection be given that right to choose.
B.

Damages

Recognizing that denial of the right to choose to have an
abortion is an injury, one must next determine how that injury
is to be compensated. In evaluating the extent of the damages
71 See, e.g., Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S.
1041 (1975); Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp.
17:3 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
7' See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. 1974); Gleitman v. Cos-

grove, 49 N.J. 22, 29-30, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).
72 Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life", 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513 (1966), points
out that the traditional measure of damages is a comparison of the plaintiff's position

before the damage and the worsened position in which he finds himself as a result of the
tort-feasor's act. The article sets out the crucial problem in a wrongful life case:
In our case, however, no comparison is possible since were it not for the act
of birth the infant would not exist. By his cause of action, the plaintiff cuts

from under himself the ground upon which he needs to rely in order to prove
his damage.
Id. at 529.
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three situations must be considered. The first is where the parent
wanted to have a child and the doctor negligently failed to diagnose the pregnancy. Here the parents were not given an opportunity to choose whether or not to terminate the pregnancy, but there
have been no damages. They would have chosen to bear the child
anyway.
The second category is where the parent wanted a child and
knew of the pregnancy, but the doctor negligently failed to diagnose rubella or some other occurrence which is likely to cause
birth defects. Had the parents been fully informed, they might
have terminated the pregnancy to avoid the risk of deformity.
Here the damages turn on whether or not the baby is born deformed. If the child is normal, the parents have nothing to be
compensated for. However, if the child is deformed, they have a
compensable injury. In both instances the parents were denied
the right to make an informed choice whether or not to have the
baby and take the attendant risks. In the first there was nothing
for which to compensate them, because they had wanted a child
and the child was healthy. In the second they were injured by the
birth of the deformed child when they could have avoided the
birth had the doctor used reasonable care. The measure of the
damages here is not the difference between a healthy child and
one that is deformed. The option open to the parents involved
either the risk of a deformed child or no child at all. Thus, the
correct measure of damages is the full cost of raising this child
offset by the benefits the child brings.
The third category is that of the woman who would have
aborted had the doctor informed her she was pregnant. Here the
injury does not turn on whether or not the baby is healthy. She
has been damaged by being denied the opportunity to terminate
the pregnancy. The child, regardless of the fact that it is healthy,
was not wanted or planned for. Although unplanned, that child
will probably be loved and bring happiness to the parents. However, it will also bring all the hardships that the parents had
wanted to avoid. For these, offset by the benefits, the parents are
entitled to compensation. But for the doctor's negligence, damage
could have been prevented.
In wrongful birth actions determining the cost of the parents'
injuries involves a weighing of the pluses and minuses caused by
the unplanned addition to the family (or, in the rubella cases, by
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the deformed child). The circumstances of the individual family
cannot be ignored. If the plaintiffs made no effort to terminate
their parental rights so that someone could adopt the child, that
may indicate that they will receive joy and satisfaction from the
child. Thus, it would reduce the damages recoverable. However,
such failure to place the child for adoption may also be because
the plaintiffs could not face the emotional trauma of giving up
their own child after its birth. In such case the damages would
not necessarily be greatly reduced as a result. In measuring the
injury the court must look to the size of the family and its financial situation. Some pertinent questions may be: Did the mother
have a career; had the plaintiffs determined for philosophical or
emotional reasons that they did not want any (or any more) children; what age are the plaintiffs? All of these considerations must
be a part of the process of measuring damages. It is admittedly a
difficult task to view the full picture, examining not only the
economic factors but also such intangible aspects as emotions.
Nevertheless, it is not an impossible task, and is not any more
difficult than determining such injuries as pain and suffering73 or
loss of consortium.74 No amount of money can place the plaintiffs
in the position of not having that child, but some effort must be
made to compensate them.
CONCLUSION

This article has examined wrongful birth actions in the abortion area against the background of earlier wrongful birth cases.
The early cases, which arose in the context of contraception and
sterilization, denied recovery on the grounds that to allow the
action would violate public policy and would require speculation
and conjecture in the assessment of damages. Troppi5 rejected
those theories, allowing recovery of the expenses incident to raising a healthy but unplanned child. Thereafter, many predicted
an increased willingness of the courts to uphold wrongful birth
actions not only in the area of contraceptives but also in steriliza7 Justice Jacobs' dissent in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
was addressed to the argument that damages would be too speculative. He pointed out
that if a judicial system can grant damages for pain and suffering it should he able to
evaluate the injury to the plaintiffs in a wrongful birth case. Id. at 50. 227 A.2d at 704.
71 See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
7' Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
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tion and abortion cases. Roe v. Wade7" seemed to open the door
further in the abortion cases by invalidating the public policy
argument. However, the past four years have not produced the
expected trend. As this article has discussed, the courts have
acted with little predictability in wrongful birth actions. They
have confused issues, ignored important cases, and isolated
themselves from current social and philosophical attitudes.
The article has analyzed the four post-Troppi wrongful birth
cases dealing with abortions. As has been discussed, only
Ziemba 77 recognized the impact of Roe. Rieck 7 was written as if
the case were being decided in the 1930's. The policy arguments
and fear of speculative damages so prevalent in early cases were
the foundation of the opinion. Jacobs79 and Dumere0 recognized
the right of a woman to choose whether or not to bear a child, even
though each was based on facts arising before Roe. However, the
damages in each case were limited to those incident to the baby's
deformity.
Having examined these four cases, as well as other opinions
in wrongful birth actions, this article has developed an approach
for handling an action where the doctor's alleged negligence precluded any opportunity for the parent to seek an abortion. The
basic premise is that the wrong to the parent has been denial of
the right to choose whether or not to continue the pregnancy. If
the parent can prove that a third person breached his duty of
reasonable care and in so doing denied the parent that choice, he
should be allowed to present the issue of damages to the trier of
fact. Roe signified the importance of that right to choose; to then
deny recovery against an individual whose negligence prevents
exercise of that option would be to vitiate that right. Furthermore, the finding of law that a child confers pure bliss on its
parents has been shown to be an unwarranted presumption. Any
benefits the plaintiffs' child may confer on them are mitigating
factors; they should not destroy the cause of action.
In approaching the damages issue the above discussion has
propounded balancing benefits and injuries as first suggested in
"

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W. 2d 242 (1974).
" Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
" Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
7'
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Troppi. Before any decision can be reached, however, the case
must be placed into one of three categories. Where the parents
wanted a child but were not informed of the pregnancy, they
probably have no actual damages; where they wanted a child but
were not informed of the likely possibility that the child would
be deformed, damages turn on whether the child is healthy;
where they did not want a child, damages do not depend on the
baby's being abnormal. Having determined whether the plaintiffs
have any actual damages, one then can apply the method of
weighing the pluses and minuses the child has brought the parents. In so doing, the circumstances of that particular family
must be considered, and both the emotional and the more tangible factors must be weighed.
What will happen in future abortion wrongful birth cases
remaims to be seen. If the cases look to Roe, Troppi, and Ziemba
for guidance, and follow an approach similar to that set forth
above, plaintiffs will have a chance to prove their cases. However,
if the courts continue to ignore those cases, and to rely on the
antiquated arguments that originated in an entirely different
social and legal setting, plaintiffs will have little success.
Kim Lacy Morris

NOTE
FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT IN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT:
AN ILLUSTRATION
INTRODUCTION

Until just a few years ago, state regulation of land use in the
United States consisted mainly of zoning ordinances instituted
by local governments.' However, in the last 5 years state concern
with the control of land use has caused a dramatic increase in the
number and forms of state land use regulations.' This increase
illustrates that there has been an expansion in the scope of regulation in regard to both the levels of government regulating land
use and the criteria upon which such regulatory decisions are
based. Thus, today one can see land use being regulated at state,
regional,3 and local levels, in accordance with a broad range of
criteria, including such considerations as the environmental impact of the proposed land use.' Besides indicating an expansion
in scope, a survey of the many and various forms of state land use
regulation indicates that states are becoming more innovative in
land use legislation, adopting different approaches to the problems of land use control.5 For example, regulation of land use at
the state level may be by a comprehensive land use management
system, as found in Hawaii,6 or by a system which regulates only
certain activities, as does the Maine "Site Location of Development" statute.' The effect of the expansion in both scope and
variety of legislation is that more and more land use activities are
becoming subject to state regulation.
F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 1-3 (1971).
See generally F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 1; Freilich, Development
Timing, Moratoria and Controlling Growth, in 1974 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND
EMINENT DOMAIN 147.
Freilich, supra note 2, at 212-17.
An excellent example of the current trend to expand the criteria for local land use
regulation is the Colorado Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act of 1974,
Coi.o. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-20-101 to -107 (Supp. 1975).
' Best, Recent State Initiatives on Power Plant Siting: A Report and Comment, 5
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 668 (1972); Note, State Land Use Regulation-A Survey of
Recent Legislative Approaches, 56 MINN. L. REV. 869 (1972).
1 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-1 to -37 (Supp. 1975).
7 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-89 (Supp. 1976).
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There has been a growing national concern and growing federal involvement in energy matters, which has taken place concurrently with the expansion of state land use regulation. President Ford's emphasis on energy problems in his State of the
Union Address delivered on January 15, 1975,8 and his later proposals for new legislation to increase domestic energy supplies9
exemplify the fact that today energy development is a highpriority national policy. This national concern for energy development has resulted in considerable federal legislation; for example,
in 1974 alone Congress passed the Federal Energy Administration
Act,'" the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act,"
and the Energy Reorganization Act." Also illustrative of the high
federal priority accorded energy development is the fact that
Congress, by enacting the Energy Supply and Environmental
Coordination Act of 1974,' 3 amended the Clean Air Act" to set
back timetables for reducing pollution and to encourage the conversion of power plants to coal, even though the burning of coal
would increase air pollution.'" The latest pronouncement of Congress' concern with energy development is the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975'" which states that the purpose of the
act is "to increase the supply of fossil fuels in the United States
through price incentives and production requirements."'"
The inevitable result of expanding state control of land use
and increasing federal energy legislation is a collision of state and
federal interests. In particular, the difference between state and
federal priorities for energy development and environmental conservation portends an ultimate federal-state conflict of major proportions. The phrase "federal-state conflict" is somewhat misleading; while it connotes a struggle between relative equals, ac11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 45, 48-51 (1975).

See, e.g., Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
Transmitting Proposed Legislation to Increase Energy Supply and Availability, January
30, 1975, 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 119 (1975).
15 U.S.C. §§ 761-86 (Supp. IV, 1974).
88 Stat. 246 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42 U.S.C.).
12 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-91 (Supp. 1976).
,3 88 Stat. 246 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42 U.S.C.).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970).
'5 Id. § 1857f-l(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10 (Supp. IV, 1974).
" 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6201-6422 (Supp., March 1, 1976).
" Id. § 6201.
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tually the parties are far from being equal. The United States
Constitution established a union of equal states, but at the same
time created a federal system of government under which the
federal government was granted certain prerogatives in relation
to the states. This potential federal-state conflict in the field of
energy development appears in three major situations where federal prerogatives may invalidate state regulation: (1) When the
activities regulated by the state are also subject to federal regulation or regulatory schemes, raising the question of federal
preemption; (2) when, even in the absence of federal regulation,
the state regulation may by its very nature be repugnant to one
of the enumerated powers of the federal government; and (3)
when state regulation affects land over which the federal government has dominion.
This note will analyze how these federal prerogatives affect
state-wide land use regulation in the context of one state regulatory scheme-the Wyoming Industrial Development Information
and Siting Act."8 This Act is particularly appropriate for study for
several reasons. It specifically regulates facilities which develop
energy resources.'" It is comprehensive in that its decisionmaking
criteria include social, economic, and environmental considerations. 10 It is one of the most recent examples of state land use
regulation." Its regulation of site selection represents an approach
to land use regulation which is presently utilized in Maine,22 and
which has been under consideration for use in Colorado.2 3 In addition, almost half the land in Wyoming is public land under the
24
dominion of the federal government.
" WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-502.75 to -.94 (Cum. Supp. 1975) [hereinafter referred to
in text as the Wyoming Act].
Id. § 35-502.76(c)(i).
Id. § 35-502.87.
The rules and regulations implementing the Wyoming Act became effective on
September 30, 1975, and, at the time of this writing, the first permit application is being
processed.
2 The Maine statute has withstood several challenges to its validity. See In re Maine
Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973); In re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d
736 (Me. 1973).
An energy facility siting bill entitled the "Energy Development and Conservation
Act" (H.B. 1253) passed the Colorado House on March 12, 1976, but was postponed
indefinitely by the Senate on March 30, 1976.
24 U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION's LAND 327
(1970).
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In analyzing the question of whether federal prerogatives can
invalidate the operation of the Wyoming Act, this note will examine the following issues: (1) Whether there is federal preemption
in the context of energy development facilities subject to both
state and federal control; (2) whether the Wyoming Act unduly
burdens interstate commerce; and (3) what effect federal ownership of land, including ownership of subsurface mineral rights,
will have on present and future state regulation of that land.
I.

THE WYOMING INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION AND

SITING ACT

The Wyoming Industrial Development Information and Siting Act, which became law on March 8, 1975, is an example of
state legislation requiring approval at the state level before any
major industrial facility can be constructed in the state. 25 The
statute applies to any industrial facility with an estimated construction cost of at least $50 million, and to any energy generating
and conversion plant designed for, or capable of, producing certain threshold amounts of electricity, synthetic gas, liquid hydro2
carbon products, or enriched uranium.
An application for a permit to construct a major industrial
facility must contain 16 items of information, including inventories of various pollutants caused by the proposed facility, and
either a preliminary evaluation of any social, economic, or environmental impact upon local governments or special districts, or
plans and proposals for alleviating such impact. 27 These evaluations or proposals must also specifically discuss the impact on
other categorical areas.Y The applicant must also pay an initial
fee to cover the cost of investigating, reviewing, and processing
the application. This fee may be as high as 0.5 percent of the
but
estimated cost of construction or $100,000, whichever is less,
21
applicant.
the
to
refunded
are
fee
the
of
unused portions
21 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-502.80 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
21 Id.

§ 35-502.76(c).

21Id. § 35-502.81(a).

21The areas which must be discussed include the following: Natural, recreational,
archeological, and historical resources; sewer, water, fire, police, health, and hospital
facilities; land use patterns; education; housing; transportation; and anticipated growth
of satellite industries. Id. § 35-502.81(a)(xii).
2 Id. § 35-502.81(b).
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After the application is received, a public hearing must be
held. At that time the applicant may present evidence that the
facility complies with all applicable law, that it will not pose a
threat of serious injury to the environment or to the social and
economic condition of the local inhabitants, and that it will not
substantially impair their health, safety, or welfare.30 After this
hearing, the Industrial Siting Council may either approve the
application and issue a permit, with or without conditions, or
reject the application pending further study. 3' If further study is
required by the council, and if the applicant still wishes to obtain
a permit, the applicant must pay an additional fee to cover the
expenses3 of an intensive study and evaluation of the proposed
facility. 1
The council must grant a permit when the following conditions are met: (1) The probable environmental effect is acceptable; (2) any adverse environmental impact is reduced to a minimum; (3) the facility is compatible with state, regional, and local
land use plans; (4) the facility or its cumulative effects will not
violate state and federal standards and implementation plans;
and (5) the facility will have an acceptable impact upon the
environmental, social, and economic well-being of the municipalities and people in the area.3
The Wyoming Industrial Siting Council implemented the
Wyoming Act by issuing its Rules and Regulations, which became
effective on September 30, 1975.11 The Rules and Regulations set
forth in considerable detail the requirements for the initial application.3 1 More importantly, the Rules and Regulations define key
terminology in the Act. The applicant, to demonstrate that the
Id. §§ 35-502.82(b),(c).
Id. § 35-502.82(e).
312The Wyoming Act lists 8 major topics and 56 subtopics which may be required for
further study. The Office of Industrial Siting Administration is required to obtain information and recommendations from 13 state agencies (including the University of
Wyoming). Id. §§ 35-502.83(a),(b). The additional fee required to cover the expenses of
this study may be as high as $1 million. Id. § 35-502.83(b).
Id. § 35-502.87.
Industrial Development Information and Siting Rules and Regulations, §§ 1 to 15,
Sept. 8, 1975 [hereinafter referred to in text as Rules and Regulations].
3 These requirements include providing data on such diverse subjects as job classifications at the proposed facility, existing library facilities in the area, regional meteorology,
occupational noise exposure within the areas of site influence, and ozone generation of
transmission lines. Id. § 5.
"
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facility will not pose a "threat of serious injury," must show that
the granting of a permit will not result in a "significant detriment
to, or impairment of, the environment or the social and economic
condition of present or expected inhabitants."3 The Rules and
Regulations also define "environment," "social condition," and
"economic conditions" in very broad terms."
Before discussing the federal prerogatives which bear on this
Act, it is necessary to inquire whether the Act itself is a valid
exercise of state authority. As shown by the decisionmaking criteria, the purpose of the Act-to protect the public health, safety,
and general welfare-places it within traditional state police
power.3 As stated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in
regard to the Maine siting regulation:
We consider it indisputable that the limitation of use of property for the purpose of preserving from unreasonable destruction the
quality of air, soil, and water for the protection of the public health
and welfare is within the police power.3"

Even though such regulation is within the power of the state,
it must not be unconstitutionally vague. The preceding summary
of the Act and the Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder indicates a clear delineation of criteria for issuance or denial
of a permit.'" Such criteria have been upheld by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine.4 Thus, assuming that the Wyoming Act
is administered in a reasonable manner so as to preclude any
42
charge that it is merely a guise to halt development and growth,
Id. § 6(b).
§§ 6(b)(1) - (b)(3). For example, a "serious injury" to the social condition of
the inhabitants includes any "significant" decrease in the quality of the transportation
system. Id. § 6(b)(2). To demonstrate that the proposed facility will not "substantially
impair the health, safety, or welfare" of the inhabitants the applicant also has a considerable burden. "Health" is defined to include psychological as well as physical well-being,
and "safety" is defined to mean freedom from fear of injury, where this fear may be
premised on crime rates, traffic accident rates, or dangers of industrial accidents. Id. §
6(c).
See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
u

31Id.

" In re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d 736, 748 (Me. 1973).

See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
See note 39 supra.
,2Courts have invalidated attempts by communities to immunize themselves from
growth or to otherwise exclude groups of people from joining the community. See, e.g.,
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972);
National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). Contra,
Construction Indus. Assoc. v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148
3'

"

(1976).
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it is likely to be upheld as a valid exercise of state authority.
However, the degree to which this control can actually be exerted
is limited by federal prerogatives which bear on the state system.
II.

A.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Theory

Federal preemption finds its basis in the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution, which states that the Constitution and laws of the United States are to be supreme, notwithstanding state constitutions and laws to the contrary.43 Between
those powers which the Constitution denies the states"4 and those
which it reserves to the states 5 lies a broad range of powers capable of being exercised concurrently by the states and the federal
government. This range of concurrent powers is quite large because, although those powers enumerated by the Constitution
and delegated to the federal government are generally prohibited
to the states, the Constitution also delegates to the federal government broad general powers to provide for the "general welfare"" and to make all laws "necessary and proper"' 7 to effectuate
its other powers. It is federal regulation under the authority of
these general powers that creates a conflict with state regulation.
Where the nature of the power is such that it may be held
concurrently,'" preemption of state regulation by federal regulation or regulatory schemes depends on whether or not Congress
has exercised its power so as to exclude the states from asserting
concurrent jurisdiction. 9 The United States Supreme Court has
found preemption in three basic situations: (1) Where the state
and federal regulations conflict so that compliance with both is
impossible; s° (2) where Congress had declared its regulation to be
exclusive;5 or (3) where there is an implied congressional intent
art. VI.
10.
" Id. amend. X.
,S Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
,7 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
" See note 111 infra.
" See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963).
" See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 233 (1947); Campbell v.
Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 299 (1961).
"3 U.S. CONST.
" Id. art. I, §
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that the regulation be exclusive.5" The Supreme Court has indicated that exclusiveness may be implied: If indicated in the legislative history of the federal regulation or regulatory scheme; 3 if
the federal regulatory scheme is pervasive; 4 if the nature of the
regulation or the subject matter is such that it requires nationwide uniformity;5 or if the state regulation frustrates congressional purposes and objectives."
While the theory of federal preemption can be simply stated,
it, like all doctrines based on broad philosophical considerations,
is very difficult to apply. The Supreme Court has said:
In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly
marked formula. Our primary function is to determine whether,
under the circumstances of the particular case, [the state's] law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.57

Where the regulation is an exercise of the state's traditional police
powers, as is the Wyoming Act, the Court is even more uncertain.
It has said:
It is often a perplexing question whether Congress has precluded state action or by the choice of selective regulatory measures
has left the police power of the States undisturbed except as the
state and federal regulations collide." s

The Court, in applying these tests, has given some deference to
state regulations which are an exercise of the police power:
In determining whether state regulation has been preempted by
federal action, "the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of
its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation
is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to
circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other
words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress
fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State.""
52See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S.
767, 772 (1947).
11See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-50
(1963).
11City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); cf. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State
Bd. of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).
5' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
57 Id.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947).
5gHuron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960) quoting
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This deference to police power regulation has been expressed succinctly by two federal courts of appeals: "It is well settled that
where the state's police power is involved, preemption will not be
presumed."60
While the Wyoming Act may be a valid exercise of the state's
police power, the implementation of the regulation, if it restricts
energy development, may also frustrate the purposes and objectives of Congress. This dichotomy highlights one major difficulty
in applying the doctrine of preemption: The outcome of a particular case will depend on how the Court chooses to apply the conflicting police-power/preemption tests. This situation has produced an inconsistency in preemption cases which has been criticized by commentators."' The doctrine of preemption is, therefore, far from being clear cut in its application, and the outcome
of any litigation in which the question of federal preemption may
be raised will probably depend mainly upon the facts of the particular case.
More particularly, the issue of preemption of the Wyoming
Act arises because of its regulation of energy development facilities which are also regulated by the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
B.

FPC Regulation of Energy Facilities

The FPC regulates three types of facilities: (1) Facilities
which develop water power and water resources; 2 (2) natural gas
companies engaged in interstate commerce;" and (3) electric utility companies engaged in interstate commerce.6
1.

Water Power and Resource Facilities

The FPC has extensive authority over the siting of hydroelecSavage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319, 324 n.8 (1st Cir. 1969), quoted in Chrysler
Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499, 511 (2d Cir. 1969).
"I See, e.g., Abraham & Loder, The Supreme Court and the Preemption Question,
53 Ky. L. J. 289, 311-35 (1965). The Supreme Court has also been criticized for confusing
preemption with other doctrines, Comment, A Conceptual Refinement of the Doctrineof
Federal Preemption, 22 J. OF PUBLIC L. 391 (1973), and for using the doctrine to avoid
reaching other issues. Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of
Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
" 16 U.S.C. § 797 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 717 (1970).
" 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1970).
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tric power facilities. Through the Federal Power Act, 5 Congress
established the FPC and set up a regulatory system requiring
anyone desiring to construct, operate, or maintain any facility for
the development or improvement of navigation, or for the development or utilization of water power, to obtain a license from the
FPC."6 The Act also gave the FPC broad authority to condition
the issuance of these licenses." The Supreme Court has made it
clear that the federal government has complete authority over the
development of water power, 8 and that Congress embodies its full
constitutional authority in the FPC.6 9
Not only does the FPC's authority extend to its licensees, but
the agency may have an effect upon the legal relationship between a licensee and the state so as to supersede state law. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that a municipality (which
only exists as a creation of state law) can, in its capacity as an
FPC licensee, condemn state land even though such condemnation is prohibited by state law." However, the FPC's authority
over water resources does have some limits. The Supreme Court
has held that the FPC does not have licensing authority over
thermal-electric power plants, even when such plants draw considerable amounts of water from navigable waters of the United
States."
The ability of this federal regulatory scheme to preempt state
regulation is clearly demonstrated in First Iowa Hydro-Electric
Cooperative v. FPC,"1 in which the Supreme Court held that a
state cannot impose permit requirements on an applicant for an
FPC license for a hydroelectric power project. Although the Federal Power Act 3 provided that an applicant must submit
"[s]atisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with
16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1970). The act as originally passed was entitled the Federal
Water Power Act and only dealt with control of water power and water resources. The title
was changed to the Federal Power Act in 1935 when the FPC's regulatory authority was
extended to electric utility companies.
60Id. § 797(e) (1970).
'7 Id. § 803.
6" United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
" FPC v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965).
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320 (1958).
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395 (1975).
72

328 U.S. 152 (1946).

71

16 U.S.C.

§§ 791a-828c

(1970).
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the requirements of the laws of the State or States within which
the proposed project is to be located . . . ,," the Court interpreted this provision to be informational in character, referring
merely to those matters over which the state does have jurisdiction, such as the title to water rights within its borders.7"
The Court, in First Iowa, said that to condition an FPC license on the obtaining of a prior state permit would "vest" in the
state a "veto power" over the federal project,76 thereby indicating
that state permit requirements are of no ultimate effect on an
applicant for an FPC license.
Moreover, the state permit to construct the facility had been
refused because state law expressed a policy that water should
not be diverted." The FPC, on the other hand, had deemed the
applicant's proposal inadequate and undesirable until the proposal was modified to include a major diversion of water.7" This
was, for the Court, an example of a situation where the state law
"strikes at the heart" of a federal project.79
The permit requirements of the Wyoming Act, on the other
hand, are not directly opposed to a federal policy of energy development, but merely attempt to channel the development to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Regardless of
the nature of the permit system, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that the federal government has dominion over water
power.8 0 Thus, if an applicant is granted a federal license to construct a hydroelectric power project in Wyoming, lack of state
approval of the site will probably not be sufficient to stop the
construction. However, the Wyoming Act can be characterized as
informational as well as regulatory. Hence, a good argument can
be made that, even if the FPC licensing authority preempts the
state requirements of prior site approval, the informational aspects of the Wyoming Act, including the disclosure and public
hearing requirements, should be upheld, since they do not affect
or oppose the federal regulatory scheme.
Id. § 802(b).
First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 177-80 (1946).
, Id. at 164.
" Id. at 166.
" Id. at 160, 166.
, Id. at 166.
* See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
"

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

2.

VOL. 53

Natural Gas Companies

The question of whether the regulatory system of the FPC
preempts the Wyoming Act can also be raised in regard to natural
gas companies. While the Wyoming Act requires site approval for
facilities which produce synthetic gas,' rather than natural gas,
a facility producing natural gas may come under the requirements of the Act, if its construction cost is more than $50 million.81
The relationship between state and federal jurisdiction over
natural gas companies is quite different from that of water power
development. The Supreme Court, interpreting the Natural Gas
Act of 19388 and its legislative hsitory, has concluded that, although Congress intended to create a comprehensive regulation
of the natural gas industry, this was to be a dual system of regulation; the federal government, rather than displacing the state
systems, was merely filling in the gaps where there was no state
regulation."4 This conclusion indicates that any aspects of the
natural gas industry which are regulated by the states under their
traditional police powers should not be displaced by regulation of
the FPC. Accordingly, the FPC can regulate interstate commerce
carried on by natural gas companies, and the State of Wyoming,
under its police power, can regulate the siting of such facilities.
That Wyoming can regulate siting is further supported by
the Natural Gas Act itself. The Act states that the FPC's authority does not apply to the "production or gathering" of natural
gas." As the FPC cannot regulate the production of natural gas,
it has no authority over the siting of a plant.
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has
been liberal in defining the FPC's authority over natural gas companies. For example, in FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,8
the Supreme Court held that the federal curtailment programs
could be applied to intrastate customers, 7 even though the sale
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-502.76(c)(i)(B), -502.80 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
s2 Id. § 35-502.76(c)(ii).

15 U.S.C. §§ 717 to 717w (1970).
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961); Panhandle Eastem Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507 (1947).

" 15 U.S.C. § 717(b).
" 406 U.S. 621 (1972).

17Id. See also Carver, The Trend to State Protectionism in Natural Resource
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of natural gas for intrastate consumption, albeit by a company
doing interstate business, appears from the Natural Gas Act to
be under the jurisdiction of the states.88 In extending FPC jurisdiction, the Court based its holding on the theories that state
regulation of "direct sales" customers applied only to rate-setting
and that the FPC had broad authority to regulate the transportation of natural gas. 9
This case also illustrates an important issue in any application of the tests for preemption: Is the matter alleged to be
preempted from state regulation within the delegated authority
of the federal agency implementing the regulatory scheme? In
Louisiana Power the Supreme Court stated that, although curtailment plans by their very nature require uniformity of application and the states regulate with a view to their own interests, the
need for federal jurisdiction does not in itself give the FPC the
authority to regulate, as this authority must come from Congress. 0 Although the need for uniformity of regulation and for an
unhampered national policy have each been sufficient to invoke
federal preemption in other cases,9 they cannot give a federal
agency jurisdiction. Therefore, in any situation where preemption
may be implied from a federal regulatory scheme, and where a
federal agency administers the scheme, it must first be determined whether authority over the subject has been expressly delegated by Congress to the agency.
3.

Electric Utility Companies

The Wyoming Act requires site approval for facilities which
produce electricity.2 However, the Federal Power Act 3 grants the
FPC authority to regulate electric utility companies engaged in
interstate commerce. Unless otherwise provided, the FPC does
not have jurisdiction over facilities for the generation of electricity nor the transmission of electrical energy in intrastate commerce. 4 The FPC's authority over facilities producing electric
Management, 18

ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST. 253 (1973).
15 U.S.C. § 717(c).
406 U.S. at 640.
90 Id. at 633-36.
" See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
0 WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-502.76(c)(i)(A), -502.80 (Cum.Supp. 1975).
93 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1970).
" Id. § 824(b).
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energy is, therefore, limited primarily to the sale of electricity in
interstate commerce.
Although the Federal Power Act does state that one of the
purposes of the FPC is to assure an abundant supply of electricity, it speaks of achieving this purpose solely in the context of the
"interconnection" and "coordination" of facilities. Even in this
limited context the language is that of request, not command,
with the coordination of facilities being merely "voluntary" on
the part of the individual facilities. 5 What authority the FPC
does have over the supply of electricity is limited in scope and
insufficient to overcome the Federal Power Act's general denial
of FPC authority to regulate the generation of electricity. Therefore, this authority should not affect the operation of the Wyoming Act.9
C.

NRC Regulation of Energy Facilities

The Wyoming Act also applies to nuclear power plants which
produce certain threshold amounts of electricity 7 and to uranium
enrichment facilities capable of producing a specific output.9
Both types of facilities are subject to regulation by the NRC. 9
Although the question of federal preemption of state regulation of nuclear energy is currently of great interest, 0 the issue of
federal preemption of siting regulations has not been resolved by
the courts. However, should the issue come squarely before the
courts, two particular cases may shed some light on the possible
outcome.
In Northern CaliforniaAssociation to PreserveBodega Head
Id. § 824a(a).
" It should be noted that the Supreme Court has held that private energy producing
facilities are to be considered as engaging in interstate commerce, if the energy produced
is comingled with energy from another energy producing facility which is engaged in
interstate commerce. FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972).
11 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-502.76(c)(i)(A) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
" Id. § 35-502.76(c)(i)(D).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-34 (1970).
'" See, e.g., Estep & Aldeman, State Control of RadiationHazards: An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. REv. 41 (1967); Helman, Pre-Emption:Approaching Federal-State Conflict over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQUETTE L. REV.
43 (1967); Martone, Federaland State Responsibilitiesin the Environmental Control of
Nuclear Power Plants, 2 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 20 (1972); Comment, Power
Play in the Nuclear Arena, 53 DENVER L.J. 228 (1976).
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& Harbor, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission,'0' the California
Supreme Court held that a state does have the power to determine the location of nuclear reactors, on the basis of safety factors
other than radiation hazards. To the contrary, however, is
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,02 in which the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that under the doctrine of preemption, the federal government has exclusive authority to regulate the construction and operation of nuclear power
plants, which necessarily includes the regulation of levels of radioactive effluents from the plant.' 3 The Eighth Circuit thereby
invalidated state standards regarding allowable radioactive discharges which were stricter than the federal standards.' 4 In holding that the state regulation was preempted by federal regulation,
the court found that Congress intended to exclude regulation of
radiation hazards from state control;1 5 that the federal regulatory
scheme was pervasive; 0° and that the subject matter required
uniform regulation to effectuate the objectives of Congress.' 7
These two cases, of course, are not determinative of the siting
issue. The California case specifically permits a state to regulate
siting, but only where there is a safety question involved. 08 The
Eighth Circuit case, while holding that state regulation was
preempted, did not specifically address the siting issue.
There are strong arguments on both sides of the question of
federal preemption of state regulation of nuclear facility siting.
Although the development of atomic energy was initially an outgrowth of the important federal interest in national defense,
today atomic energy is developed for many peaceful purposes.
This change in the nature of atomic energy is reflected in the 1959
" 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964).
"o 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
"o Id. at 1154.
104 Id. at 1145.
105 Id. at 1147-52.
,6Id. at 1152-53.
Id. at 1153-54.
The California Supreme Court justified state regulation of the siting of nuclear
reactors by saying that the location of a reactor at or near an active earthquake fault zone
was a safety consideration which the federal government did not address, and, therefore,
the federal government clearly did not preempt the entire field of safety, but only that
portion relating to radiation hazards. Northern Calif. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head &
Harbor, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 133, 390 P.2d 200, 204, 37 Cal. Rptr.
432, 436 (1964).
"o
"
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amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, 09 in which Congress recognized the peaceful purposes of nuclear energy and stated that
the states are to have a role in its development."10 Arguably, the
nature of atomic energy has clearly changed so as to preclude any
necessity for preemption of state regulation. Although the technical complexity of the regulation of actual construction and operation of a nuclear facility may currently be best accomplished by
federal regulation, such matters as siting, which are local in nature and well within the competence of the states, should be
regulated by the states."'
Moreover, a valid police power regulation concerning the
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of a state should not be
preempted unless there is an express congressional exclusion of
state regulation."' Both the legislative history and amendments
to the Atomic Energy Act"3 make it clear that not all facets of
4
state regulation of nuclear facilities are to be preempted.1
Even if federal preemption applies to any regulation affecting the construction and operation of nuclear facilities, state requirements for site approval are not regulation of either the
construction or the operation of nuclear facilities. Therefore such
regulation is arguably beyond the scope of the federal regulatory
scheme and not subject to preemption. The language of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974"' 1 indicates that the NRC does
not have congressional authority to require the siting of nuclear
'o 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).

,,8 Id. § 2021.
' The Supreme Court has expressed the idea that state regulation of matters of
fundamentally local concern should only be preempted upon a showing of positive evidence that Congress intended to oust the state from regulating the matter. Head v. New
Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1963).
"I See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
113 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
" The 1959 amendments to the act state that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to effect the authority of any
state or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards.
Id. § 2021(k). In its Section-by-Section Analysis of the 1959 amendments to the act, the
Joint Committee Report stated:
This subsection is intended to make it clear that the bill does not impair
the State authority to regulate activities of AEC licensees for the manifold
health, safety, and economic purposes other than radiation protection.
1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2882.
1" 42 U.S.C.A. 99 5801-91 (Supp. 1976).
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facilities at particular locations. While this statute appears to
support the view that the NRC has no direct authority to regulate
site selection, it does provide an expression of national policy on
nuclear facility site selection. Such an expression could support
a finding of federal preemption where state requirements for site
approval frustrate the purposes and objectives of Congress.",
The arguments supporting federal preemption are set forth
in Northern States Power:"' The pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme, the need for uniformity of regulation, and the
congressional intent to exclude state regulation of the subject
matter."' Arguably, since the Atomic Energy Act authorizes federal regulation of the construction of nuclear facilities by licensing," 9 and construction inherently involves the selection of a site,
congressional exclusion of state regulation of construction"
preempts state regulation of siting.
However, these arguments do not address the question of
valid state police power. The Eighth Circuit in Northern States
Power'2 ' did speak to this issue in its discussion of the need for
uniformity of regulation. The court noted that congressional
objectives expressed in the 1954 amendments of the Atomic Energy Act evinced a legislative design to foster and encourage the
development and control of atomic energy to make the maximum
contribution to the general welfare. 2 ' This design was to be effectuated consistently with the common defense and with the health
and safety of the public.'2 The court concluded that Congress had
vested the AEC with the authority to resolve the question of the

"' Section 207 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 establishes a Nuclear Energy
Center Site Survey by directing the NRC to make a national survey of possible sites for
nuclear facilities, including those which produce enriched uranium. Id. § 5847(a). The
NRC is to conduct the survey in cooperation with other interested federal, state, and local
agencies and is authorized to adopt policies which will "encourage" the location of nuclear
facilities at these sites. Id. § 5847(a)(1), (4).
117447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
I" Id. at 1147-54. Commentators on the federal system of regulation of atomic energy
clearly give support to the arguments of pervasiveness and the need for uniformity. E.
STASON, S. ESTEP, & W. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW 1059 (1954); Shapar, Licensing of
Nuclear Power Reactors in the United States - New Developments, 15 ATOMIC ENERGY
L.J. 135 (1973).
"' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-34, 2235 (1970).
" Id. § 2021(c)(1); See 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2880-81.
1 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
'" Id. at 1153.
12 Id.
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proper balance between desired industrial progress and adequate
health and safety standards, and that only a uniform system
could accomplish these dual objectives.'24 In other words, public
health and safety were not the ultimate considerations but were
factors to be considered by the federal government. Thus, even a
valid exercise of a state's police power could be preempted if
Congress intended that health and safety must be weighed with
other factors and that this weighing occur at the federal level.
In regard to the Wyoming Act, the question of preemption
clearly presents itself when site approval is required for a facility
whose construction must also be licensed by the NRC. Although
the environmental report required by the NRC must include information about the status of the applicant's compliance with
appropriate environmental quality standards and zoning and
land use regulation, 5 a court could view this requirement as
being purely informational in character and not providing any
state jurisdiction over the regulation of a federally licensed facil126
ity.
In essence, the issue is whether one mechanically applies the
tests given for preemption or shows some deference to the fact
that the Wyoming Act is a valid police power regulation. While
the Eighth Circuit in Northern States Power based its holding on
the usual preemption tests, the better criteria would seem to be
those given by the dissent in that case:
[TIn our present case the trial court decided the case on the basis
of absolute preemption as a matter of law and refused to permit
testimony on the reasonableness of the state regulations or the
balancing of environmental protection against the desired development of the use of atomic energy. The court made no findings upon
such issue. The issue of reasonableness of the state regulations and
of whether they were so burdensome as to frustrate the development
of atomic energy is not properly before us.'2

Although this dissent appears to be a restatement of previously
cited Supreme Court holdings giving deference to state police
power regulations, 128 the authority of these decisions was not apI Id. at 1153-54.
C.F.R. § 51.20(c) (1975).
2 First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 177-80 (1946); See text accom-

121 10

panying notes 72-75 supra.
2' 447 F.2d at 1158 (Van Oosterhout, J., dissenting).
21 See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
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plied by the majority. The failure of the Supreme Court to clarify
this inconsistency in its memorandum affirmation" 9 is indicative
of the ambiguities arising from the Court's treatment of policepower/preemption issues.
As an exercise of state police power, the Wyoming Act reasonably accomplishes the goal of protecting the health, safety,
and welfare of the citizens of Wyoming, and therefore would seem
to be valid under the police power reasonableness test.""0 However, as Northern States Power demonstrates, the doctrine of
preemption is broad enough to allow a finding as a matter of law
that the NRC's authority preempts the Wyoming Act.' 3 ' Despite
the Supreme Court's long-standing assertion that the police
power is "one of the most essential powers of government, one
that is least limitable,"' 32 the express congressional exclusion of
state regulation of nuclear facility construction 3 makes it highly
unlikely that a court would allow a state to prohibit such construction. This is especially so in light of the national policy encouraging reliance on nuclear energy and the impending shortage
of the enriched uranium needed to fuel nuclear power plants.'
Should a coart find that the Wyoming Act as applied indicates a
pattern of interference with the development of nuclear energy,
it would be invalidated as a frustration of national policy.
HI.

COMMERCE CLAUSE

The preceding section detailed how, under the authority of
the supremacy clause, federal regulations or regulatory schemes
may preempt state regulations. This section will address a second
category of federal prerogatives which, while also based on the
supremacy clause, occurs in the absence of federal legislation.
405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
"" For a discussion of the Wyoming Act's detailed standards and its viability due to
a funding procedure which insures the kinds of studies needed for competent decisionmaking, see notes 27-37 and accompanying text supra.
" Though Northern States Power is distinguishable in that it dealt with an area
expressly excluded from state regulation by Congress, the alternative preemption grounds
which were used indicate that a federal court could find the Wyoming Act preempted by
federal regulation.
"I Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915), cited in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
'
See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
'3' President Ford's State of the Union Address, 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 45
(1975); Hennessey, Legal Aspects of Uranium Enrichment, 14 ATOMic ENERGY L.J. 219,
220 (1972).
12'
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As stated earlier, the enumerated powers of Congress are
generally exclusive in nature and admit of only congressional
exercise of the power.'3 If any state regulation or statute affects,
even indirectly, Congress' power to exercise its exclusive powers,
it could be found repugnant to that enumerated power and would
be invalidated under the supremacy clause. For example, in
Zschernig v.Miller 136 the Supreme Court held that the Oregon
escheat statute regulating the rights of foreign heirs to receive
property was invalid. The Court found that the statute, as construed by the Oregon courts, affected international relations, authority over which is committed by the Constitution to Congress
and the President, in a "persistent and subtle way."' 137 The assertions of counsel for the United States that the application of the
Oregon escheat law did not, in the circumstances of the case,
unduly interfere with the United States' conduct of13 foreign relations were not found to require a different holding.
In determining whether the Wyoming Act may be invalidated by this federal prerogative, one must first ask which of the
federal government's enumerated powers may be affected by this
particular state regulation. The regulation of site selection for
hydroelectric power projects could affect federal control over navigable waters, derived from Congress' authority under the commerce clause. 3 Also, the regulation of site selection of nuclear
facilities could be construed as affecting national security because of the early ties between national defense and the development of atomic power." 40 As we have seen, in both of these situations Congress has delegated its authority to federal agencies
which are actively regulating those facilities."'
The Wyoming Act, in its regulation of site selection of facilities which deal in commodities (both electricity and fuels) which
"- See text accompanying notes 44-47; the Constitution's delegation to Congress of
the power to exercise exclusive legislation for the District of Columbia is one example of
an enumerated power which clearly precludes any state regulation. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl.17.
136 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
's Id. at 440.
' Id. at 443 (Stewart & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
131U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8,cl.
3.
"I See Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy's report on the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946, 1946 U.S. CoDE CONG. SERV. 1327.
"' See text accompanying notes 65-69, 99 supra.
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may reach other states, also affects one of Congress' enumerated
powers for which there is no corresponding regulatory scheme.
Due to the relative abundance of energy resources as compared
to the population of Wyoming, it is clear that these commodities
in particular are being developed to be placed in interstate commerce. Since the Act's regulatory scheme may determine whether
or not a facility can be built and may impose additional costs on
any business desiring to build an industrial facility in Wyoming,
it clearly could be said that the Act has some effect on interstate
commerce, but is the effect enough to invalidate the legislation?
A discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of the relationship between the commerce clause and state regulations is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, two basic points emerge
from a perusal of commerce clause cases: (1) State police power
regulations can be upheld even though they affect interstate commerce'
and (2) state regulations, including police power
regulations, which burden, i.e. directly impair or impede, interstate commerce will be invalidated. 4 ' The Supreme Court has
stated that, although the Constitution conferred upon Congress
the power to regulate commerce, it
never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects
relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the
legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country."

On the other hand the Court has also said:
"I E.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968) (upholding state law requiring full train crews); Cities Serv.
Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) (upholding state order requiring
company to take natural gas ratably at fixed prices although 90% of gas went out of state);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (upholding state law requiring delivery of most of
raisin crop to control committee although 95% of raisins went out of state); South Carolina
State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (upholding state law restricting weights and size of motor carriers).
" E.g., Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964)
(invalidating state regulation which would have barred interstate milk from a major
segment of the Florida milk market); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (invalidating
state law segregating races on interstate buses); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (invalidating state law regulating length of interstate trains);
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 U.S. 369 (1923) (invalidating
state order requiring that interstate trains be stopped at a small town); Illinois Central
R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142 (1896) (invalidating state law requiring trains to stop at
county seats).
"' Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960), quoting
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103 (1876).
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The State cannot, under cover of executing its police powers, undertake what amounts essentially to a regulation of interstate com5
merce, or impose a direct burden upon that commerce.'

Therefore, assuming that a state regulation results in some burden on commerce, the first issue becomes whether a state police
power regulation either directly or indirectly burdens interstate
commerce. The Wyoming Act does not directly deal with any
particular commodity but rather deals with the selection of sites
which could then be used to produce a commodity. Under the
"mechanical test" the Wyoming Act is applied before any "operation of interstate commerce occurs" and is, therefore, constitutional.'" Even assuming that the Wyoming Act did have a closer
relationship to any particular commodity, the Act does not prohibit outright any facility producing these commodities but
merely insures that the facilities will be located in accordance
with state interests. Thus, any effect resulting from a particular
site being invalidated would be incidental to the siting process
rather than a natural outcome of the state regulation.
Even though the Wyoming Act does not constitute a direct
burden on commerce there are further tests which the Supreme
Court has applied to state police power regulation. First, the state
regulation must be reasonable. The Supreme Court has articulated this test to be "whether the means of regulation chosen are
reasonably adapted to the end sought."' 47 While this determination is dependent on the facts of a particular case, the Court has
given some indication of what will be considered unreasonable in
the context of interstate commerce. For example, in Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit'4 the Court said that a
state may not impose a burden which either discriminates against
interstate commerce or operates to disrupt its required uniformity.

149

Once a determination is made that a regulation is a reasonable means to attain the ends sought, a court is left with a number
of alternatives, although it first must determine whether it should
conduct a balancing test. In 1938 the Supreme Court stated that,
'
"7

Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 524 (1912).
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 360-61 (1943).
South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938).

362 U.S. 440 (1960).
" Id. at 448.
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in the absence of congressional legislation, the judicial function
stops at the inquiry of whether the means of state regulation
chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought. 50 Since that
time the Court has developed a balancing test. 5 ' A fairly recent
pronouncement of this test is found in Pike v. Bruce Church,

Inc. :12
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. 5 3

Although this statement appears to require a balancing of interests, the method has not been used by other courts. For example,
in Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago,'54 the Seventh Circuit, after noting that there were some arguments for not going
any further once the reasonableness of the state regulation had
been shown, 5 opted to take a middle path:
[If the burden on interstate commerce is slight, and the area of
legislation is one that is properly of local concern, the means chosen
to accomplish this end should be deemed reasonably effective unless
the party attacking the legislation demonstrates the contrary by
clear and convincing proof."'

Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case, the test
given by the Seventh Circuit would appear to be as valid as the
balancing test used by the Supreme Court in Pike. The Seventh
Circuit's test, which presumes the validity of state legislation, is
actually a restatement of a precept consistently used by courts in
deciding zoning cases. 5 '
In applying these tests to the Wyoming Act, it is apparent
that the construction permit requirement is not an undue burden
South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938).
The Supreme Court has struck down state regulations by applying the balancing
test even where the regulation was non-discriminatory. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959).
152397 U.S. 137 (1970).
" Id. at 142.
509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 1980 (1975).
Id. at 75.
• Id. at 76.
The Supreme Court has said that where a legislative body makes a zoning classification which is fairly debatable, the legislative judgment will control. See, e.g., Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
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on interstate commerce. It does not discriminate, nor does it disrupt any required uniformity. As to whether the Act is a reasonable means to the ends sought, a permit system, designed to produce decisions based on adequate information, appears considerably more reasonable than outright banning of certain activities,
such as is done in zoning and which has been upheld. 58 While it
could be argued that the denial of a permit does create an undue
burden on commerce, such an argument really goes to the issue
of whether the Act is being applied in a reasonable manner, not
to the issue of whether the Act is invalid on its face as an undue
burden on interstate commerce. If the Wyoming Act is unreasonably applied, it may be59 struck down regardless of whether or not
it is valid on its face.

Another remaining consideration is whether the fee requirements of the Wyoming Act are an undue burden on interstate
commerce. First, the total fees (including the fee for an additional study) can be no more than 1 percent of the estimated
construction cost, with certain lower limits, depending on the
amount involved.6 0 The provisions for a refund of the fees, combined with the fact that no further fees are incurred, indicate that
this burden is slight and the provision would be upheld, even if
the balancing test were applied. Even if the fees were higher, the
Wyoming Act might be upheld, since the purpose of the regulation is social and environmental. In American Can Co. v. Oregon
Liquor Control Commission'' an Oregon court held that a banning of disposable cans for environmental reasons was not an
undue burden on commerce even though the affected parties
would lose considerable amounts of money.' And, the Supreme
Court has upheld state regulations completely banning a particular business on the grounds that the Court would not interfere
where the purposes of the regulation were for the social, as opposed to the economic, benefit of the citizens.6 3
'" See Cadoux v. Planning & Zoning Comm., 162 Conn. 425, 294 A.2d 582, cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 924 (1972); Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester Township, 37
N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-502.81(b), -502.83 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
"I

15 Ore. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973).
!d. at 625-27, 517 P.2d at 695-96.

"'

Breard v. Alexander, 341 U.S. 622 (1951)(banning door-to-door soliciation).
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Thus, under traditional Supreme Court tests the Wyoming
Act appears not to be an undue burden on interstate commerce.
This conclusion is reinforced in the light of a June 1976 Supreme
Court decision which represents a turning in the Supreme Court's
treatment of state regulation and the commerce clause. National
League of Cities v. Usery"4 concerned 1974 amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act which applied minimum wage requirements to almost all public employees employed by the states and
various political subdivisions. In overruling its decision in
Maryland v. Wirtz,'65 made eight years earlier, the Court stated:
We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the State's freedom to structure integral operations
in areas of traditionalgovernmental functions, they are not within
the authority granted Congress by [the commerce clause].'

Thus, although the Court specifically recognized that Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce is "plenary,"'"7 it held that
it was not absolute. The Court's reluctance to use the commerce
clause to invalidate state regulation of "traditional" functions
could just as well be applied to such other traditional functions
as the exercise of the police power.
IV. PUBLIc LANDS
The third situation in which federal prerogatives may
preempt the operation of a state regulation occurs when the state
regulation affects public land. The term "public land" as used in
this note does not include all federally owned land, as "Article I"
lands, which the government owns, are inherently excluded from
state regulation. "Article IV" lands, on the other hand, may be
the subject of concurrent state and federal control, "' and, thus,
will be dealt with in this note.
"1

96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).

"'

392 U.S. 183 (1968).
96 S. Ct. at 2474 (emphasis added).

Id. at 2468.
Federal lands may be roughly divided into two categories. What may be termed
"Article I" lands are those lands purchased for the erection of "forts, magazines, arsenals,
drydocks, and other needful buildings," over which the Constitution gives the federal
government full legislative authority. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The second category
'"

of federal lands, which may be termed "Article IV" lands, encompasses all other territory

and property belonging to the federal government. Over these lands, the Constitution
gives the federal government the power "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and

Regulations." Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Federal authority over Article IV lands, rather than
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The question of jurisdiction over federal land is of particular
importance to the Wyoming Act, because federal lands comprise
almost half of the area of the State of Wyoming."' In addition to
owning considerable land in fee simple absolute, the federal government has, since 1916, transferred land to private ownership
but reserved the rights to the minerals which lie below the surface. 70 Thus, the combination of the high percentage of federal
lands in Wyoming with federal ownership of key energy resources
means that almost any state regulation of energy development
facilities in Wyoming will involve federal property.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that a state's police
power does extend over public lands. 7' However, the Court has
qualified this statement to the effect that Congress has unlimited
power to control and dispose of the public lands.'72 The relationship between these state and federal powers over public lands is
perhaps best described by one federal district court:
[T]he authorities treating with the matter of exclusive control of
federal lands by the Federal Government clearly and definitely hold
that State law and the State police power extends over the federal
public domain unless and until Congress has determined to deal
exclusively with the subject.'73

Although the Supreme Court has consistently asserted that
Congress' power over federal lands is "without limitation,''' 7 this
being legislative in character, as is the express federal authority over Article I lands, is
really proprietary, albeit uniquely so. Thus, this note will deal only with Article IV lands
over which there may be concurrent federal and state jurisdiction.
"I See note 24 supra.

Mineral rights were reserved to the United States in the Stock-Raising Homestead
Act of 1916, 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1970). For a view of the problems that the federal
mineral reservations created see Note, Mineral Prospecting in Urban Areas: A Study of
Surface and Mineral Rights Conflicts Under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, 16 ARIZ.
L. REV. 860 (1974). Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, the energy resources of coal,
oil, gas, and oil shale are to be developed only through leasing arrangements with the
federal government. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970).
"I Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); Omaechevarria v. Idaho,
246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918). See also Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277
F. Supp. 366, 369 (W.D. Okla. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 829 (1969).
I'lKleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 2285 (1976); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272
(1954); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918); Utah Power & Light Co. v.
United States, 243 U.S. 389. 404-05 (1917).
"I Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp. 366, 369 (W.D.
Okla. 1967) (citations omitted).
"I,Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273-74 (1954); United States v. San Francisco,
310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940).
17o
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has been challenged as an incorrect interpretation of the law.' 7
One commentator has argued that the source of the Court's misconception was Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States.'76 Prior
to this case, the Supreme Court had upheld the enforcement of
state law regarding public lands, with the major exception that
the federal government had an absolute power of disposal regard77
less of state law:'
The dicta, [in Utah Power,] however, disclose an entirely novel
and radically different view of relative state and federal power over
Article IV property. On this view, the exception pertaining to acquisition of private rights devoured the established rule.17

It is clear that, at the present time, the Wyoming Act applies
with full force and effect to federal land. Apart from general
pronouncements by the Supreme Court that state police powers
apply to federal lands, in United States v. Hatahley, 71 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit specifically held
that state law applies to federal lands administered under the
Taylor Grazing Act.'80 Well over half of the federal lands in Wyo,I Engdahl, State and Federal Power over Federal Property, (Plowshare Technical
Paper No. 3), 2 WESTERN INTERSTATE NUCLEAR BD.-PLWSHARE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
LEGAL STUDIES 136 (1973). Engdahl argues that the federal government's power over public
lands is proprietary in nature, and, that, although the federal government under the broad
authority of the "necessary and proper" and "general welfare" clauses can use extraneous
methods to effectuate goals under its enumerated powers, and can use its enumerated
powers to effectuate extraneous goals, it cannot use extraneous methods to effectuate
extraneous goals. Thus, although the federal government can use its power over the disposal of public lands or can use its power to condition contracts to regulate commerce and
provide for the national defense, it cannot use its power over public lands to develop
energy.
'7

243 U.S. 389 (1917).

Engdahl, supra note 167, at 174-75.
Id. at 176-77. Although Engdahl agrees with the outcome of the decision, he says
it could have been based solely on the federal government's absolute right to dispose of
title to its property, rather than on a much broader proposition that the federal government has complete dominion over federal lands. Id. at 176. While Engdahl's argument is
legally sound, it is not likely to be persuasive, in light of the Supreme Court's consistent
1"

'71

position for 50 years. In addition, the argument ignores the fact that the Constitution,
besides granting the federal government authority to "dispose" of federal lands, also
grants it authority "to make all needful Rules and Regulations" for federal lands. U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. If the power to "dispose" is one exception to the general rule
that state law applies, it is not very difficult to view the power "to make all needful Rules
and Regulations" as creating a second exception providing the authority necessary to
support the Supreme Court's position that the federal government has broad powers over
public land.
,7, 220 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
'" Id. at 671.
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ming are administered by the Bureau of Land Management,""'
which is primarily responsible for managing public lands under
the Taylor Grazing Act.' Under the decision in Hatahley then,
as much as a quarter of the State of Wyoming is public land
over which state law applies. In addition, the federal courts have
also held that state law applies to leased mineral rights.'m While
it is clear that the federal prerogatives over federal land do not
currently affect the operation of the Wyoming Act, the federal
government does possess the power to supplant state police power
regulation whenever it desires.

V.

RESOLUTION OF POTENTIAL FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT

The preceding discussion of federal prerogatives and the
Wyoming Act indicates that there are definite preemption problems if the Wyoming Act is applied to facilities subject to federal
licensing, specifically, hydroelectric and nuclear facilities. In
addition, a potentially significant problem exists in that the federal government may direct that federal lands be used to further
the national policy of energy development. Legislation effectuating this policy could effectively preempt state land use regulation
over federal lands. Although the state would continue to exercise
other powers, such as taxation of federal lessees, such exercise
would be of little value if the state lost the ability to control the
use of land within its boundaries.
How then should Wyoming, or any state with similar land
use regulations or concerns, assert the right to control land use?
One alternative is to litigate the issue, asserting that the state
regulation is a legitimate exercise of state police power to protect
its citizens through the control of land use, rather than a frustration of national policy.' It could also be persuasively argued that
site selection has not been made the subject matter of federal
regulation.'8
See note 24 supra.
43 U.S.C. §§ 315 to 315n (1970).
"
Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Okla. 1967). Support for these decisions
may be found in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, which states:
[Niothing in this chapter shall be construed or held to affect the right of
States or any local authority to exercise any rights which they have ....
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287, 189 (1970).
"I See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
1 Support for this contention is found in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
"

",
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While the federal government has not yet specifically legislated on the subject of site selection of energy facilities,' it has
granted the FPC and NRC licensing authority over the construction of energy development facilities." 7 Whether a court would
consider site selection an inherent part of the construction of
these facilities would probably depend on the particular fact situation; for, while the actual site is crucial to the construction of a
hydroelectric power project, it may be considerably less important to the construction of a nuclear power plant. The outcome
of any litigation in this area is not predictable, and because of the
expense involved, litigation would not be the most satisfactory
means to assert state rights to regulate land use.'88
However, the states could assert legitimate local interests
and work within the framework of the federal system. While the
federal government can legislate to invalidate state regulation
(albeit under strong political and perhaps legal dissent by the
states), it is clear that the federal government can also give the
states the legal right to regulate certain matters of true local
interest. Such authority already exists in certain areas.8 9 One
might say that the question of whether a state could regulate land
within the federal process was answered in First Iowa HydroElectric Cooperative v. FPC, 90 where the Supreme Court held
that these kinds of federal requirements were merely informa218 (1947). Although the Supreme Court held in that case that federal regulation of
warehousemen licensed under the Warehouse Act terminated the dual system of state and
federal regulation, it also held that Illinois law could validly require approval for management, construction, and contracts between licensees and other parties, because the federal
act did not expressly preempt these activities. Id. at 237. Thus, even though it was found
that the federal regulatory system completely preempted the state system, the Court
acknowledged that some activities of the federal licensee were still subject to state regulation.
'" But see H.R. 11066, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) which would have provided for
"State siting agencies" to facilitate federal/state coordination on the siting of bulk electric
power facilities and which declared that issues involving a balancing of regional power
needs with environmental factors should be resolved at the state level. Cf. S. 619, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), the administration's Energy Facilities Planning and Development
Act, which expressly preempts state siting laws.
"
See text accompanying notes 66, 119 supra.
"
See text accompanying note 61 supra.
"' For example, the NRC operates under rules and regulations which require its
applicants to provide evidence of compliance with state land use regulation. See note 125
supra.
190 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
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tional in character and did not, therefore, grant the state any
power to affect a federal licensee.' 9'
Since the decision in First Iowa, a federal statute has been
enacted which could change the outcome of any future decisions
in this area. The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968
(Cooperation Act),'92 which provides the basis for state review of
federal assistance grants under the Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-95,193 contains broad language which could be
the foundation of a federal policy to require federal consideration
of state views. The Act states:
All viewpoints-national, regional, State, and local-shall, to
the extent possible, be fully considered and taken into account in
planning Federal or federally assisted development programs and
projects. State and local government objectives, together with the
objectives of regional organizations shall be considered and evaluated within a framework of national public objectives, as expressed
in Federal law, and available projections of future national conditions and needs of regions, States, and localities shall be considered
in plan formulation, evaluation, and review." 4

While this language is located in a section entitled "Declaration
of development assistance policy,"' 95 it clearly includes a range of
federal programs and projects beyond those providing federal
development assistance. Just as the courts established that the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969'" set forth a "substantive policy" making environmental protection a part of the
"mandate" of every federal agency and department,'97 the courts
could consider the language of the Cooperation Act a mandate to
consider the views of the states.' 9
"' See text accompanying note 75 supra.

1,242 U.S.C. §§ 4201-44 (1970).

"I See generally Sikorsky, Local Control Over Federally Funded Projects, 19 N.Y.L.
FORUM 113 (1973).
"1 42 U.S.C. § 4231(b) (1970).
", Id. § 4231.

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
,, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir.

1971).
"I The Cooperation Act does, however, differentiate between federal projects and
federally assisted development. While the section dealing with both types of programs
speaks of state views being considered to "the extent possible," the section dealing with
federally assisted development states that programs are to be consistent with state, regional, and local comprehensive planning to "the maximum extent possible." 42 U.S.C.
§ 4231(c). Whether this distinction would operate to preclude an argument that the
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This interpretation of the Cooperation Act would appear to
fill present gaps in state jurisdiction to regulate land use. In those
instances where a federal prerogative operates to supplant state
regulation, state views on how the activity is to be regulated
would become part of the process of the very federal system which
supplanted the state regulation. Until such an interpretation of
the Cooperation Act is accepted by the courts, states will not be
able to force federal agencies to consider state views in the federal
decisionmaking process. However, there are several measures
that a state may take to assert its views on matters of state
concern as a participant in the federal process. For example,
states can provide necessary input to federal programs and regulations.'" In addition, states should endeavor to have state regulation be given legal effect within the federal process.200 Although
federal laws and regulations which recognize a state role in the
federal process are few in number, the states should utilize the
political process to encourage both the enactment of federal legislation and the adoption of federal agency regulations which recognize the legitimate role of states in the federal process in matters
of state concern.
Cooperation Act established a substantive policy for the consideration of state views
cannot be known until the question is litigated.
"I U.S. Office of Management & Budget, Circular A-95, 38 Fed. Reg. 32876-77 (1973),
which concerns all federal development activities, requires federal agencies to consult with
state officials and agencies. Also, NRC requirements provide for cooperation with the
states in the conduct of the Nuclear Site Survey. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
" Such recognition of state regulation within the federal process does exist. For
example, Section 401(d) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(33 U.S.C. 1341(d) (Supp. II 1972)) specifically provides for incorporation of state law into
federal permit programs. Also, the Army Corps of Engineers, under its authority to issue
permits for activities in navigable waters and ocean waters, on July 25, 1975, published
interim final regulations which recognized a state role in the regulation of navigable
waters. 40 Fed. Reg. 31319 (1975). The new regulations provide that, if a permit is being
sought from the Corps of Engineers for an activity for which state certification or authorization is required by federal, state, or local law, and if the certification or authorization
is denied by the state, the Corps of Engineers will deny the permit. Id. at 31327. The intent
of the Corps of Engineers to include a state role in its permit process is clear from the
letter of explanation which accompanied the publication of the new regulations:
We believe there is considerable merit in having the States become
directly involved in the decisionmaking process to the maximum extent
possible.
Id. at 31322.
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CONCLUSION

An analysis of the Wyoming Act indicates that this Act and
similar statutes of other states could be limited by federal prerogatives when the state regulation pertains to facilities actively
regulated by federal agencies. In the case of the Wyoming Act,
these facilities are hydroelectric power projects regulated by the
FPC and nuclear facilities regulated by the NRC. As long as the
application of the Wyoming Act does not present a pattern of
obstructing a major segment of interstate commerce, the application of a balancing test would indicate that the Act does not unduly burden interstate commerce. As to the question of the effect
of state land use regulation on public lands, there is presently no
difficulty, but herein lies the greatest potential for federal-state
conflict, should Congress decide to direct specifically how public
land is to be used for energy development.
In the face of these federal prerogatives, the states have two
basic alternatives: Litigate to assert the right to regulate matters
of state concern, or try to work within the federal framework to
ensure that state views are respected. The latter approach, using
the authority expressly given the states to comment on federal
projects and activities 210 through the authority of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act,120 appears to be the more practical.
In the final analysis, however, the most effective means to
resolve federal-state conflict and successfully assert the right of
states to regulate land use lies in the political process. The states
should strive to have Congress and the federal agencies grant the
states express authority to regulate activities of significant local
impact which call for the exercise of the states' police powers. As
the tenor of the Supreme Court becomes more receptive to the
states' role in the federal system, the states may find that litigation will become more effective.
Louis J Marucheau
2' See text accompanying note 189 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 182-87 supra.

COMMENT
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney:

CLOSING

THE

DOOR TO A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF SEXUAL PRIVACY
INTRODUCTION

In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney' the Supreme Court
affirmed a federal three-judge court's decision upholding the constitutionality of a Virginia sodomy statute' which, on its face,
criminalized oral and anal sex between members of the same or
opposite sex, married or unmarried. The affirmance without
opinion of the lower court decision is a setback for those who had
hoped the Court would take the logical step from its historic
holdings in Griswold v. Connecticut 3 and Eisenstadt v. Baird4 and
accord constitutional status to a right of sexual privacy for all
consenting adults. Viewed in its clearest light Doe can be regarded only as a determination by the Court to close the door
quietly but firmly on any prospect for recognizing such a right in
- 96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976), aff'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) [hereinafter cited in
text and footnotes as Doe]. Appellants John Doe and Richard Roe are homosexuals who
"regularly seek and enjoy sexual gratification in a private and consensual manner with
other adults." Their action was brought to enjoin enforcement of the Virginia sodomy
statute, see note 2 infra. The only testimony given before the three-judge court was that
of plaintiffs' witness, Frank Kameny, Ph.D., who was qualified as an expert in the field
of homosexuality. Defendants presented no evidence, and there were no factual disputes
in the case. Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement at 3-4. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens would have noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument. 96 S.
Ct. at 1490.
' VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1975), amending VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (1950). The
statute provides:
If any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth,
or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of
a Class 6 felony.
A Class 6 felony is punishable in Virginia by imprisonment of not less than 1 year or more
than 5 years. In the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case without a jury, the
penalty may be limited to confinement in jail of not more than 12 months and a fine of
up to $1,000. Id. § 18.2-10.
3 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Connecticut contraceptive statute held unconstitutional invasion of married couple's due process right of privacy) [hereinafter cited in text and
footnotes as Griswold].
' 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts contraceptive statute held unconstitutional as
a denial of equal protection to unmarried adults) [hereinafter cited in text and footnotes
as Eisenstadt].
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the foreseeable future, notwithstanding persuasive due process
and equal protection arguments to the contrary.
Basically the Supreme Court was faced with two sharply
competing options in Doe. It could write a decision that would
effectively dismantle the ancient proscriptions against sodomy, '
a decision that would join Griswold, Stanley v. Georgia,'
Eisenstadt and Roe v. Wade7 in establishing an important new
benchmark in the right of privacy. Or it could exercise judicial
restraint and defer to the state's police power to legislate in areas
of public morality. Existing constitutional doctrine made either
alternative equally plausible, and either could be chosen without
straining policy, principles, or precedent. Faced with this clear
choice of alternatives, the Supreme Court elected not to break
new constitutional ground. In so doing the Court gave its official
blessing' to laws in many states which prohibit sodomy by consenting adults.' It also raised fresh doubts about the power of
I For a discussion of the origins and development of sodomy laws from medieval times
to the present see Comment, The Bedroom Should Not Be Within the Provinceof the Law,
4 CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 115, 115-17 (1968). For an argument that laws regulating sexual
conduct are rooted in ancient religious beliefs, and that their perpetuation by government
unconstitutionally violates the separation of church and state see Hefner, The Legal
Enforcement of Morality, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 199 (1968). See also discussion in note 79
infra.
A394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess obscene materials in the home).
7 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Texas statute prohibiting abortion held unconstitutional as an
invasion of a woman's right of privacy in deciding whether to have an abortion during first
trimester of pregnancy). The right of privacy in abortion matters was extended to unwed
minors in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
It should be borne in mind that the Supreme Court's action in Doe was not to deny
certiorari, but rather to affirm without comment a decision on appeal from a three-judge
federal court. The difference is critical. "Reliance on denial of certiorari for any proposition impairs the vitality of the discretion we exercise in controlling cases we hear ...
When we deny certiorari, no one, not even ourselves, should think that the denial indicates
a view on the merits of the case." United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460-61 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Dismissal or affirmance of an appeal, on the other hand, "is a
decision . . . having precedential value, not a mere refusal to review that allows the lower
court's decision to stand." STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 230-31 (4th ed.
1969).
1 For a compilation of state sodomy statutes in effect as of 1971, see Note,
Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 272, 280-87 (1971). A former
Colorado statute prohibiting consensual sodomy was repealed July 1, 1973, and replaced
by two punishing only "Deviate sexual intercourse by imposition" and "Deviate sexual
intercourse by force or its equivalent." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-403 to -404 (1973),
repealing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-31 (1963). See Note, Sexual Assault Law Reform
in Colorado-An Analysis of House Bill 1042, 53 DENVER L.J. 349 (1976). For a compilation
of pre-Griswold cases holding that proscriptions against sodomy extend to heterosexual

DOE: THE RIGHT OF SEXUAL PRIVACY

Griswold to carve out new areas of sexual privacy. And, by declining to hand down even a brief opinion, the Supreme Court
avoided a direct confrontation with the now overripe question of
whether statutes regulating sexual conduct between consenting
adults bear any rational relation to a legitimate state purpose.
Doe should have come as no surprise to those who have followed state appellate and lower federal court decisions on the
constitutionality of state sodomy statutes since Griswold was decided in 1965. The vast majority of courts have sustained the
constitutionality of these statutes. Only one ultimate tribunalthe Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts-has held that
the state may not punish consensual sodomy between adults in
private.
This discussion begins in Part I with a consideration of those
cases in which courts were required to examine the constitutionality of sodomy statutes in light of Griswold and Eisenstadt;
wherein the United States Supreme Court laid the doctrinal basis
for a constitutional "right of privacy" secure against governmental intrusion, and specifically brought marital sex within the
ambit of that right. In Part II, the lower court's analysis in Doe
will be compared with three decisions which have held state sodomy statutes constitutionally invalid as applied to consenting
adults. The conclusion discusses the meaning of Doe, including
whether Griswold may have lost whatever potency it once had as
a constitutional source for a substantive right of privacy in sexual
matters.
I. REACTIONS TO Griswold AND Eisenstadt
Prior to Griswold, state appellate courts universally held that
consent was not a defense to sodomy, whether the consent was
exercised by married or unmarried sexual partners. In State v.
Nelson,10 for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
statute criminalizing sodomy expressed a legislative design to
ban such conduct, and further determined that the proscription
as well as homosexual conduct see State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 394, 301 A.2d 748, 752 (1973).
Discussions of pre-Griswold case law, along with an argument for the wholesale repeal of
state sodomy statutes, may be found in Note, Deviate Sexual Behavior: The Desirability
of Legislative Proscription, 30 ALBANY L. REV. 291 (1966), and Note, The Crimes Against
Nature, 16 J. PuB. L. 159 (1967).
,0 199 Minn. 86, 271 N.W. 114 (1937).
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did not stop short of the marital bed. Likewise, the North Carolina Supreme Court declared that compulsion was not an element
of sodomy, and that consent was no bar to the prosecution of
either married or unmarried persons."
Griswold and Eisenstadt radically altered the course of sodomy litigation by providing an entirely new line of constitutional
attack. Beginning with Griswold, state and lower federal court
decisions have fallen into three major categories: First, cases
holding that married couples are exempted from sodomy statutes
on the ground that Griswold constitutionally screens consensual
marital sex from state scrutiny; second, cases decided since
Eisenstadt rejecting the argument that unmarried adults are exempted from sodomy statutes on the authority of Griswold and
Eisenstadt; and third, cases decided since Eisenstadt holding
that state sodomy statutes are unconstitutional as applied to all
consenting adults. As will be seen, Eisenstadt was the critical
factor in stemming the seemingly inexorable tide of decisions
holding unmarried persons criminally liable for consensual sodomy.
A.

From Griswold to Eisenstadt

Cotner v. Henry" was the first case to make specific use of
Griswold in decriminalizing consensual sodomy between married
persons. The defendant had filed a habeas corpus petition after
being sentenced to 2-14 years for committing "the abominable
and detestable crime against nature" with his wife. His conviction was set aside on the ground that a guilty plea had been
entered without knowledge of Griswold and the strong constitutional arguments that case offered him. The court noted that the
prosecutrix was the defendant's wife, and that she had made no
claim of compulsion. Construing Griswold to mean that "private,
consensual, marital relations are protected from regulation by the
state through the use of criminal penalty,"' 3 the court held that
consensual sex between married persons could not be punished
absent a "clear showing that the state had an interest in preventing such relations, which outweighed the constitutional right to
"

State v. Jemigan, 255 N.C. 732, 122 S.E.2d 711 (1961).
394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968) [hereinafter cited in text
and footnotes as Cotner].
11394 F.2d at 875.
12
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marital privacy."'" Cotner became a foundation case, on which
later decisions would build, standing for the proposition that consensual marital sex was within the ambit of Griswold and thus
immune to criminal sanctions. 5
Two years after the Supreme Court had denied certiorari in
Cotner, a three-judge federal court examined the constitution5 The
ality of the Texas sodomy statute in Buchanan v. Batchelor."
original action was brought by a homosexual, but a married couple intervened on the ground the statute did not exempt private
acts of married persons. The statute was declared facially void for
unconstitutional overbreadth, the court reasoning that since
Griswold had brought marital relationships within the scope of
privacy, the Texas statute swept too broadly in punishing marital
conduct along with homosexual sodomy. No legitimate state purpose in criminalizing homosexual sodomy, the court said, could
justify intrusion into the private conduct of married persons.
Buchanan was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court, and
Texas courts have consistently declined to adopt the federal district court's reasoning. 7
"

Id.

Cotner was cited with approval the following year in Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp.
581 (W.D. Va. 1969). In Towler a man convicted of forcible sodomy on his wife raised a
constitutional challenge to the Virginia sodomy statute. The statute was upheld, but in
dictum the court noted that had the element of force been absent it would have been
"guided" by Cotner. Id. at 582. Cotner was then cited for the principle that consensual
sodomy by a married coupe is no crime without a clear showing that the state's interest
outweighed the right of marital privacy established in Griswold. Id.
"1 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S.
989 (1971) [hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as Buchanan]. For a discussion of the
lower court's decision see Note, Sodomy Statutes: The Question of Constitutionality, 50
NEB. L. REV. 567 (1971), and Comment, Texas Statute Prohibiting Sodomy Is
Unconstitutionally Overbroad in ProscribingPrivate, Consensual Conduct of Unmarried
Couples, 49 TEX. L. REV. 400 (1971).
'1 See Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402
U.S. 902 (1971), wherein the state court specifically repudiated Buchanan and rejected
any claims that the Texas sodomy statute was constitutionally infirm. The court then
went on to hold that consensual marital sex was not covered by the statute. It reached
this conclusion not on the basis of prior case law, but on the unique theory that prosecution of married persons for sodomy was a practical impossibility. A private sexual act will
not have witnesses, the court said, and if the conduct is consensual the parties are equally
guilty, which would require outside corroboration of the act; in any event, where the
element of force was lacking neither husband nor wife would be competent to testify
against the other.
As for the claim of unconstitutional overbreadth, the state court refused to strike
down the Texas statute on the basis that it covered a class of persons-i.e., married
'
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The Griswold-Eisenstadt PrincipleRejected

Prior to Eisenstadt, actions brought by unmarried persons to
challenge the constitutionality of state sodomy statutes were uniformly unsuccessful."8 The infirmity underlying these persistent
defeats was that the assault had to be mounted almost exclusively on the strength of Griswold, which was conceptually too
inelastic for the job it was being asked to do. Consequently the
parties' tireless attacks were met with the courts' equally tireless
reiteration that Griswold was written not to secure the rights of
American men and women at large, but only those sacrosanct
marital amenities such as the home, the family, and the healthy
procreational activities of the connubial bed. Griswold's right to
privacy might ultimately embrace a broad range of fundamental
human interests, such as a woman's right to abortion, 9 but in
purely sexual matters it could not be extended without the help
of some conceptual tool that would gather married and unmarried
persons under the same constitutional umbrella, thereby linking
adults-who in fact are not prosecuted under the statute. To allow such a result, the court
said, would be inconsistent with Griswold and the reverence which Justice Douglas paid
to the marital relationship in that case. It went on to declare that the Texas statute
nevertheless remained fully applicable against unmarried consenting adults. Accord,
Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972).
Since Pruett v. State the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has thrice upheld the
state sodomy statute against attacks for unconstitutional overbreadth and violation of
constitutional rights. Lee v. State, 505 S.W.2d 816 (1974); Turner v. State, 497 S.W.2d
593 (1973); Everette v. State, 465 S.W.2d 162 (1971).
Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York,
" Courts in California, Indiana,
Oklahoma, and Texas rejected the right-of-privacy argument, holding that regulation of
sodomy was a permissible state objective. Most cases also held that such statutes invaded
no constitutionally protected areas. See People v. Brown, 6 Cal. App. 3d 619, 86 Cal. Rptr.
149 (1970); People v. Blagg, 267 Cal. App. 2d 598, 73 Cal. Rptr. 93, aff'd, 10 Cal. App. 3d
1035, 89 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1968); People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70
(1967) (following a pre-Griswold holding in People v. Ragsdale, 177 Cal. App. 2d 676, 2
Cal. Rptr. 640 (1960); Miller v. State, 256 Ind. 296, 268 N.E.2d 299 (1971); Dixon v. State,
256 Ind. 266, 268 N.E.2d 84 (1971); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800 (1966);
Washington v. Rodriguez, 82 N.M. App. 428, 483 P.2d 309 (1971); Raphael v. Hogan, 305
F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Moore v. State, 501 P.2d 529 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 987 (1973); Warner v. State, 489 P.2d 526 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971);
Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (challenge to Texas sodomy statute
dismissed for lack of justiciability); Everette v. State, 465 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App.
1971); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S.
902 (1971).
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
'" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
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both classes to the right of privacy guaranteed in Griswold. That
tool was to be fashioned in Eisenstadt, which meshed with
Griswold to provide an argument for a substantive right of sexual
privacy unrelated to marriage. Even then the argument was to be
rejected by a great majority of courts.
The analytical flaws in the new Griswold-Eisenstadtprinciple were first revealed in Lair v. State,20 which proved a significant bellwether of how this two-pronged argument would fare in
the courts. Lair fell at a critical point in the history of sodomy
litigation, coming well after Griswold had ripened to judicial acceptance, but only one year after the Supreme Court held in
Eisenstadt that the married-unmarried classification was an unconstitutional basis for criminalizing the distribution of contraceptives. Thus the defendant in Lair found the court willing to
grant his claim that, on the strength of Griswold and Cotner,
consensual marital conduct was exempt under the New Jersey
sodomy statute; but the court summarily rejected his then novel
argument that Eisenstadt clothed unmarried adults in all the
rights of privacy accorded married persons in Griswold. Echoing
similar language in Pruett v. State,21 Hughes v. State2 and other
cases where a critical distinction was drawn between married and
unmarried persons, the court said:
The opinion of Justice Douglas in Griswold eulogizes the married
state, stresses the intimacies of married life and concludes that privacy is so important to a fulfillment of the marriage relationship as
to justify recognition as a right of constitutional dimension. It is a
rather obvious non sequitur that as a matter of equal protection
some similar or equal right to privacy must be found to exist in order
to protect the sexual conduct of the unmarried. . . . [Eisenstadt]
touches in no way upon the right of marital privacy with which
Griswold is concerned. .....

Further distinguishing the two cases, the court pointed out that
while the results reached in Griswold and Eisenstadt were analogous, their doctrinal bases were distinctly different: Eisenstadt
declared the Massachusetts contraceptive statute a violation of
equal protection, while in Griswold the Connecticut contracep62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973) [hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as Lair].
463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971). See
note 17 supra.
14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972).
62 N.J. at 396-97, 301 A.2d at 753.
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tive statute was deemed inconsistent with a due process right of
privacy. Having disposed of the argument that Eisenstadt is a
linear extension of Griswold, the court held that consensual sodomy by unmarried persons was not entitled to constitutional
protection under either decision. 4
As the court demonstrated in Lair, the rationale of
Eisenstadt did not ineluctably bring unmarried persons within
the scope of a due process right of privacy. Nor were many courts
moved by Eisenstadt'sequal protection argument when they were
asked to apply it to sodomy, a species of sexual conduct that was
void of the redeeming procreational considerations and "natural
sex" that were at stake in the abortion and contraceptive cases."
Unpersuaded even in the wake of Eisenstadt, courts followed the
lead of Lair and turned back fresh or renewed challenges to sodomy statutes in several states.
24 Lair also considered a challenge to the New Jersey sodomy statute on the ground
it was unconstitutionally vague in failing to set out with sufficient clarity the conduct
proscribed. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:143-1 (1952) equated "sodomy" with "the infamous
crime against nature, committed with man or beast," but offered no further definition.
The court held that "crime against nature" had a definite meaning in common law, that
this meaning was well known to the general population, and that failure to describe
sodomy in precise terms "has always been attributed to legislative desire to avoid the
indelicacy of explicit description." 62 N.J. at 394, 301 A.2d at 752.
The leading case in the area of sodomy statutes challenged for unconstitutional
vagueness is Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, rev'g per curiam 478 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.
1973), holding a Florida statute not unconstitutional for vagueness in its proscription
against "the abominable and detestable crime against nature, either with mankind or with
beast." Accord, Locke v. Rose, 423 U.S. 48, rev'g per curiam 514 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1975);
Thompson v. Turner, 275 F. Supp. 65 (E.D.N.C. 1967); State v. Moles, 17 N.C. App. 664,
195 S.E.2d 352 (1973); Moore v. State, 501 P.2d 529 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 987 (1973). Contra, Jellum v. Cupp, 475 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1973) (Oregon statute
proscribing "unnatural conduct contrary to the course of nature" unconstitutionally
vague); Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969) ("crime against nature" held unconstitutionally vague, but "sodomy" held constitutionally permissible); Franklin v. State, 257
So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971) ("abominable and detestable crime against nature"). For a general
discussion of the question see Note, Sodomy Statutes: The Question of Constitutionality,
50 NEB. L. REV. 567, 568 (1971). While some sodomy statutes have been set aside for
unconstitutional vagueness, these holdings cannot be regarded as substantive victories
since state legislatures have been able to cure the constitutional infirmity merely by
explicitly describing the crime, as Virginia has done. See note 2 supra.
25 See discussion in note 88 infra.
" See State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (1975), rev 'd sub nom. State
v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976); Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d
368 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974); Connor v. State, 253 Ark. 854, 490 S.W.2d
114, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 991 (1973); People v. Baldwin, 37 Cal. App. 3d 385, 112
Cal. Rptr. 290 (1974); People v. Drolet, 30 Cal. App. 3d 207, 105 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1973) (an

DOE: THE RIGHT OF SEXUAL PRIVACY

The Griswold-Eisenstadt Principle Sustained
Despite its ultimate failure to penetrate the constitutional
armor which judicial interpretations of Griswold have erected
against challenges brought by unmarried persons, Eisenstadt has
been the critical factor in those few decisions which have declared
sodomy statutes invalid as against consenting adults. The value
of Eisenstadt lies in supplying a nexus arguably linking the interests of unmarried persons to the right of sexual privacy which
5 found for the marital relationship in
Cotner 7 and Buchanan"
Griswold. The absence of this nexus accounts for the fact that
prior to Eisenstadt no state or federal court extrapolated from
Griswold a generic right of sexual privacy for consenting adults.
Wrapped in Justice Douglas' "eulogy" of marriage, and further
confined by the specific restrictions laid down by other Justices
in concurring opinions,2 ' Griswold stoutly refused to yield until
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Eisenstadt, drew a
tenuous connection by means of his oft-quoted reference to an
"individual" right of privacy:
C.

If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.3

Using Eisenstadtto breach Griswold's hitherto impenetrable
wall, three state appellate courts have held that a right of sexual
privacy exists to shield the sexual conduct of unmarried consenting adults from state scrutiny. The Supreme Judicial Court of
unreported case from California, People v. Schwarz, Super. Ct. No. A-282165 (1973),
holding the California sodomy statute unconstitutional as applied to consenting adults,
was disapproved in People v. Drolet, supra; see 58 A.L.R.3d 640 n.7); State v. Enslin, 25
N.C. App. 662, 214 S.E.2d 318, appeal dismissed, 288 N.C. 245, 217 S.E.2d 669 (1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1492 (1976) (Enslin was convicted of oral sodomy with a young man
who, acting as a police undercover agent, invited and permitted the petitioner to perform
the act in the petitioner's bedroom); State v. Crouse, 22 N.C. App. 47, 205 S.E.2d 361
(1974); State v. Moles, 17 N.C. App. 664, 195 S.E.2d 352 (1973); Canfield v. State, 506
P.2d 987 (Okla. Crim. App.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 991 (1973); Cook v. State, 506
S.W.2d 955 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973); Lee v. State, 505 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974); Turner v. State, 497 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
v 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
2 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S.
989 (1971).
E.g., 381 U.S. 479, 495-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
405 U.S. at 453.
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Massachusetts was first in Commonwealth v. Balthazar.' Noting
the Supreme Court's "articulation of the constitutional right to
be free from governmental regulation of certain sex-related activities," the court concluded that the Massachusetts sodomy statute
"must be construed to be inapplicable to private, consensual conduct of adults." 32 The New Mexico Court of Appeals was next in
State v. Elliott,3 3 declaring the state sodomy statute facially void
as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Arizona Court of Appeals followed suit in State
v. Callaway,34 finding the state statute violative of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Of
these three decisions, only Balthazar can be relied upon as authority. The court of appeals' holding in Callaway was set aside
35
by the Arizona Supreme Court shortly before Doe was affirmed,
and Elliott has been reversed by the New Mexico Supreme
Court.3 6
31 318
32

N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974).

Id. at 481.

88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (N.M. App. 1975), rev'd, 551 P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976).
Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147, rev'd sub nom. State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107,
547 P.2d 6 (1976).
3 The Arizona Supreme Court held that "sexual activity between two consenting
adults in private is not a matter of concern for the State except insofar as the legislature
has acted to properly regulate the moral welfare of its people, and has specifically prohibited sodomy and other specified lewd and lascivious acts." 547 P.2d at 10. The court
further stated that "[t]he right of privacy is not unqualified and absolute and must be
considered in the light of important state interests," and that among those interests was
the state's concern "for the moral welfare of its people." Id. Justice Gordon said in dissent
that he would affirm Callaway and its companion case, State v. Bateman, "as they both
appear to be correct interpretations of the law as laid down by the United States Supreme
Court in this area." Id. at 11.
11 The opinion reversing Elliott was based primarily on the decision in Doe. The court
was careful, however, to point out that the parties in Elliott were not husband and wife,
and so avoided confronting the Griswold issue. 551 P.2d at 1353. In other case law development, two lower state courts have declared the New York sodomy statute unconstitutional, both holding on equal protection grounds. People v. Rice, 80 Misc. 2d 511, 363
N.Y.S.2d 484 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1975); People v. Johnson, 77 Misc. 2d 889, 355
N.Y.S.2d 266 (Buffalo City Ct. 1974). The Nevada Supreme Court has expressed grave
doubts about the constitutionality of its sodomy statute as applied to consenting adults.
Allan v. State, 541 P.2d 656 (Nev. 1975). A federal district judge in Pennsylvania has
strongly suggested that he may void that state's sodomy statute at the first opportunity.
United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974). And a federal district judge in Virginia has declared that
were a party with proper standing to bring the issue before him he would be compelled to
strike down the Virginia statute as an unconstitutional infringement on the right of privacy of unmarried adults. Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E. D. Va. 1973) (Merhige,
31 25
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Despite the tenuous beachheads established by these postEisenstadtcases, the overwhelming number of courts have agreed
with Lair that the mantle of constitutional protection does not
extend to the sexual conduct of unmarried persons. Of the 14 preEisenstadt decisions noted here, 7 not one stands as authority for
exempting unmarried persons from state sodomy laws. Of the 19
post-Eisenstadtdecisions, 8 all but six have affirmatively rejected
arguments that these statutes are unconstitutional;3 9 and in only
one instance - Commonwealth v. Balthazar4° - has a substantive challenge been sustained by a court with the ultimate authority to do so.' It was against this background that John Doe
and Richard Roe, two Virginia homosexuals, brought their action
for a declaratory judgment striking down the Virginia sodomy
statute in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.
II. ANALYSIS OF Doe
The choice presented to the Supreme Court in Doe could not
have been more sharply defined. The appellants had moved for a
declaratory judgment striking down the Virginia sodomy statute
on the grounds it was a denial of equal protection and an unconstitutional deprivation of their rights of privacy, freedom of association, and freedom of expression. Apart from the fact the appellants were homosexuals, the issue was uncluttered by any contextual problems. The great bulk of prior case law sustained the
validity of statutes like Virginia's, but a handful of carefully reasoned cases holding to the contrary was also available for the
Court's consideration.
J.), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 62 through 70 infra.
.Judge Merhige was a member of the three-judge court convened to hear Doe, and wrote a
dissenting opinion in that case. 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
:1 See authorities cited note 18 supra.
' See authorities cited notes 26, 31, 33, and 36 supra.
Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aft'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.
1976); United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974); Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478
(Mass. 1974); State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (N.M. App. 1975), rev'd, 551
P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976); People v. Rice, 80 Misc. 2d 511, 363 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Dist. Ct.
Suffolk County 1975); People v. Johnson, 77 Misc. 2d 889, 355 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Buffalo City
Ct. 1974).
40 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974).
" For a discussion of sodomy statutes overturned on grounds of unconstitutional
vagueness, see note 24 supra.
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In electing to affirm the lower court's decision without comment, the Supreme Court raised grave doubts about the scope of
a constitutional right of privacy, and-perhaps deliberately-left
doctrinal matters in this area in a state of profound uncertainty.
The purpose here is to reduce the uncertainty created by the
Court's silence, if such is possible, and to work toward some understanding of Doe as a matter of constitutional law. To do this
it is necessary to frame the constitutional doctrines within which
the Court made its decision. As will be seen, the Court was in the
convenient position of being able to draw both on its own decisions and those of other courts to support polar opposite conclusions. Griswold and its progeny cut like a two-edged sword across
the sodomy issue. The division among lower courts following
Eisenstadt provided an ample supply of analytical models which
would have enabled the Court to reach a principled decision in
either direction.
One model available for the Court's adoption was the opinion
of the three-judge court in Doe.42 A second, composite model was
provided by one federal and two state appellate court decisions
which used Griswold as a springboard for extending a constitutionally protected right of sexual privacy to all consenting
adults. 3 When the Supreme Court's affirmance in Doe is measured against the doctrinal formulations reached in these three
cases, the contrast provides some rough conclusions as to the
long-term significance of Doe.
When the New Mexico Court of Appeals handed down State
v. Elliott" in July 1975, it became the nation's first state appellate court to hold a sodomy statute unconstitutional on the authority of Griswold and Eisenstadt." Massachusetts had ex403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976).
Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.
1976); State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147, rev'd sub nom. State v.
Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976); State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207
(N.M. App. 1975), rev'd, 551 P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976). The value of Elliott and Callaway
as models of analysis is greatly diminished by the fact that each decision has been reversed
by its respective supreme court. Despite their weakness as authority, the appeals courts'
opinions in these two cases are nevertheless worthy analyses of the constitutionality of
sodomy statutes.
" 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (N.M. App. 1975), rev'd 551 P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976)
[hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as Elliott].
,1 See, however, discussion in note 24 supra regarding statutes overturned for unconstitutional vagueness.
2
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empted consenting adults from its sodomy statute 8 months earlier, citing in a footnote a number of federal court decisions on
the right of privacy;4" but Elliott was the first decision to articulate a chain of reasoning which led systematically from Griswold
to a holding that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to
consenting adults. Elliott is not an impeccably constructed decision, but it does map out one doctrinal scheme-in this case, an
equal protection argument-which a court could follow to hold a
sodomy statute in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
The court in Elliott began its analysis by citing Griswold for
the proposition that
[tioday . . .our law recognizes a constitutionally-protected right
to marital privacy. This right lies within the zone of privacy created
by constitutional guarantees in the First, Fourth and Fifth
Amendments . . . . It is a right that is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" . . . .Roe v. Wade. 7

Having concluded that sexual privacy is a fundamental right of
married persons, the court then sought to extend that right to
unmarried persons. This in turn raised a conceptual problem
which could be solved only by bringing Eisenstadt within the
scope of the analysis. The difficulty faced by the court was that
Griswold rests on due process, while Eisenstadt was based on
equal protection. Some doctrinal basis-a connection more substantial than the mere fact that both cases overturned contraceptive statutes-had to be found to link the two decisions. The
nexus lay in Eisenstadt's crucial language asserting that "[i]f
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion ....
With unmarried persons thus brought within the reach of
Griswold, the final step was to determine whether the statute
" Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478, 481-82 n.2 (Mass. 1974). The cases

cited are: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132 n.10
(1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Cotner v.
Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363
F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973); aff'd; 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976); Buchanan v. Batchelor,
308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated sub non. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989
(1971).
88 N.M. at 193, 539 P.2d at 213.
4 405 U.S. at 453. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
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discriminated invidiously against this class of persons. The court
concluded:
To allow the Legislature to regulate sexual practices between
unmarried consenting adults, but not between married persons,
would be to deny equal protection of the laws to the former, contrary
to the Fourteenth Amendment. Eisenstadt v. Baird."'

The appeals court buttressed its position by citing Ravin v.
State, 0 a 1975 decision by the Alaska Supreme Court declaring
that a statute prohibiting the possession and use of marijuana in
the home unconstitutionally violated individual rights of privacy
under the United States and Alaskan Constitutions. Borrowing
from Ravin the general proposition that a state's police power is
limited to matters where individual conduct substantially affects
the public at large, the court declared that the New Mexico statute invades constitutionally protected rights and "cannot be validated simply by a showing that it accomplishes a purpose that is
within the police power of the State."'"
The result reached in Elliott was duplicated 4 months later
in State v. Callaway,52 when the Arizona Court of Appeals held
that state's sodomy statute unconstitutional on substantive due
process grounds. Citing Griswold as the constitutional wellspring
for a right of sexual privacy, the court criticized four preEisenstadt decisions5 3 for having "inaccurately" interpreted
Griswold as being limited strictly to "a 'eulogy' of the marital
relationship."" While other courts had assumed from Griswold
," 88 N.M. at 193, 539 P.2d at 213.
537 P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975).
1188 N.M. at 194, 539 P.2d at 214. The New Mexico court did not pause to consider
whether the state might have been able to justify the invidious discrimination by demonstrating a compelling state interest in regulating sexual conduct. In fact the state never
had an opportunity to argue the constitutionality of the sodomy statute. The defendant
had been acquitted below, and the state had taken an appeal on the factual issue of
consent. No constitutional issues were raised before the trial or appellate courts. In its
apparent eagerness to void the New Mexico statute, however, the court of appeals found
that the case "nonetheless provides a proper forum for this Court to decide whether the
sodomy statute invades the constitutional rights of consenting adults." Id. at 210.
S2 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (1975), rev 'd sub nom. State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz.
107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976) [hereinafter cited in text and footnotes as Callaway].
3 Dixon v. State, 256 Ind. 266, 268 N.E.2d 84 (1971); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App.
497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); Washington v. Rodriguez, 82 N.M.
App. 428, 483 P.2d 309 (1971); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970),
appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971).
- 542 P.2d at 1150.
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that "the right of privacy inhered in the marriage relationship
alone," the Arizona court reasoned that Eisenstadt had clearly
"extended the right of privacy under Griswold far beyond the
narrow view" 55 which those courts had erroneously taken. Citing
Justice Brennan's oft-quoted reference to "the individual" in
Eisenstadt," the court concluded that "[tihis language makes it
clear that the right of privacy is a right of all persons, whether
married or not."57 In view of the right of privacy which Griswold
and Eisenstadt jointly extend,
no sound argument can be made that the right of privacy in sexual
conduct between consenting adults is "fundamental" only when the
consenting adults are married to each other. The right of privacy is
deemed fundamental because it is basic to the concept of the individual in our American culture and because it is a necessary prerequisite to the effective enjoyment of all our other fundamental
rights. As Eisenstadt and its progeny have recognized, these reasons
are wholly unrelated to the existence vel non of a marriage relationship. We hold accordingly that the right of sexual privacy between
consenting adults is fundamental.-

At this juncture, having established sexual privacy as a constitutionally guaranteed right of all consenting adults, the court
utilized language from Roe v. Wade to set up a strict scrutiny test
against which to measure the state's interest in regulating sexual
conduct:
"Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has
held that regulations limiting these rights may be justified only by
a 'compelling state interest'...

The Arizona court states that it has
"looked in vain" for a compelling state interest . . . . We have
found none and can conceive of none. . . .We therefore hold that
the subject statutes are void as violative of the constitutional right
of privacy."0

In conclusion the court notes that Elliott "provides an alternative
ground for our decision,""' and that it also could have struck down
the sodomy proscription as a violation of equal protection.
55 Id.

See text accompanying note 30 supra.
542 P.2d at 1151.
58Id.
542 P.2d at 1151, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155.
542 P.2d at 1151 (citation omitted).
11

17

61 Id.
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Elliott and Callaway were strongly influenced by a 1973 opinion handed down by Judge Robert R. Merhige of the Eastern
2 Judge Merhige conDistrict of Virginia. In Lovisi v. Slayton,"
cluded that the Virginia sodomy statute was unconstitutional as
applied to consenting adults acting in private, and declared that
he would so rule should the issue ever come before him in a
justiciable posture.6 3 That opportunity arrived two years later
with Doe, where Merhige vigorously dissented from the majority
opinion of the three-judge court.64 Lovisi of course had no effect
on the Virginia statute, and is now valuable chiefly as the most
sophisticated judicial expression to date of the GriswoldEisenstadt line of attack on state sodomy laws.
Lovisi follows a pure due process line of reasoning. This is
clear from the court's lengthy ruminations on the origins of substantive due process, in which it rejected the theory that newly
created rights must derive from a specific constitutional provision, and adopted instead
the candid approach of Roe v. Wade . . .and of Mr. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut. . . that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides substantive protection for fundamental values "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." 5

Having carefully set out the constitutional principle by which it
would analyze the question, the court proceeded to lay the foundation for holding that all consenting adults enjoy a substantive
right of sexual privacy under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Griswold, Judge Merhige reasoned, unequivocally extended
the right of privacy to sexual relations between husband and wife.
While Merhige conceded that Griswold's authority may be limited to the marital bedroom, he further argued that Eisenstadt
" 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter
cited in text and footnotes as Lovisij.
11 Id. at 625. In Lovisi a married couple sought relief through habeas corpus from their
convictions under the Virginia sodomy statute, a class 6 felony. See note 2 supra. The
court stated that absolute privacy was a prerequisite to asserting any right to consensual
sodomy. The defendants waived their right of privacy, the court held, by permitting third
persons to witness the sodomy, either in person or by photographs. Therefore the defendants had no standing to challenge the statute.
" 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting).
363 F. Supp. at 624.
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can only be construed as "extending the rationale of Griswold""6
to unmarried persons. Moreover, Eisenstadt "casts doubt upon
the viability of the marital-nonmarital distinction" because in
Eisenstadt the Supreme Court "declined to restrict the right of
privacy in sexual matters to married couples.""7 The court quoted
5 as proof of this
Justice Brennan's famous language in Eisenstadt"
proposition, and of what it concluded to be the indisputable fact
that Eisenstadt is in a direct line of descent from Griswold.
Summing up the result of its substantive due process reasoning, the court concluded that
the rationale expressed in Eisenstadtextends to protect the manner
of sexual relations between unmarried persons. It is not marriage
vows which make intimate and highly personal the sexual behavior
of human beings. It is, instead, the nature of sexuality itself or
something intensely private to the individual that calls forth constitutional protection. While the condition of marriage would doubtless make more difficult an attempt by government to justify an
intrusion upon sexual behavior, this condition is not a prerequisite
to the operation of the right of privacy. Accordingly, the statute also
poses a threat to the right of privacy possessed by consenting
adults."

Having found that a fundamental right was at stake, and that the
statute threatened an invasion of that right, the court declared
that the statute could be sustained only if the state's interest
outweighed that of the individual. The ultimate issue was framed
as "whether a compelling state interest underlies and justifies"70
the Virginia sodomy statute.
11Id. at 625.
67 Id.
" See

text accompanying note 30 supra. This passage from Eisenstadt is unfailingly
set forth in any decision which attempts to draw a connection between the rights of
privacy of married and unmarried people. The reasons for its popularity are quite apparent: (1) It contains the only reference to Griswold in the entire majority opinion; and (2)

itis the only point in Eisenstadt where the decision shifts briefly from an equal protection
to a due process basis. Apart from the fact that Griswold and Eisenstadt both struck down
contraceptive statutes, they are essentially two very different expressions of constitutional
law. Some courts have seized upon the doctrinal difference as a basis for not extending a
right of sexual privacy to unmarried persons. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
11 363 F. Supp. at 625.
10Id. Unfortunately the court never answered its own question. Instead, having sharpened the constitutional issue to a fine point, the court declared that the facts of the instant
case relieved it of any duty to make the determination of constitutionality. By way of
explanation, the court reiterated its earlier conclusion that the defendants lacked standing
to challenge the statute. See note 63 supra.
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Elliott, Callaway, Lovisi, and a handfull of other decisions7'
provided the Supreme Court with analytical models that, despite
their imperfections, illustrated a line of principled reasoning
which led plausibly from Griswold to a conclusion that all forms
of private sexual conduct by consenting adults enjoyed constitutional protection. Equal protection and substantive due process
both appeared to be useful approaches by which to analyze the
constitutional issue.72 Overpowering these few decisions, however,
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Lovisi, coupled with the three-judge court's opinion
in Doe and the Supreme Court's affirmance of that decision, has left the constitutionality
of the Virginia sodomy statute in a state of no little confusion. In Doe, the three-judge
court specifically declared that the Virginia statute was constitutional "on its face and in
the circumstances here": That is, the statute was constitutional as applied to "any person," see note 2 supra, whether that person be homosexual or heterosexual, married or
unmarried, and that it was constitutional as applied specifically to homosexual conduct.
403 F. Supp. at 1200. That the court was condemning all sodomy would appear from the
fact that it made no attempt either to exempt married couples or to narrow the statute's
application to homosexuals. Moreover, the court specifically referred to the facts in Lovisi
as "just such a sexual orgy as the statute was evidently intended to punish." 403 F. Supp.
at 1202. Lovisi had involved heterosexual conduct and had directly raised the issue of
marital privacy.
In sustaining the Lovisis' conviction, however, the Fourth Circuit adopted the trial
judge's argument that the Lovisis had "waived" their right of marital privacy by permitting a third person to witness the act. Chief Judge Haynsworth, writing for the majority,
stated that married persons "possess the freedom to follow their own inclinations in
privacy, but once they accept onlookers" the couple may not exclude a state as a "constitutionally forbidden intruder." 539 F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court's
alfirmance in Doe, Haynsworth added, "reinforces our conclusion that the oral sexual
activity of the Lovisis in the presence of. . . was not within the area of the constitution's
protection." Id. at 352. In adopting Judge Merhige's reasoning insofar as it applied to the
Lovisis, a married couple, the court impliedly held that a right of sexual privacy does
inhere in the marital relationship, and that the Virginia statute is unconstitutional as
applied to consenting married adults. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit rejected
Judge Merhige's dictum that a fundamental right of sexual privacy exists for all consenting adults, and that the right applies indiscriminately unless it is waived by permitting
others to view the act.
The three-judge court's holding in Doe and the Fourth Circuit's holding in Lovisi
cannot be adequately reconciled, despite Haynsworth's assertion that Doe was limited to
"homosexual acts." It would appear, however, that the Fourth Circuit has concluded the
Virginia sodomy statute is unconstitutional as applied to consenting married adults acting
in private, and will so hold if the issue is ever raised properly before the court.
11See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 491 F.2d 751
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974); People v. Rice, 80 Misc. 2d 511, 363
N.Y.S.2d 484 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1975); People v. Johnson, 77 Misc. 2d 889, 355
N.Y.S.2d 266 (Buffalo City Ct. 1974).
11For further discussion of the Griswold-Eisenstadt line of reasoning see Comment,
Oral Copulation: A Constitutional Curtain Must Be Drawn, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 523
(1974).
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was the great weight of cases which had declined to recognize
Eisenstadt as a conduit linking unmarried persons to a right of
privacy in sexual matters. Lair v. State73 was the strongest example of judicial refusal to extend Griswold. The analysis which
demanded the Court's primary attention, of course, was the lower
court's opinion in Doe holding that the Virginia sodomy statute
was constitutional on its face and as applied to private, consen74
sual homosexual acts.
The district court set out five basic reasons for sustaining the
constitutionality of the Virginia statute in Doe: First, Griswold
and other precedents cited by the plaintiffs rest exclusively on the
precept that the Constitution condemns legislation which "trespasses upon the privacy of the incidents of marriage, upon the
sanctity of the home, or upon the nurture of family life; '75 homosexuality, however, does not lie within the scope of the marital
interest in privacy; second, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature in matters concerning "the promotion of morality and decency; 76 third, assuming that the state
has the burden of proving that it has a "legitimate interest in the
subject of the statute or that the statute is rationally supportable,
Virginia has completely fulfilled that obligation;"" fourth, the
state is not required to show that homosexuality actually encourages delinquency, and "[i]t is enough for upholding the legislation to establish that the conduct is likely to end in a contribution
73 62

N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973).
11While homosexuals are often the real target of state sodomy laws, in no case has a
distinction between homosexual and heterosexual conduct loomed as the determinative
factor in a court's decision. Nor is there any reported decision voiding a sodomy statute
on the basis of selective enforcement against homosexuals. The majority opinion of the
three-judge court in Doe consistently refers to the state's interest in punishing homosexuality, but the court deftly avoids making the homosexual-heterosexual distinction the
pivotal point of analysis. See discussion in note 70 supra.
For a discussion of other legal problems encountered by homosexuals see Willick,
Social Class As a FactorAffecting Judicial Disposition: Defendants Charged with Criminal Homosexual Acts, 13 CRIMINOLOGY 57 (1975); Note, Security Clearances for
Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403 (1973); Comment, Government Employment and the
Homosexual, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 303 (1970).
" 403 F. Supp. at 1200. The plaintiffs had relied heavily on Eisenstadt and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in their arguments to the court. See Opening Brief for Plaintiffs at 4, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney. Eisenstadt and Roe, however, go unmentioned in the court's opinion.
11 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
77 Id.
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to moral delinquency;"7 and fifth, Virginia's sodomy statute is
not an "upstart notion;" it can be traced to the Virginia Code of
1792, and has "ancestry going back to the Judaic and Christian
law."7"
As an example of constitutional analysis the lower court's
opinion in Doe cannot command great respect. It is riddled by
three major weaknesses. First, its selection of the "rational basis"
test to measure the constitutionality of the Virginia statute is
highly debatable, if not clearly untenable. It has been well established since the principle was first enunciated in United States
v. CaroleneProducts Co.sa that statutory schemes which impinge
on individual interests and liberties will be subject to a stricter
standard of review than the "rational basis" test traditionally
applied to economic legislation. The power to regulate does not
mandate any legislation merely because it is aimed toward a
constitutionally permissible goal; thus while regulation of sexual
conduct arguably lies within the scope of a state's police power
that fact alone does not legitimate a court's use of the "rational
basis" test where something more than an economic right is at
stake-in this instance, an adult's desire to perform a victimless
act in private. That desire may or may not amount to a "fundamental" human right. In any event the deprivation cannot be
sustained by anything less than a colorable showing on the
state's part that it has a legitimate interest in denying that desire.
"Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal lib'A Id.

7'Id. In support of the ancient religious origins of sodomy laws, the court quoted
Leviticus 18:22: "'Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is
abomination.'" Again, 20:13: "'If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman,
both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their
blood shall be upon them.' "Id. at 1202 n.2. The plaintiffs argued to the three-judge court
that the Virginia sodomy statute violated the establishment clause of the first amendment
in that it "serves no other purpose than to enforce the legacy of the Judeo-Christian ethic
viewing sodomy as a sin." Opening Brief for Plaintiffs at 12-13. The court ignored this
claim.
For two decisions where courts rejected arguments that proscriptions against sodomy
were specifically rooted in ancient Judaic and Christian laws, and that in perpetuating
this religious ethic sodomy statutes violated the establishment clause of the first amendment, see Connor v. State, 253 Ark. 854, 490 S.W.2d 114, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 991
(1973), and People v. Baldwin, 37 Cal. App. 3d 385, 112 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1974).
- 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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erty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling."'" By its failure to invoke a higher
standard of review the court effectively ignores the constitutional
question, demonstrating anew the potential tyranny of the "rational basis" test as a means by which a court can sustain legislation without undergoing the rigors of careful analysis.
The second major infirmity in the court's treatment of Doe
is its failure to deal with or even mention Eisenstadt and Roe v.
Wade,"2 decisions of unquestioned importance in the area of
constitutional privacy. The court offers not the slightest explanation for ignoring these vital precedents.
Finally, the opinion's chief weakness lies in its extraordinarily heavy reliance on dicta in Griswold and Poe v. Ullman 3 as
definitive statements of constitutional principles. The analysis of
Griswold as a potential wellspring of fundamental rights is limited to a quotation of Justice Douglas' so-called "eulogy of marriage. "84 Justice Harlan's lengthy dissent in Poe is quoted exhaustively for the proposition that homosexual conduct is not constitutionally protected. 5 These dicta are virtually the flesh and
blood of the court's decision, leaving one to search in vain for
some plausible analysis that would justify the result.
In sum, the court's cursory and superficial treatment of the
important constitutional question underlying Doe, coupled with
its wrongful application of the "rational basis" test and inexplicable indifference to Eisenstadt and Roe, combined to produce a
poorly reasoned and doctrinally inscrutable opinion. By contrast
6 squarely confronted the issues,
the court in Lair v. State"
examined the relevant precedents, and forthrightly set out its concluBates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (challenge to constitutionality
of Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptives dismissed for lack of justiciability).
" "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights ....
Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred." 381 U.S. at 486. The three-judge court also refers to, but does not quote,
Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold where he notes that a state may have an
interest in "the discouraging of extra-marital relations" and the regulation of "sexual
promiscuity or misconduct." 381 U.S. at 498, 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
- 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
- 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973).
"
.2
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sions of law. The opinion from the Eastern District of Virginia
merely increased what are already grave difficulties in evaluating
this area of constitutional tension.
CONCLUSION

In affirming Doe, the Supreme Court effectively rejected the
analytical models provided by Elliott, Lovisi, and Callaway, putting its imprimatur instead on a lower court opinion that cited
more dicta than doctrine and failed even to confront the constitutional issues involved. Doe now stands-at least insofar as its
result is concerned-as an approved gloss of the constitutional
question raised by state statutory proscriptions against private
sexual conduct of unmarried adults."7 And however shocking the
Court's decision may have been to the legal community, and to
Americans who had already taken a right of sexual privacy for
granted, it is utterly consistent with the great weight of decisions
by state and lower federal courts which have considered the same
issue.
What is the meaning of Doe? Despite the many fundamental
questions of constitutional law which the Supreme Court left
unanswered, its affirmance in Doe leads inescapably to five conclusions: First, Griswold is an insufficient doctrinal basis to support arguments for a substantive right of sexual privacy indiscriminately shielding the private acts of consenting adults from government scrutiny; second, the Burger Court is not prepared to
create, either by extending the rationale of Griswold or by use of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a per se
right of sexual privacy for consenting adults as distinguished from
a right of privacy which the Court has already conceded to exist
in certain matters surrounding the begetting of offspring;" third,

" Doe represented the first time the Supreme Court had been compelled to scrutinize
the constitutionality of a typical state sodomy statute since Eisenstadt. Consequently
much was at stake here, and presumably the parties spared no resources in preparing their
written submissions for the Court. Nevertheless, briefs filed with the Supreme Court in
Doe reflect little more than a careful distillation of those arguments that have previously
carried the day for their respective positions, and neither side added appreciably to the
body of constitutional theories that have developed around the sodomy question since
Eisenstadt. See Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement and Appellees' Motion to Dismiss,
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.
The Supreme Court recognized a constitutional "right to procreate" in Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). That a person has a fundamental, personal interest in
procreation or matters related to procreation has distinctly colored Supreme Court deci-

1976
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outside the context of state contraceptive laws, Eisenstadt is of
little or no doctrinal value as a nexus linking unmarried persons
to the right of privacy secured for the marital relationship in
Griswold; fourth, assuming that Griswold provides a total right
of sexual privacy for consenting married persons, as most courts
which have considered the question now concede, a state sodomy
statute which exempts married couples but subjects unmarried
persons to prosecution sets up a legitimate classification that does
not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; and finally, regulation of sodomy among consenting unmarried adults remains a legitimate exercise of a state's police
power to legislate for the maintenance of public morality, and the
Supreme Court will continue to defer to legislative judgments in
this area.
For every conclusion that reasonably can be extracted from
Doe, a more nagging question remains: Has a majority of the
Court decided to draw strict new limits around Griswold as a
constitutional source for a right of privacy in varying contexts,
thereby restricting Griswold's future power to sustain decisions
such as Roe v. Wade?"9 Is Eisenstadt forever confined to the narrow circumstances of discriminatory state contraceptive laws?
Has the Court elevated to the level of constitutional principle
Justice Goldberg's dictum in Griswold, wherein he spoke of the
state's power to regulate "sexual promiscuity,"90 and Justice
Harlan's dictum in Poe v. Ullman, wherein he inveighed against
"homosexuality" and other "intimacies which the law has always
sions involving individual sexual matters such as Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). It is precisely for this reason that the important Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Roe trilogy has often worked not to the benefit, but to the detriment, of parties
challenging the constitutionality of sodomy statutes. Central to these three cases is the
matter of begetting children. Arguments on the validity of sodomy statutes, on the other
hand, ask the court to endorse a person's interest in pure sexuality apart from the traditional aspects of procreation. The Court has shown its willingness to protect one interest,
but not the other.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), would appear to be a strong constitutional
source for arguments that consenting adults enjoy a fundamental right of sexual privacy.
But the Court has stoutly refused to use Stanley as a doctrinal springboard for reaching
new areas of constitutionally protected privacy, e.g., United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351
(1971); United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), and the decision continues
to languish within the narrow factual confines of the right to possess obscene material in
the home.
" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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forbidden"?"' Would the Court have held differently if the constitutional challenge in Doe had been brought by two heterosexuals,
married or unmarried, instead of two homosexuals?
Whatever the case, appeal to the Supreme Court is at present
not a viable course for unmarried persons who wish to challenge
the constitutionality of state sodomy statutes on the grounds they
invade a fundamental right of privacy, deny a due process right
to be let alone, or violate equal protection of the laws. To embark
on such litigation flies in the face of virtually all case history since
Griswold. And if one message rings clearly through the Supreme
Court's silence in Doe, it is that review of such statutes will remain foreclosed for at least the next several years. The real
battleground has now shifted to state courts and state assemblies,
where judges and legislators have the power to achieve, as a matter of state law, what Doe was unable to achieve as a matter of
92
constitutional law.

W. Cecil Jones
367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Conceivably Congress could exercise its still largely untested power under § 5 of
the fourteenth amendment to enact legislation establishing an indiscriminate right of
sexual privacy among consenting adults. This prospect, of course, is quite unlikely. See
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). But see Mitchell v. Oregon, 400 U.S. 112
(1970).
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Based upon his study under a commission from the Administrative Conference of the United States, Mason Willrich has written a scholarly and detailed evaluation of two disparate programs
of the federal government which respond to resource "shortage."
Petroleum and natural gas, which account for two-thirds of the
energy consumed in the United States, are subject to different
regulatory systems. The author attempts to define "shortage"
generically with respect to both systems as a "situation of diminishing energy supply or increasing demand in which government
action is deemed necessary in order to direct or control the distribution of available supplies by non-price methods."
But the stated definition breaks down in the distinction the
author draws between the shortage of natural gas and the supply
vulnerability of petroleum. In the final chapter, the natural gas
"shortage" is singled out for the specific recommendation that
Congress enact legislation to broaden federal authority to administer the natural gas shortage on a nationwide basis, and specifically to grant additional authority to the Federal Power Commission to allocate intrastate natural gas now exempt from regulation.
The petroleum "supply vulnerability" is seen only as a potential petroleum shortage, and Willrich believes it can be dealt
with by the Federal Energy Administration's present authority.
The study was confined to non-price aspects of shortage
administration, which means it deals mainly with curtailment
practices of the Federal Power Commission, and not its rate- and
price-fixing responsibilities. The Federal Energy Administration
has only allocative activities, so all its functioning areas are included. With respect to the excluded area, Willrich observes that
the price mechanism is a better allocator of energy supplies in the
long run than government programs, but he does not put his eggs
in that policy basket. He says that any government action consciously directed to the energy shortage problem will cause less
damage than doing nothing.
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The non-price constraint in the study is awkward. Beyond
that, additional discussion of the possibilities of integrating the
federal government's "shortage administration" activities involving petroleum and natural gas would be welcome. However, the
narrower focus which was adopted lays a good foundation for
comparing and contrasting the activities and methods of the Federal Power Commission and the Federal Energy Administration.
There is much material for students of administrative law and of
public administration: Independent regulatory agency versus single administrator agency; the adjudicative traditions of utility
regulation versus the less formal legislative-type hearings of an
allocating agency; and the merits and demerits of the procedural
protections of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The book is also a useful handbook for practitioners whose
interests are concentrated in one or the other of the administrative systems. Chapters two through four treat natural gas, including the structure of the industry, the jurisdiction and procedures
for natural gas curtailment, and its administrative development
and implementation. Chapters five through seven cover the same
general topics for the petroleum industry. There are introductory
and concluding chapters which concern energy shortages generally, constitutional authority, issues and options, and conclusions
and recommendations.
This reviewer's bias is based upon familiarity with the workings of the Federal Power Commission. That agency's system of
procedural safeguards seems superior to that available under the
administrative structure of the Federal Energy Administration.
The latter agency seems to have been largely unconstrained by
either substantive or procedural standards in its enabling statutes. Furthermore, the beginning of the system was founded upon
incomplete contingency planning; the promulgation of its rules
and regulations was dominated by the office of the General Counsel; and an ad hoc and anonymous group of "reg writers" (regulation drafters) played a significant policy-shaping role. The drafting of the statute was based upon the premise that only a shortterm emergency had to be dealt with. Judicial review was inconsistently assigned to a Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
and to district courts.
The workings of the Federal Power Commission are perhaps
not a model to be emulated, and certainly a statute almost 40
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years old is an imperfect instrument for the task assigned. But
fairness is one of those measures of administrative action-the
others are practicality and consistency with other policies-which
can be applied impartially. These standards don't dictate final
answers, but legislators and government policymakers should be
reminded of them from time to time.
The chapters dealing with energy shortage generally and generically make important contributions. Of particular interest is
the discussion of the administrative options among government
action to direct or control the distribution of energy supplies by
utilization of existing contractual arrangements, pro rata reductions, end-use priorities, and negotiated settlements.
The volume is easily read, and a considerable contribution
to thinking on an important subject.
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